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Abstract
This thesis investigates the key drivers of rural households’ choices of livelihoods,
and how these choices impact forest clearing and biodiversity conservation under a
landscape approach. Using a novel and unique database obtained from a face-to-face
survey with a representative sample of 1035 households in the Dja-Odzala-Minkébé
trinational transboundary conservation landscape (Tridom-TCL)- Congo basin , this
PhD thesis address three main questions investigated in three chapters. Using a
spatial probit model, the first chapter investigates “how do local and indigenous
households formulate their preferences among livelihoods strategies?” Using a spatial
lag model, the second chapter investigates “how and how much do these livelihoods
strategies, given wildlife constrains such as human-wildlife conflicts, impact small-
scale deforestation?” Using corner solution models, the third chapter investigates
"how the nature of the interactions among households and wildlife, the households’
main activities as well as their land holdings impact their willingness to pay to
prevent endangered forest elephant extinction?”
Among other, we find that livelihoods strategies are determined by autochthonous
status, financial assets (money transfer and access to loan), distance to market and
larger crop losses resulting from human-wildlife conflicts. Further, we show that
livelihoods strategies are important for deforestation. Therefore, the commitments to
reducing small-scale deforestation may be favored by a good consideration of factors
that drive households’ livelihoods strategies. We find out that spatial issues seem to
be important. Proximity among households yields spatial shift effects and spatial
spillover effects that are likely to amplify small-scale deforestation.
We also argue that, cross-cutting solutions towards a sustainable landscape
considering these three crucial issues involve optimizing trade-off between households’
livelihoods strategies, forest and the natural habitats of fauna. Therefore, the issues
of community land security, of where natural habitat is needed and of how it should
be managed are at the core of the problem. For example, decision-makers should
proceed with the integration of large mammals mobility corridors far away from the
community settlements in order to enhance zero-conflict-oriented elephant habitats;
corridors should be consistently placed relatively to high elephant-concentration
zones without crossing into zones with denser human populations.
Keywords : Households’ livelihoods strategies, Deforestation, Human-wildlife
conflict, Endangered forest elephant conservation, Landscape, Spatial Econometrics
JEL Codes: C11 & 21 & 23 & 24 & 25 & 31; D12; Q12 & 24 & 23 & 29 & 57; R14.
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Résumé
Cette thèse examine les principaux déterminants des stratégies de subsistance des
ménages ruraux. Elle cherche à comprendre comment ces stratégies impactent la
déforestation à petite échelle et la conservation de la biodiversité suivant une approche
paysagère. A partir d’une base de données uniques obtenues grâce à une enquête en
face-à-face auprès d’un échantillon représentatif de 1035 ménages dans le paysage
transfrontalier de conservation du Trinational Dja-Odzala-Minkébé (Tridom-TCL)-
Bassin du Congo, cette thèse vise à répondre à trois questions et s’organise en trois
chapitres. Le premier chapitre analyse "comment les ménages autochtones et locaux
formulent leurs préférences parmi les stratégies et moyens d’existence” à l’aide d’un
model Probit autorégressif spatial. Le deuxième chapitre examine "comment et à
quelle amplitude ces stratégies impactent la déforestation à petite échelle" à l’aide
d’un modèle de décalage spatial. Compte tenu de la nature des interactions entre les
ménages et de la faune, de leurs principales activités, le troisième chapitre examine
"les préférences des ménages pour la conservation des éléphants de forêt” à l’aide des
modèles à variable qualitatives limitées.
Les actifs financiers (transfert d’argent et emprunts), la distance au marché, les
dommages résultant des conflits homme-éléphant et l’ethnicité, plus précisément,
l’autochtonie comptent parmi les facteurs déterminants des choix de stratégies de
subsistance des ménages ruraux dans le Tridom-TCL. Nous montrons en outre que
l’intensité de déforestation des ménages varie significativement en fonction de ces
stratégies de subsistance. Par conséquent, les engagements en faveur de la réduction
de la déforestation peuvent être favorisés par une bonne prise en compte des facteurs
qui gouvernent les choix des modes de subsistance opérés par les ménages. Ils peuvent
également être favorisés par la prise en compte les interactions entre ménages ainsi
que leur localisation dans le paysage. En effet, nous trouvons qu’il existe des effets
d’imitation, dans la décision de déforestation, entre les ménages d’un même voisinage,
avec des effets spatiaux indirects susceptibles d’amplifier la déforestation à petite
échelle.
Les solutions transversales, aux trois questions abordées dans cette thèse, en faveur
d’un paysage durable devraient viser l’optimisation des compromis entre les stratégies
de subsistance des ménages, les forêts et/ou les habitats naturels de la faune. Les
décideurs devraient, par exemple, procéder à l’intégration des corridors de mobilité de
grands mammifères dont les éléphants de forêt, dans des zones à forte concentration
de la faune et loin des espaces communautaires afin de réduire le risque de conflits
hommes-faune.
Mots Clés : Strategies de subsistance des ménages, Déforestation, Conflits
homme-faune, Conservation des éléphants de forêt, Paysage, Econometrie spatiale
JEL Codes: C11 & 21 & 23 & 24 & 25 & 31; D12; Q12 & 24 & 23 & 29 & 57; R14.
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General Introduction
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2
Background and issues
In tropical forested landscapes, agricultural expansion for livelihoods (Deakin et al.,
2016; Laurance et al., 2014) and trade (Leblois et al., 2016) have transformed and
fragmented forest habitats at alarming rates. It has proximately driven around 80
percent of deforestation worldwide (Gibbs et al., 2010; KissinGer et Herold, 2012),
contributing for 10 to 12 percent of the total global annual anthropogenic emissions
of GHGs (Verchot, 2014; Pachauri et Reisinger, 2008). As a result, the destruction
of large-scale natural habitats has led to the endangering of multiple biodiversity
species, while the ability of ecosystems to provide some services also depends both
on the number and type of species (Tilman et al., 2002, 2001). There is a significant
regional variation among the responsibility of commercial agriculture and subsistence
farming. Commercial agriculture accounts for almost 70 percent of deforestation
in Latin America, while, in tropical Africa, forest land conversion for small-scale
agriculture is known as one of the main drivers (FAO, 2016; Hosonuma et al., 2012).
In 2005, Africa showed a continued net loss of forest area with 21.4 percent, compared
to 23.6 percent in 1990 and small farming has been responsible for more than 50
percent of this forest loss (Delacote, 2012). Particularly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
many people are poor, rural households adopt low-risk, immediate and low-return
agricultural and other income-generating strategies (FAO, 2015). In the same vein,
when property rights are insecure, deforestation can be seen as a risk management
strategy (Araujo et al., 2009). Small-scale agriculture is relatively inefficient, since it
is based on obsolete agricultural technologies resulting to large yield gaps compared
to potential agricultural production (Masters et al., 2013; Laurance et al., 2014).
Environmental resources are important to millions of poor households in developing
countries (Angelsen, 2011). As pointed out by Ellis (2000b); Scoones (1998), rural
households develop further livelihoods strategies, beside agriculture, including forest
resource extraction, hunting bushmeat and/or mixing among them. In many places
in the developing world, rural households adopt various sets of livelihood strategies
(Delacote, 2009). Some of them specialize in one activity, while others tend to
diversify their activities portfolios. Motivations behind these choices can depend
on households’ characteristics (education, productivity, etc.), on the economic and
environmental context (access to markets, access to land, quality of environmental
resources, etc.) and on preferences (profit-maximizing or safety-first approaches,
etc.). Unsustainable harvesting of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) observed
in these countries can lead to forest degradation (Belcher et Schreckenberg, 2007;
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Hosonuma et al., 2012; KissinGer et Herold, 2012). Together with agriculture, this
can reduce the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and services (Tilman et al.,
2002).
In these conditions, there are strong interconnections among, (1) socioeconomic
issues including households’ livelihoods as well as rural development, (2) forest cover
and (3) biodiversity and environmental issues into a whole system.
A broad range of literature has investigated the issue of livelihoods and deforestation
(Babigumira et al., 2014; Belcher et al., 2015; Vedeld et al., 2007; Wunder et al.,
2014), the issue of small scale farming and deforestation (Angelsen, 1995; Angelsen
et Wunder, 2003) and the issue of deforestation and biodiversity conservation (Amin
et al., 2014; Pfaff et al., 2015), targeting poverty reduction mainly at the national and
global level. These studies did not explicitly address these issues as interconnected,
while issue-specific solutions would lead to adverse effects among these components of
the landscape and contribute to worsen rather than to improve the system (Holmgren,
2013). This is especially true in situation with competing and often contradictory
uses among forest, biodiversity and productive land-uses.
For instance ignoring human-wildlife conflicts when pursuing compatibility between
households’ livelihood strategies and less deforestation would undoubtedly worsen the
perception of wildlife conservation by households. In the meantime, some wild species
have became endangered species. For instance, loxodonta africana cyclotis (forest
elephants) has been subject to a devastating decline during the last two decades
(Maisels et al., 2013; Blake et al., 2007). Also, disregarding the issue of biodiversity
conservation would contribute to a weakening of the rural livelihoods system and the
forest ecosystem as well. As an example, the forest elephant, as a flagship species,
contributes to ecological, cultural and socio-economic equilibria (Blake et al., 2009).
It contributes to indigenous people’s cultural and spiritual enrichment in tropical
Africa (Lewis, 2002; Kent, 1996). (2) It is considered as a tree planter, disseminating
seeds of some species over long distances (Blake et al., 2009; Wang, 2008; Beaune
et al., 2013). (3) It also make some fleshy fruit like Baillonella toxisperma (moabi)
available for rural communities’ livelihoods.
In view of the foregoing considerations, there is a need to build diagnostics and
research in order to guide decision-makers to adopt cross-cutting solutions towards
sustainable development combining different transmission channels such as sustain-
able livelihoods, biodiversity conservation issues and forest restoration. This thesis
thus seeks to answer the following question : what are the key drivers of rural house-
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holds livelihoods, and how do those choices impact forest clearing and biodiversity
conservation?
This question can give rise to several side issues. Yet, this thesis considers three
crucial questions that comply with rural households’ behavior in a landscape: (1) How
do local and indigenous households formulate their preferences among livelihoods
strategies? (2) How and how much do the different livelihoods strategies developed
by households, given wildlife constrains such as human-wildlife conflict impact small-
scale deforestation? And finally, (3) given the nature of interaction among households
and wildlife, given their main activities and their land holding, how much are local
households willing to pay to prevent endangered forest elephant extinction?
The aim of this work is to investigate interactions among households’ livelihoods
strategies, their ecological footprint in terms of deforestation and their sensitivity
to biodiversity conservation using our recent household’s survey in the Dja-Odzala-
Minkébé trinational conservation landscape (Tridom-TCL) - Congo Basin. The
main interest is to improve an integrative perspective of the governance of this
multifunctional landscape.
Conceptual and Theoretical Approaches
This thesis adopts as main point of view, the landscape approach. It is a framework
for cross-cutting and combined solutions that help integrate agriculture and forestry
issues and reduces or even remove externalities among components (Holmgren, 2013).
The landscape approach helps to better understand and recognize the interconnections
between different land uses and different stakeholders by integrating them into a
joint management process (GLF, 2015). Following (Sayer et al., 2013), the landscape
approach is viewed in this thesis as a framework for convenient management of
forest land by local households to achieve (1) sustainable forest and non-forest-based
livelihoods, (2) spiritual and cultural enrichment of local and indigenous populations,
(3) sustainable forest-related businesses and (4) biodiversity conservation, inclusive
of the issue of endangered forest elephants. The landscape approach is consistent
with the framework proposed in the literature for analyzing households’ strategies,
deforestation and ecosystem services.
Our starting point to analyze livelihoods strategies is the sustainable livelihoods
framework. "A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for
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means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from
stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now
and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base" (DfID, 1999;
Chambers et Conway, 1992). According to Scoones (1998); Ellis (2000a); Jansen et al.
(2006); Soltani et al. (2012); DfID (1999), the ability to sustainably pursue different
livelihoods strategies relies on households specific assets, such as social, tangible,
intangible assets and geographical assets that people have in their possession.
Investigating the link between different livelihoods strategies developed by house-
holds and small-scale deforestation requires considering the framework for analyzing
deforestation developed by Angelsen et Kaimowitz (1999); Geist et Lambin (2002);
Combes et al. (2015). According to Angelsen et Kaimowitz (1999), when analyzing
households’ deforestation inputs, microeconomic models have to be considered with
a focus on immediate causes such as socioeconomic characteristics and decisions
parameters including income, given the livelihoods strategy, financial asset, to name
a few.
In order to investigate the sensitivity of rural households to the endangered forest
elephant conservation given the nature of interaction with wildlife, we use the
ecosystem services framework developed by MEA (2005) . This framework helped
to provide a synoptic description of the ecosystem services and the total economic
value of an environmental asset.
Finally, spatial interactions are among the crucial components of the landscape
approach. Neighborhood interactions should be considered when analyzing landscape.
Indeed, green spaces can contribute to the strengthening of the local social cohesion
(Felbinger et Jonuschat, 2006) which require considering the location of households.
Proximity among households may lead to social interactions and strengthen or worsen
their social cohesion. We rely on the strategic-interaction models and more precisely
on the spillover model and the resource flow model developed by Brueckner (2003) to
explicitly account for the effect of neighborhood interactions. According to Anselin
(2002), both models are suitable when a farmer would determine the amount of
farmland devoted to a crop by taking into account the amounts allocated by the
other farmers in the system. From the conceptual and the theoretical approches
presented above, we built a tentative framework, displayed in Figure 1, that should
be applied when investigating issues related to a multifunctional landscape.
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Figure 1: Tentative landscape approach for analyzing households’ livelihoods strate-
gies, deforestation and conservation in the Tridom-TCL
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The case study and households survey
The Dja-Odzala-Minkébé Trinational Landscap
The household’s survey was held in the Dja-Odzala-Minkébé transboundary conser-
vation landscape (Tridom-TCL). It is a cross-border conservation landscape covering
a geographical area of 191,541 km2, representing 7.5 percent of the total area of
the tropical forests in the Congo Basin of Central Africa. It was created in 2005 by
an agreement between Cameroon, Gabon and Congo governments called "Tridom
Agreement", as one of the twelve "priority landscapes" of the Congo Basin Forest
Partnership (CBFP)1. The management of the Tridom-TCL is entrusted to a Re-
1The Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) was launched as a multi-stakeholder partnership
(with 70 partners, including African countries, donor agencies and governments, international
organizations, NGOs, scientific institutions and the private sector) at the 2002 World Summit
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. It aims to enhance natural resource
management and improve the standard of living in the Congo Basin ( http://www.pfbc-cbfp.org/)
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gional Management Unit (RMU) with representative members in each of the three
countries. Each representative member manages the corresponding segment of the
landscape according to the national law. The RMU is prepared to act beyond national
borders with the following missions: (1) sustainable management of transboundary
biodiversity in the inter-zone, (2) maintaining the ecological, economic and social
connectivity of the complex, (3) ensuring long term conservation of its protected area
system and (4) fostering local development with reduced impact on environment.
The Tridom-TCL is located very close to the Equator, the climate is bimodal. There
are two seasons with less rainfall, around January and July, and two rainy seasons,
around October and April-May. It lies on a plateau at an altitude of 300 to 1,000
m above the see. In many places, especially in the regions of Minkébé in Gabon
and the Dja in Cameroon, the plateau is punctuated with inselbergs. Regarding
the hydrology, The Gabonese section is drained by the Ivindo, the Djidji and the
Langoué that are tributaries of the Ogooué; and by the Ntem. The Cameroonian
section is drained by the Ntem and more significantly the Dja and the Boumba,
tributaries of the Congo River. The Congolese section is drained by the Mambili
and pertains entirely to the basin of the Congo River (De Wachter et al., 2009).
The majority of the Landscape is covered with forests. The Tridom-TCL consists
of a network of 10 protected areas, namely, the Dja biosphere reserve, the Boumba-
Bek NP, the Nki and the Mengamé gorilla sanctuary (Republic of Cameroon), the
Odzala-Kokoua NP and the Lossi NP (Republic of Congo), the Minkébé NP, the
Ivindo NP, the Lopé NP and the Mwagne NP (Gabonese Republic). These protected
areas spread over 37,498 km2 and are connected by a wide inter-zone of more than
111, 000km2 with 40,000 km2 of thelivable area. The Tridom-TCL includes rich and
diversified flora and fauna and is abundant in highly commercial valuable timber
species. It houses the largest population of loxodonta africana cyclotis in the world,
with the highest density in the Minkébé National Park. It also has a relatively high
density of other large mammals, such as Gorilla gorilla gorilla (western lowland
gorilla), Syncerus caffer (buffaloes), Tragelaphus eurycerus (bongo) Manis gigantea
(giant pangolins) and Cephalophus (duikers), to name a few.
Households in the landscape
The inhabited inter-zone of the Tridom-TCL is home to indigenous and local people
who depend on slash and burn agriculture and forest-based activities. The human
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population density is between 1-7.9 inhabitants per km2 and is currently growing
due to resource exploitation Ngoufo et al. (2012). The Tridom-TCL hosts industrial
activities such as forest management units; industrial agriculture, safari hunting zones
and industrial mining. The landscape also include illegal logging of timber with high
commercial values, illegal mining and intensive poaching. From a quick look into our
data set, about 78 percent of the indigenous and local communities declare relying on
small-scale farming (40.9 percent), Cash-cropping (19.6 percent), Hunting-Gathering
bushmeat and NTFP (14.8 percent) as well as Traditional gold-mining (3 percent)
as predominant livelihoods activities with full-time employment.
In the Tridom-TCL, there is a competition for land among households. Land holding
is almost considered as an indicator of renown and honor. Thus, economic rationality
is not always the motive behind land clearing. After removal or selling the softwood
lumber in surrounding forests, all the remaining plants and material in the forest are
burnt and the land is used for extensive agricultural and cash-crop production with
very poor yield.
Regarding the interaction with wildlife, local households undergo many conflicts with
wildlife resulting in damage to their livelihoods. For instance, evidence from our
survey reports that about 28 percent of local households have been victim of crop
damage by forest elephants. These conficts may lead to a poor perception of forest
elephant conservation. Also, this may drive the involvement of local households to
the slaughtering of this iconic species.
Considering the above, the "Tridom agreement" is still far from meeting the intended
objectives stated in sub-section , contrariwise, the ongoing practices often contribute
to environmental degradation, increased deforestation, fragmentation and disintegra-
tion of the protected area network within the landscape. Hence the Tridom-TCL
is a prime example of a landscape that urgently needs research and evaluations for
cross-cutting solutions.
Households survey
There is a common understanding among scientists with regards to the lack of
reliable subnational and households-level data relating to households livelihoods,
deforestation and biodiversity conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ferretti-Gallon
et Busch, 2014; Palo, 1999; Geist et Lambin, 2002). This thesis was made possible
thanks to a novel and unique database that we gathered from the field to debar and
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Figure 2: Study area and location of households surveyed
overcome the lack of data. Because of administrative constraints and limited funding
for field work, the survey was conducted in the Cameroon and Gabon segments but
not in the Congo segment of the Tridom-TCL. These segments are inhabited by more
than 43 tribes which are dominated by the Bantu compared to indigenous Baka tribe
who is a minority group.
Sampling, survey design and implementation
The organisation and the realization of the survey were realised in a way to minimize
the survey implementation problems when measuring households livelihoods and
deforestation as advised by Angelsen (2011). (a) After defining the sample and
designing the questionnaires, (b) we recruited and adequately trained the enumerators.
(c) We did the questionnaire pre-test on the field, (d) we proceeded further to the
main survey. (e) We proceeded to data entry and finally we checked and used them
for analysis.
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This thesis uses data obtained from a representative face-to-face survey of a random,
stratified sample of 1035 households. The total number of households in the study
area is approximately 65,140 (Gabon, 2010; Bucrep, 2010). The statistical sample
size required at a confidence level of 95 percent with the typical value of 1.96 was 384.
We expanded the sample size to 1035 for two reasons. First, it was important to have
a statistically valid sub-sample’s size per sub-division to improve the accuracy of
analysis considering social interaction among households. Secondly, it is statistically
true that, the larger the sample size, the more representative is the sample. The
questionnaire was designed based on a literature review on the research issues.
The questionnaire was organized into sixteen topics, including, among others, the
drivers of households choices concerning land use, households use right and livelihoods
production, land use conflicto; the multi-functionality of the landscape, the contingent
valuation design as well as the cultural value and biodiversity conservation. The
questionnaire was checked by experts and researchers before pre-test and survey.
The questionnaires were prepared at the Laboratory of Forest Economics in Nancy,
and the field work preparation was done at the Central African hub of the Center
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in Yaounde, Cameroon.
To ensure high data quality, we organized five training seminars in Cameroon and five
training seminars in Gabon with 20 post-graduate students covering all the topics
addressed by the questionnaire. The training seminars included the use of GPS by a
GIS expert for successful geo-localization of all the households surveyed. At the end,
10 participants were selected to perform as enumerators under the supervision of the
PhD Candidate.
The survey started by two questionnaires pre-test with 40 households in four villages
from two different sub-divisions in Cameroun. The first pre-test was held in Eboman
and Endon villages in Oveng sub-division from December 20 to 24, 2013. This step
helped in redefining and controlling some indicators embedded in the questionnaire.
The second pre-test took place in the Kongo and Mbieleme villages in the Meyomessi
sub-division from January 26 to 29, 2014. This step helped further to check the
questionnaires’ validation.
The geographical coverage of the survey included 108 villages from all the 26 adminis-
tratives sub-divisions and districts of the Cameroonian and the Gabonese part of the
landscape (Figure 2). The villages were chosen so as to represent the sub-division.
In each sub-division, we chose one to three groups of villages geographically far apart
from each other. Each group was inclusive of two to four consecutive villages. All the
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villages were displayed in 42 geographical maps using ArcGIS before the beginning
of the field work to draw the route map of the whole survey.
Figure 3 presents an example of the a group of villages located in the Ngoyla-Mintom
forest (in Mintom sub-division, Cameroun). The survey was fielded over 8 months
between December 2013 and July 2014. The visited villages are spread over nearly
27,000 km2, which represent two third of the landscape’s livable inter-zone. The
random sampling of the households in the villages was based on the inhabitants’
registry held by the village chiefs. The interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours. The
survey was facilitated by introductory letters provided by the ministers of forest and
fauna of both countries. These letters helped legitimating access to reliable data.
Each village provided us with at least two local translators in case the household
heads could not communicate in French. Beside Household’s survey, numerous
interviews were held with the sub-prefects and the mayors of the 26 sub-divisions.
As regard the post-field work, 50 percent of the data entry was made in Cameroon by
six bachelor students and three master students. The remaining data entry was done
by the PhD Student. The whole dataset was verified questionnaire-by-questionnaire
and a part of the dataset was cleaned for the PhD dissertation. This final step
from data entry to data clearing lasted from September 2014 to April 2015. In
the next subsections, we present the measurement of the households’ livelihoods
and deforestation, and the measurement of their references for endangered forest
elephant.
Households’ Livelihoods measurement
In addition to the face to face survey, evening visits to various surveyed households
were conducted to quantify and measure daily, weekly and per annum livelihoods
production. The per annum value of livelihoods were derived in two ways. Some
well organized household’s heads have the habit of recording their daily, weekly and
per annum livelihoods statistics. We trusted and collected these statistics. This
information was cross-checked using our daily measurement. For the remaining
households, we considered the daily and weekly measurement which we realised
using contextual material. We extrapolated to obtain the per-annum livelihoods’
production according to the recall data they provided and the seasonality of each
species or product. The seasonality and the production irregularity of each species
was defined during the design of the questionnaire and was validated during the
pre-test steps. For instance, among the forest-based livelihoods, (1) Ricinodendron
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Figure 3: One of group of villages surveyed in Ngoyla-Mintom forest
Heudelotti is harvested every year for a two-month period, it is measured with
a five liters pail that weight 7.5kg, and a bag of 90kg is made of 12 pails. The
total value for two months were considered as the per annum value. (2) Likewise,
Irvingia gabonensis is harvested every year for a three-months period. Some products
are harvested during 12 months (Gnetum africanum, Piper nigrum, Afromomum
dalzeillii etc.) and other are harvested every year for two to three months periods
(Fungi, Corylus avellana, Garcinia cola, Monodora myristica etc.). Table A.2.1 in
appendix shows the measurement indicators for the 20 NTFP, including fuel wood
extraction that account among forest-based livelihoods. We also used a mechanical
dynamometer to weight bushmeat, crop (banana, casava, potato, vegetables etc.) and
cash crop (including rubber and cocoa) daily and weekly production. We used the
average local sales price to estimate the value for such livelihoods resulting from each
strategy. Indeed, price variation within rural area is normally too small (Angelsen et
Kaimowitz, 1999).
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Deforestation Measurement
Regarding deforestation measurement, households were asked to fill the information
about their land-holding in a table. After that, we randomly chose one plot among
the total plots declared by the household to visit. The visited plot was tracked with
a GPS to obtain the real area. A total of 3338 plots of land were declared by overall
sample, that is on average 3.2 plots held by each household. A total of 526 plots
were tracked with a GPS. The data declared were adjusted using the tracked data
to obtain the value used in this thesis. On average, the household’s head declared
holding 4.75 ha of forest. We found after correction a land holding of 4.41 ha. Table
1 displays additional descriptive statistics comparing both the declared and the
adjusted values of households deforestation.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Declared deforestation VS Ajusted value
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Percentiles
1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%
Deforestation declaration 4.76 5.39 0 64 0 0 0.5 1.55 3.34 6 10 14 23
Deforestation ajustement 4.42 5.24 0 56.24 0 0 0.4 1.36 2.88 5.59 9.67 12.99 23.71
Preferences for endangered forest elephant measurement
We used the contingent valuation (CV) technique to assess the preferences of house-
holds for endangered forest elephant conservation. We first described the socio-
economic and ecological attributes of the elephant, as well as the potential change
in socio-cultural services associated with the possible extinctions, given that forest
elephants are currently only present in the Congo Basin. Respondents were asked to
state their preferences for the entire bundle of services provided by forest elephants
because addressing services separately leads to double counting (Loomis et Larson,
1994; Bandara et Tisdell, 2003).
Next, we proposed the following hypothetical scenario, given that we are valuing a
non-market good without an implicit market. "Considering the trend towards the
extinction of forest elephants, if action is not taken quickly, this multiple-used iconic
species will disappear in the next few years. To stop this tendency towards extinction
and make the species more abundant, the Tridom-TCL Regional Project Management
Unit may develop a 10-year elephant conservation program that aims to seize weapons
currently used by poachers and to effectively fight cross-border poaching by (1) creating
joint checkpoints at the landscape scale and (2) recruiting more young people from
villages and involving them in a communication network to improve anti-poaching
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control strategies and prevent human-elephant conflicts". Then, each respondent
was asked whether he would be willing to contribute to the program by paying some
monthly amount if the Regional Management Unit were to demand financial support
from all the inhabitants of the village. The payment vehicle presented was direct
cash payment of secure funds that would be held by the Tridom program. This
means of payment is the most familiar, credible and feasible based on the economic
situation in the area.
We used both the closed-ended and open-ended elicitation format. We first apply the
closed-ended format, particularly, the Double-bounded dichotomous choice model
(DBDC) proposed by Hanemann (1985) and Carson (1985). This technique involves
asking the respondent whether he would be willing to pay an initial amount for
elephant conservation. A lower bid was presented to those with a negative answer
and a higher bid was presented to those with a positive answer. In the OE format,
respondents were asked to specify their WTP. To minimize "Yea-saying" and "Nay-
saying" bias2 as well as the starting point bias, (1) we asked each respondent to
consider their monthly income, their sources of income, and their usual monthly
expenditures, and (2) we asked each respondent to be realistic, making sure that
he/she could actually pay the stated monthly amount for the next 10 years before
answering. Furthermore, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of six
starting bids developed and validated during the pre-test steps. Finally, we asked
follow-up questions to examine the reasons for zero observations to be able to identify
protest bidders in the database before model estimation (Arrow et al., 1993).
A full description of this technique as well as the data are imbedded in the third
chapter. The following sub-section present our contributions and the organisation of
this thesis.
Contribution and thesis organisation
Our contribution is multiple. First, following the reasoning presented in section 1,
it provides a complete analysis of households behavior as regard to their livelihood
and environment. Indeed, we first consider the households’ livelihoods strategies
choice. Then we investigate how those livelihoods strategies influence their land-use
2Yea-sayers and Nay-sayers are respondents who try to please or to counter, respectively, the
interviewer without considering the specific amount they are asked about (Carson et Hamenann,
2005; Frew, 2010).
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decisions and deforestation, and thus their environmental impact. Finally, we adopt
the reversal analysis, i.e. how do they value wildlife conservation.
Our approach is essentially micro-econometric, with a strong emphasis on spatial
issues. Indeed, we showed earlier that spatial interactions are important to take
into account in our context of interest. Yet, the lack of reliable data prevent from
implementing such type of analysis. We present in this piece of work much evidence
that, indeed, it is essential to investigate spatial spillovers in order to fully understand
the environment-development nexus which rural households of developing countries
are confronted to.
This thesis is organized around three chapters.
(1) What drives livelihoods strategies in rural areas? Evidence from the
Tridom-TCL using Spatial Probit Analysis
The first chapter investigates the factors which drive the household’s livelihoods
strategies in rural regions, using a Spatial Probit Model. Very few scientific
studies have focused on the determinants of such choice in the Congo Basin.
More precisely, the role of human, financial, natural and location assets in
the portfolio choice is investigated. A unique dataset is used from our recent
survey with random and stratified 1035 households in 108 villages of the
Tridom-TCL to investigate household preferences between (1) specialization
and diversification strategies, (2) land-conversion and non-land-conversion
activities, and (3) between strategies relying on forest vs other strategies. The
Spatial Autoregressive Probit Model shows a significant similarities on the
likelihood of closer households to prefer a given livelihoods strategy. Beside
socioeconomic characteristics, the existence of human-wildlife conflict as well
as the indigenousness directly lead households heads to make the choice of
diversified strategies including activities related to land-conversion with some
significant spillover effects on the likelihood of neighboring households heads
to adopt the same strategies.
(2) Households livelihoods and deforestation in the Tridom-TCL : A
spatial analysis
This chapter aims to examine the determinants of household’ deforestation in
the Tridom-TCL. It investigates the role of household livelihoods strategies.
It also tests the effects of crop damage caused by elephant (human-elephant
conflict) in the households’ decision of deforestation, using a unique dataset
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gathered with 1035 households in the Tridom-TCL. The results of the spatial
autoregressive model state that: (1) households tend to imitate deforestation
decisions of their neighbors. (2) When account is taken of cash crops in a diver-
sification livelihoods strategy, households’ deforestation increases significantly
with a significant indirect impact on neighboring households’ deforestation. In
fact, a one-unit increase in the income of such households leads to six to sevent
times increases in households’ deforestation compared to other strategies. Also,
(3) the indirect effects of these choices on neighboring households’ deforestation
have almost the same magnitude as the direct impact sesulting from other
strategies. (4) In addition, there is no substitutability between leisure and work
in land use choices. Indeed, the Pygmies, who constitute the pincipale labor
with low cost, are employed in activities related to larger deforestation, while
household labor duration do not significantly drive households’ deforestation.
The share of household self-consumption is associated with a low deforestation,
therefore, a better integration of the market can lead to increased deforestation,
if practices remained unchanged.
(3) The value of endangered forest elephants to local communities in a
transboundary conservation landscape
The last chapter seeks to determine and characterize social and cultural prefer-
ences for the conservation of endangered forest elephants in the the landscape,
given the households activities. We combine double- bounded dichotomous
choice with open-ended elicitation formats to assess the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for EFE conservation. We find that local households are willing to
pay CFA 1,139.4 (e1.74) per month to prevent EFE extinction. This totals
CFA 753.9 million (e1.15 million) per year for all inhabitants. Indigenous-
ness positively influences the WTP for EFE conservation. Spatial data suggest
that local communities prefer that elephants remain far from their crops. The
existence of human-elephant conflicts has a neutral effect on preferences for
EFE conservation. Therefore, our study suggests that local communities would
engage in biodiversity preservation when the public benefits of conservation are
accompanied by private benefits, such as human-elephant conflict avoidance.
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Abstract
Very few scientific studies have focused on the determinants of households’ livelihoods
strategies in the Congo Basin. The aim of this paper is to understand which
factors drive the choice of portfolio activities in rural regions. More precisely,
the role of human, financial, natural and location assets in the portfolio choice is
investigated. A unique dataset is used from our recent survey with 1035 random
and stratified households in 108 villages of the Tridom landscape to investigate
household preferences between (1) specialization and diversification strategies, (2)
land-conversion and non-land-conversion activities, and (3) between strategies relying
on forest vs other strategies. Our results show significant similarities on the likelihood
of households living in the same neighborhood to prefer a given livelihoods strategy.
Beside socioeconomic characteristics, the existence of human-wildlife conflict, as
well as the indigenousness, directly lead household’s heads to make the choice of
diversified strategies, or to choose activities related to land-conversion. These choices
lead to some significant spillover effects on the likelihood of neighboring household’s
heads to adopt the same strategies.
keywords : Forest-based livelihoods, Agriculture and cash crop, Diversification
strategies, Deforestation, Spatial Spillover Effects, Spatial Autoregressive Probit.
JEL Codes: C11 & 21 & 25, D12; Q12 & 23
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1.1 Introduction
Most rural households in the Congo Basin rely primarily on small-scale agricultural
activities, harvesting and direct use of forest ecosystem goods and services for their
livelihoods1 including food security, fuelwood, water supply and primary healthcare
(Sonwa et al., 2009; Megevand, 2013; Verchot, 2014). In the Tri-National Dja-Odzala
Minkébé trinational conservation landscape (Tridom-TCL), approximately 78% of
indigenous and local communities declare slash and burn small-scale farming (40.9%),
cocoa and rubber or cash crop (19.6%), game hunting for bushmeat and NTFP
gathering of or (14.8%) as well as traditional gold mining (3%) as predominant
subsistence activities with a full time employment. A more detailed look of household
heads’ behavior in this landscape shows that an important share of household heads
develop survival strategies based on activities portfolios, mixing two or three of
above activities. Factors governing the decision to adopt a particular land-use or
livelihood’s strategy and the extent of their effects are complex and vary considerably
from one place to another (Angelsen et Kaimowitz, 1999; Babigumira et al., 2014;
VanWey et al., 2005). These individual decisions will have significant impact on
the household’s wellbeing, on the environment, and on the economic value of the
landscape (Brown, 2004) and should therefore be taken into account by policy makers
(Carrión-Flores et al., 2009).
In these conditions, there is a crucial need to investigate the factors that drive
households’ livelihoods portfolio in rural areas. Therefore, this paper seeks to
investigate how do local and indigenous households formulate their preferences among
livelihoods strategies? We state that this decision depends on several strategical
trade-offs: (1) specialization vs diversification, (2) land-converting activities vs non-
land-converting activities, (3) forest-based activities vs non-forest-based activities.
Our contribution is multiple: (1) As a pioneering study on the households’ survival
strategies in a transboundary conservation landscape, this paper tests the reliance
on the ability to pursue livelihoods strategies on natural, economic, human, physical
and social assets in order to shed light on the validity of the traditional Sustainable
Livelihoods Framework (SLF) in the Tridom-TCL. (2) Our research accounts for
both types of location assets (environmental state and infrastructure) introduced
1A livelihood comprises the capabilities and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood
is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance
households’ capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next
generation (Chambers et Conway, 1992). However, in this paper, the term livelihood is restricted
to subsistence goods and services from small-scale farming and from forest-based activities.
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by Jansen et al. (2006) and Soltani et al. (2012). Indeed, we consider the distance
to the nearest protected area as an indicator of environmental state, and distance
to the market as infrastructural asset. (3) Except for the Poverty and Environment
Network (PEN)2 and the Peruvian Amazon Rural Livelihoods and Poverty (PARLAP)
initiatives, studies of forest peasant economies have been based on small and non
representative samples of households due to practical, historical and financial reasons.
As a result, very few generalizations can be made about spatial or social variations
(Coomes et al., 2016). Our study uses a unique dataset collected in the field with
1035 geocoded households in 108 villages from the Tridom-TCL. The survey covered
all the 26 administrative subdivisions of the Cameroonian and Gabonese segments of
the landscape. Our study helps to address the lack of data at the landscape and the
household levels. (4) Our survey with representative samples and subsamples in all
the subdivisions allows us to account for shift effects as well as spatial spillover effects
in a household neighborhood resulting from geographical proximity and related social
interactions. To the best of our knowledge, no existing peer reviewed study has
attempted to account for the effect of endogenous and exogenous interactions on
households’ livelihoods strategies, yet geographical determinants including household
location were explicitly investigated by Soltani et al. (2012); Jansen et al. (2006) and
Wunder et al. (2014).
We test following hypotheses.
• Household specific assets, including social capital (Community group mem-
bership, autochthonous, household’s size and marital status), human capital
(education, age and seniority3), access to natural capital (land-use conflict,
human-wildlife conflict) and financial assets (loan and money transfers) drive
household’ heads preferences among livelihoods strategies.
• Geographical assets including environmental state (distance to the nearest pro-
tected area) and infrastructure (distance to market) influence household’s heads
preferences among livelihoods strategies. Indeed, beside household-specific
assets, location is supposed to significantly influence households’ livelihoods
choices (Soltani et al., 2012). Further, distance to market can be considered as
cost of market access (Losch et al., 1954; Von Thünen et Hall, 1966)
2The PEN is an initiative with more than 50 research partners that built a dataset containing
detailed socio-economic data collected quarterly. It contains more than 8000 households at the
village level in 40 study sites from 25 developing countries. (http://www1.cifor.org/pen)
3Seniority is the quality of households that has settled long ago in the village.
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• Finally, we hypothesize that preferences among livelihoods strategies of proximal
households are correlated and changes in the level of household assets and
characteristics will impact both own preferences and neighbouring household
preferences over strategies. Indeed, according to the strategic-interaction
models, a farmer’s decision is supposed to indirectly affect other farmers’
decisions within the same neighbourhood (Brueckner, 2003; Anselin, 2002).
This paper is structured as follows. Section (1.2) presents the literature review.
Section ( 1.3) describes the case study. Section (1.4) presents the theoretical frame-
work, and section (1.5) specifies the Spatial Autoregressive Probit (SAR-Probit)
econometric model. Results are presented in section (1.6). Finally, section (1.7)
present discussion and conclusions.
1.2 Literature Review
Households’ livelihoods strategies have been a subject of numerous papers, encom-
passing the framework for investigating sustainable rural livelihoods, global studies
and case-specific analysis. Literature on the SLF asserts that the ability to pursue
different livelihoods strategies is dependent on the basic material and social, tangi-
ble and intangible assets that people have at their possession (Scoones, 1998). In
different contexts, sustainable livelihoods can be achieved through access to natural,
economic, human, physical and social capitals or resources. Jansen et al. (2006)
have contributed to framing the livelihoods analysis by introducing geographical
determinants as a sixth fundamental factor. Soltani et al. (2012) argued that, beside
specific assets, location has a important effect on households’ livelihoods strategies.
They propose dividing this location asset into infrastructures and environmental state.
These assets are often combined to define different livelihoods strategies including
agricultural intensification, specialization or diversification (Ellis, 2000a; Scoones,
1998; Knutsson, 2006; Coomes et al., 2004; Angelsen, 2011; DfID, 1999).
Among the numerous case-specific studies on livelihoods strategies, Soltani et al.
(2012) examined poverty and forest degradation in rural areas of Zagros (Iran)
accounting for location assets beside the traditional SLF approach in other to identify
the most sustainable households’ livelihoods strategies. They studied three continuous
indices of poverty, over-grazing and over-harvesting on a stratified random sample
of 79 households. They found that 64% of the households surveyed adopt mixed
strategies, while, the livelihoods strategies of poorest households (27%) are highly
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dependent on forest extraction and livestock grazing and that the remaining 9%
combine cash crop with non farm work and earn higher income. They also found
that locational capitals namely, development and marginality are important drivers
of choice among livelihoods strategies in addition to household traditional assets.
They finally found some evidence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve. Indeed,
over-harvesting and overgrazing indices are the highest for households in the mixed
cluster and lowest for households in the non-farm/commercial one.
These diverse strategies have some key characteristics of interest. They can be
decomposed in a set of diverse choices. In this paper, we focus on three types of
strategic choices: choice of diversification, choice of land conversion and choice of
relying on forest resources.
Diversification: depending on available assets, households may prefer to diversify
their activities as a survival strategy or safety net to cope with shocks in order to
maintain or enhance their capabilities or for income motive, while, contextual effects
can lead to specialization in a particular activity (Ellis, 2000b; Scoones, 1998). A
range of global level studies have been focussing on the reliance on environmental
income for gap-filling and as a safety net to cope with risk. Indeed, agriculture is
subject to myriad risks including weather, price, pests, diseases and fire (Pattanayak
et Sills, 2001), and diversification activities can be seen as a way to cope with risk, in
a context of lacking insurance and credit markets. Angelsen et al. (2014); Delacote
(2009, 2007); Vedeld et al. (2007) and Wunder et al. (2014) are among the main
researchers who pointed out the importance of environmental amenities and income
for seasonal gap-filling and as rural safety net to shocks. They found that households
with poor human, natural and social capital were more likely to go to the forest
after a shock; while forest extraction has limited importance for seasonal gap-filling
(Wunder et al., 2014). They found that forest income contributes between 22.2% to
27% of total households’ income with large and systematic variations among regions,
and that, the poor rely more heavily on subsistence products such as wood fuels and
wild foods, and on products harvested from natural areas other than forests (Angelsen
et al., 2014; Vedeld et al., 2007; Nguyen et al., 2015). A similar result was found by
Belcher et al. (2015) in a case study in Jharkhand (India). However, this category
of households (poor households) are more likely to be trapped in common-property
resources extraction activities, that provide only minimum requirement. This is
especially true for households with a large need of insurance (Delacote, 2009).
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Land conversion: the choice of land-conversion activities has been investigated,
mainly through forest clearing and deforestation choices for example, using the PEN
dataset. Considering the SLF presented above, Babigumira et al. (2014) introduced
mediating and vulnerability indicators to examine the factors that influence rural
household decisions to clear forestland in 24 developing countries and to identify
robust global correlation between forest clearing and rural livelihoods. They found
that shock patterns do not drive forest clearing, and that male-headed households with
abundance of male labour living in recently settled places with high forest cover, as
well as households with medium to high asset holdings and higher market orientation
were more likely to clear forest than the poorest and vulnerable households.
Forest reliance: Coomes et al. (2016) used a large scale census with 919 commu-
nities in four major river sub-basins in eastern Peru under the PARLAP initiative
to analyse the drivers of the economic orientation of rain forest communities. The
authors found that initial environmental endowments and market access of commu-
nities are important in shaping their economic orientation, however, they interact in
different ways depending on the key natural resource upon which they rely. Further,
they found a strong correlation between rich endowment of terrestrial activities
components and participation in land-based extractive activities including hunting,
non-timber-forest product (NTFP) and timber extraction. An important proportion
of case-specific analysis of livelihoods strategies has been carried out in Southern and
Eastern Africa. Some results are similar to those from global studies stated above in
terms of the importance of forest income for the poorest households (Mamo et al.,
2007; Kamanga et al., 2009), the differential influence of livelihoods assets on the
choice of households strategies (Babulo et al., 2008) in Ethiopia and Malawi.
One of the very few scientific publications in the Congo Basin on this issue was carried
out by Nielsen et al. (2012). They used data collected in a typical CIFOR-PEN study
in Democratic republic of Congo to point out the importance of including asset-based
measures of wealth in studies of poverty–environment relations with poverty groups
of households. Considering poverty as a transitory phenomenon resulting from an
array of push and pull factors, and considering the importance of assets’ wealth for
seasonal gap-filling, four poverty groups were identified by dividing the sample into
five annual income quintiles and into five equally sized productive asset quintiles.
The authors found a strong reliance of the chronic poor on forest income and a strong
reliance of richest households on business. They also found that the transient poor
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consume a higher share of harvested forest products, while the transient rich have
higher agricultural productivity and absolute forest income.
1.3 Case study: The Tridom-TCL in the Congo
Basin
The Tridom-TCL is a cross-border conservation landscape created in 2005 by an
agreement between Cameroon, Gabon and Congo governments, as one of the twelve
"priority landscapes" of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP)4. The manage-
ment of the Tridom-TCL is entrusted to a Regional Management Unit (RMU) with
representative members in each of the three countries. Each representative member
manages the corresponding segment of the landscape according to the national law.
The RMU is prepared to act beyond national borders with the following missions:
(1) sustainable management of transboundary biodiversity in the inter-zone, (2)
maintaining the ecological, the economic and the social connectivity of the complex,
(3) ensuring long term conservation of its protected area system and (4) fostering
local development with reduced impact on environment. The Tridom-TCL con-
sists of a network of 10 protected areas, namely, the Dja biosphere reserve, the
Boumba-Bek NP, and the Nki-Mengamé gorilla sanctuary (Republic of Cameroon),
the Odzala-Kokoua NP and the Lossi NP (Republic of Congo), the Minkébé NP,
the Ivindo NP and the Mwagne NP (Gabonese Republic). These protected áreas,
spread over 35, 968 square kilometers, are connected by a wide inter-zone of more
than 111, 000km2 of which 36% (40,000 km2) is inhabited. It represents 7.5% of
the total area of the Congo Basin Tropical Forests in Central Africa. The inhabited
inter-zone hosts indigenous and local people. These people depend on slash and burn
agriculture, and forest-based activities such as hunting, NTFP gathering, fishing,
traditional forest management and traditional mining for their survival. The human
population density is between 1-7.9 inhabitants/km2 and is currently growing due to
resource exploitation (Ngoufo et al., 2012). The field work was carried out in the
Cameroon and Gabon segments as shown in the figure (A.1.1) in appendix. Both
4The Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) was launched as a multi-stakeholder partnership
(with 70 partners, including African countries, donor agencies and governments, international
organizations, NGOs, scientific institutions and the Tridom-TCL private sector) at the 2002 World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. It aims to enhance natural
resource management and improve the standard of living in the Congo Basin (http://www.pfbc-
cbfp.org/)
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segments are inhabited by more than 43 tribes, dominated by Bantu, with a minority
group of the indigenous baka tribe.
1.3.1 Data
The paper uses data from a representative face-to-face survey with a random and
stratified sample of 10355 households. The total number of households is approxi-
mately 651406. The survey lasted 8 months between December 2013 and July 2014 in
108 villages representing all the 26 administrative units of the Cameroonian and the
Gabonese part of the landscape. The villages visited are spread over nearly 27,000
km2, which is two third of the landscape livable inter-zone. The random sampling of
households in the villages was based on the village inhabitants’ registry held by the
chief of the village.
The interviews lasted between 1 to 3 hours. In addition, there were evening visits in
various households surveyed to quantify and measure daily, weekly and per annum
livelihoods production. The survey was supervised by the first author. Ten Masters
students selected after five training seminars participated as surveyors. Every village
provided at least two local translators in the case the household’s heads could not
communicate in French. Every household was geo-localized with a GPS.
The per annum value of livelihoods were derived in two ways: Some well organized
household’s heads usualy record their daily, weekly and per annum livelihoods statis-
tics. We trusted and collected these statistics. For the remaining households, we used
contextual material to measure daily and weekly production. We extrapolated to
have the per annum livelihoods production according to the recall data they stated
and the seasonality of each species or product. For instance, among the forest-based
livelihoods, (1) Ricinodendron Heudelotti is harvested every year for two-months
period, it is measured with a 5 liters pail that weights 7.5kg, and a bag of 90kg is
made of 12 pails. The total value for two months were considered as the per annum
value. (2) Likewise, Irvingia gabonensis is harvested for three-months period a year.
Some products are harvested during 12 months (Gnetum africanum, Piper nigrum,
Afromomum dalzeillii...) and others are harvested during three to four months
(Fungi, Corylus avellana, Garcinia cola, Monodora myristica etc.). The table A.2.1
in appendix shows the measurement indicators for the 20 NTFP, including fuel wood,
5The sample size required at a confidence level of 95% (typical value of 1.96) is 384.
6The aggregate population size in both segments of the Tridom-TCL is 418,855 inhabitants
(Bucrep, 2010; Gabon, 2010). Considering the mean household size of the sample (6.43), the number
of households is around 65,140.
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that account for forest-based strategies. We also used a mechanical dynamometer to
measure and to weight bushmeat, crop (banana, casava, potato, vegetables etc.) and
cash crop (including rubber and cocoa) daily and weekly production. We used the
average local sales price to estimate the value of such livelihoods resulting from each
strategy. Indeed, price variation within rural areas is normally quite small (Angelsen
et Kaimowitz, 1999).
1.3.2 Livelihoods portfolios
Based on an initial analysis we defined the households as member of one of six groups.
Indeed, as illustrated in the figure A.1.2 in appendix, 35% of the Tridom-TCL
households base their livelihoods strategies on small-scale agriculture and forest
products extraction (AF ). Besides these two activities, cash crop is included as
a third activity in a mixed strategy with three activities (ACF ) by 17% of the
households. 14 % mix small-scale agriculture and cash crop (AC) and the remaining
households specialize in forest-based (F , 27%), cash crop (C, 4%) and small-scale
agriculture (A, 3%). The figure (1.1) below displays the distribution of the livelihoods
strategies on the Tridom-TCL.
Figure 1.1: Livelihoods strategies on the landscape
36
1.4 Theoretical Model specification
1.4.1 Strategic trade-offs in livelihood portfolio selection
Several interesting development and environment strategic trade-offs (s) can be inves-
tigated when considering the livelihoods portfolio selection (see figure 1.2). First, one
can consider that those choices oppose specialization strategies and diversification
strategies: [A,C, F ] vs [CF,AF,ACF ]. The development literature generally consid-
ers that specialization strategies may be closer to profit-maximizing behaviors (the
household’s head selects the most profitable activity), while diversification strategies
are likely to be the consequence of risk-minimization behaviors (the household’s head
diversifies his/her portfolio in order to mitigate risk). Investigating this trade-off
allows us to analyze the factors that influence the household heads’ behavior and
especially how they balance profit-maximizing versus safety.
Figure 1.2: Trade-offs in livelihoods strategies
Another matter of interest relates to land-use. Some portfolios encompass land-
conversion activities, such as agriculture and cash crops, while others do not,
such as forest-based activities including hunting bushmeat and gathering NTFP:
[A,C,CF,AF,ACF ] vs [F ]. This trade-off allows to understand which factors lead
household’s heads to make their choice of activities related to land-conversion. The
relying results can bring evidence on the deep factors influencing deforestation
behaviors.
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Finally, one can distinguish portfolios relying on forests and the others:
[A,C] vs [F,CF,AF,ACF ]. This distinction allows us to investigate which fac-
tors leads household heads to engage in forest-related activities. This is a matter
of interests, as when household heads consider forests as assets, they may be more
likely to consider them as valuable and thus be actors of forest protection.
1.4.2 A simple microeconomic model of livelihoods portfo-
lios
Consider a household’s head i that chooses among a set of livelihoods portfolios
Li = [A,C, F, CF,AF,ACF ] to maximize his/her utility Ui. Xi is a vector of the
household’s head i socio-economic variables, Zip stands for observed attributes of
the activity portfolio p for the household’s head i (Lancaster, 1966)7. Household
i’s utility function may encompass income derived from the livelihoods portfolios,
but also other non-observable outcomes such as household’s vulnerability. Thus, the
household characteristics Xi may influence not only the economic return from the
portfolios, but also other households matters of interest. Furthermore, we consider
that household i’s utility may be influenced by his/her neighborhood. Lj is the
livelihoods portfolios selected by household i’s neighbors, that are likely to influence
his/her decision. The household maximisation problem is given by:
max
Li
Ui(Li, Xi, Zip, Lj) (1.1)
The first-oder condition implicitly gives the optimal portfolio L∗i (Xi, Zip, L∗j) for
household i:
∂Ui(L∗i , Xi, Zip, L∗j)
∂L∗i
= 0 (1.2)
As suggested by the trade-offs described in the above sub-section, households portfolio
choice can be substituted by sets of binary strategies (S = 1, 2). Henceforth, S will
be used for livelihoods strategies instead of L. The model described in equation (1.1)
leads to binary or discrete outcomes. Models of discrete choices have been known
since McFadden (1974); Bhat (1997); Horowitz (1991); Schnier et Felthoven (2011);
7 According to Lancaster’s theory, consumers derive their utility from the attributes that describe
the product.
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Albert et Chib (1993) and Thurstone (1927) and formulated as Random Utility Model
(RUM). Basically, the theory of random utility assumes that the utility function is
comprised by two components. The first is a systematic component representing
the observed attributes of different strategies, the socioeconomic characteristics of
an individual as well as the neighboring characteristics. The second is a random
component that captures the effects of unobserved attributes and characteristics
that may influence individual choices. Therefore, the utility function Ui presented in
equation (1.1) driven by household i’s livelihoods strategy becomes:
Uis = Vis + εisVis = aZis + bsXi + cs′f(S∗j ) (1.3)
Where i = 1, 2, 3...n and s = s′ = 1, 2.
In equation (1.3), Vi denotes the systematic component of the RUM, Zis is the vector
of characteristics of the binary strategy S adopted by household ’s i, Xi is the vector
of household i socioeconomic characteristics. a, b and c denote parameters associated
to the covariates and εis is the random variable that captures the random component
of the utility function and / or the unobserved attributes of the strategy S.
1.5 Spatial Probit Model
1.5.1 The model
The household i’s head will adopt the optimal livelihoods strategy S∗i that provides
him/her with the greatest utility. Since binary dependent variable observations can
be treated as indicators that relate to underlying latent or unobservable level of
utility (Albert et Chib, 1993; LeSage et Pace, 2009), the decision to choose or not to
choose, or to choose among two strategies can therefore be guided by the difference
in utilities brought about by both realizations. Therefore, assuming the couple (0, 1)
as the observed choice indicator of the strategy S by household i, the following holds:
Si = U1i − U0i = a (Zi1 − Zi0) + (b1 − b0)Xi + (c1 − c0) f (Sj) + (εi1 − εi0)
Si = a
a
Zs + βXi + ρf (Sj) + µi
(1.4)
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In equation (1.4), Si is not observed. It is considered as an unobserved latent
dependent variable, representing the relative utility derived by the household i’s
head from his/her observed strategy S∗i .
The microeconomic model of livelihoods strategies developed above defines the
household i’s strategies and the resulting utility as function of neighboring households’
matters of interest. Hence, the observed choice of a household may be similar or
dissimilar to strategies of nearby households. Modeling such discrete variables
generated by spatially interdependent processes requires defining a spatial weight
matrix and an operator that help accounts for the intensity of spatial interaction
among households as well as the resulting spatial spillover effects. In this paper, we
are interested in the strength of spatial interdependence among households as well
as its impacts on households’ likelihood to choose a particular livelihoods strategy.
Therefore, the spatial lag discrete dependent model is the most convenient among
the spatially explicit econometrics models (Anselin, 2007). In the following, we
removed the component a
a
Zs from the model. Indeed, the main characteristics of
households strategies are themselves the matter of the study.
Thus, equation (1.4) becomes:
S = Xβ + ρWS + µ
µ ∼
(
0, σ2µIn
) (1.5)
In equation (1.5), β is a kx1 vector of parameters to be estimated, ρ denotes the
intensity of spatial interdependence, W is the spatial weight matrix and WS(nxn)
is the spatial operator that denotes the mean dependant variable of neighboring
households. The term µ is a multivariate normal distribution corresponding to a
Probit model. Under the hypothesis ρ 6= 0 and (1− ρW ) 6= In, the matrix notation
of the data generating process is given by equation (1.6) below:
S = (1− ρW )−1 Xβ + (1− ρW )−1 µ (1.6)
The observed value of the limited dependent variable S∗i is defined as follows:
S∗i =
1 if S > 00 if S ≤ 0 (1.7)
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Following LeSage et Pace (2009), the probability of choosing a particular strategy is
given by:
Pr (S∗ = 1 | X,W ) = Pr (S > 0) = Pr
(
(1− ρW )−1 Xβ + (1− ρW )−1 µ > 0
)
= Pr
(
η < (1− ρW )−1 Xβ
) (1.8)
In equation (1.8), η = (1− ρW )−1 µ. In the case where ρ = 0 and (1− ρW ) = In,
the expression (1.8) follows a standard Probit model, and Maximum likelihood
estimation (ML) techniques can be used. If ρ 6= 0 and (1− ρW ) 6= In, S and µ follow
a Truncated Multivariate Normal Distribution, and the standard ML techniques are
not suitable. Indeed, the inclusion of neighboring strategies WS as a determinant
of the latent variable S involves n-dimensional integral in the likelihood function
and generates some tractability and computational problems. Further, the reduced
form of the latent process is nonlinear. This relates to the consistency of the model
(Baltagi et al., 2014). In this case, estimation can be achieved using the Bayesian
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods by Gibbs and Metropolis-
Hastings sampling (Albert et Chib, 1993; Geweke, 1991; LeSage, 2004, 2000; LeSage
et Pace, 2009), using the Recursive Important Sampling (RIS) or the GHK (Geweke-
Hajivassiliou-Keane) simulation methods (Geweke et al., 1994; Hajivassiliou, 2000) to
name a few. In this paper, we use the Bayesian approach to estimate the SAR-Probit
model with MCMC simulations and Gibbs sample with 1000 drawn, 20% of the
draws used as burn-in, assuming a non-informative prior distribution for β. For
a detailed presentation of the Bayesian approach to modelling limited dependent
variable, see LeSage (2000); Wilhelm et de Matos (2013); McMillen (1992).
As with the standard Probit model, estimates of the coefficients of the SAR-Probit
do not have direct economic interpretation as the normal probability distribution
is non linear. The sign of parameters is the only usable information, indicating
the direction of the impact. The sensitivity of the probability to choose or not to
choose a given strategy relative to one-unit change in the independent variables
is measured by a single value standing for marginal effect in the standard Probit
model. This does not hold for the SAR-Probit model. Indeed, the SAR-Probit model
involves spatial lag of the dependent variable. This implies some spillover or indirect
effect brough about by a one-unit change of the ith household characteristics on
the neighboring households’ likelihood to adopt a strategy, in addition to the usual
direct effect. Following LeSage et Pace (2009), the SAR-Probit yields three values
of interest namely, the direct, the neighborhood and the total effect derived from
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expression (1.9).
∂E (S∗ | Xk)
∂X
′
k
= φ
(
[1− ρW ]−1 In
−
Xkβk
)⊙
[1− ρW ]−1 Inβk (1.9)
Where Xk denotes the kth independent variable with
−
Xk as mean value, φ is a
standard normal distribution, and ⊙ stands for element-wise multiplication.
The main diagonal elements of expression (1.9) represent the direct effect. That is
the effect of a one-unit change in an independent variable of household i on the own
likelihood to choose or not to choose a particular livelihoods strategy. The average
value of each row results in the total impact brought about by one-unit change in
the corresponding covariates. The neighborhood (indirect) effect is measured by the
difference between the total effect and the direct effect. In the SAR-Probit, this
number captures the effect of a one-unit change in an independent variable of the
household i on the likelihood of the neighboring household to choose or not to choose
a particular livelihoods strategy.
1.5.2 Spatial operator
The consideration of social interactions and / or spatial interdependence is made
possible through the spatial operator WS that represents the neighboring livelihoods
strategies. The spatial weight matrixW that summarizes the spatial relations between
observations depends on the neighboring structures. A large body of research has
used the distance weight matrix, contiguity weight matrix or K-nearest-neighbours
(KNN) matrix corresponding respectively to distance-based households structure,
common boundary structure and nearest neighbors structure (Bivand et al., 2013).
As pointed out by LeSage et Pace (2014); Fingleton et Arbia (2008), there is near
universal agreement that estimates and inferences from spatial regression models are
sensitive to particular specifications of the spatial weight structure.
To account for this "biggest myth in spatial econometrics" (LeSage et Pace, 2014),
we consider three different structures of W , namely, the Gabriel graph weight matrix,
the KNN weight matrix and the row-standardize distance-based weight matrix.
The Gabriel relative neighborhood graph is a geographic connectivity network between
the sampling households. According to Matula et Sokal (1980) and Gabriel et Sokal
(1969), two households i and j in the Tridom-TCL are considered to be contiguous if
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and only if all other households are outside the i - j circle. In this weight matrix, two
households i and j are considered contiguous unless there exists another household l
such that in the triangle ijl, the distance between i and j is less than the sum of the
squares of the distances to any other locality l.
The KNN weight matrix bases its estimation on a fix number of k households closest
to household i. The selection of the KNN households is made possible via the
euclidean distance dij (xi, xj) =‖ xi− xj ‖=
(
(xi − xj)
′
(xi − xj)
)0.5
. With j = 1...k.
In this study, we consider 3NN, 5NN and 10NN spatial weight matrices. We choose
10 as maximum number because it is close to the minimum number of households in
many villages surveyed.
In the row-standardize distance-based weight matrix, the ith row contains the spatial
weight of neighboring households influencing household i, such that each row sums
up to unity. We consider the sparse matrices8 in the three different structure of W
we used.
1.6 What drives livelihoods strategies in the
Tridom-TCL?
This section first presents descriptive statistics (2.6.1). Then, it presents the specifi-
cation used for the results, choosing among the standard Probit model and the best
spatial model given various types of weight matrix to control the so called "biggest
myth in spatial econometrics" (2.6.2). It ends with estimates and marginal effects
for each of the three trade-offs (1.6.3).
1.6.1 Descriptive statistics
Among the 1035 households surveyed, this paper considers 987 households who were
successfully geo-localised with GPS, representing 95.4% of of surveyed households.
Regarding the first dependent variable that opposes specialization strategies and
diversification strategies as presented in the first trade-off presented in table (A.2.2) in
appendix, about 66% of household’s heads diversify their strategy, mixing small-scale
farming, cash crop and forest. As regards the second dependent variable related to
8Compared to the usual dense matrix, a sparce matrix stores only non-zero elements. It generates
economy in terms of memory, it reduces the complexity of systems’ resolutions and greatly speed
up the calculations (Erhel, 2014).
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land-use, 73% of the households adopt land-conversion activities and the remaining
prefer forest-based activities. The final trade-off opposes 67% of the sample choosing
strategies relying on single or mixed strategies with at least 30% income provided by
forest-based activities to households who do not or who rarely value forest.
the figure (A.1.3) in appendix shows that, among these trade-offs, households who
diversify, those who choose land-conversion and those who rarely value forest would
cause higher average deforestation (5.26ha, 5.57ha and 7.14ha respectively), with
lower per annum return or yields (CFAF0.40∗106, CFAF0.40∗106 and CFAF0.37∗106
respectively, that is $84, $84 and $77.7 )9 while those who choose to specialize, to
adopt forest-based activities or to rely on forest with a mixed of single strategies
deforest twice less, with a two-time higher return.
Following these rough statistics, a tentative conclusion is that forest resource would
be socially beneficial, and could therefore constitute a safety net for rural households.
Specialization, as well as strategies that value forests would be viewed as sustainable
strategies. However, this result does not provide detailed information about those
who specialize, those who adopt forest-based activities, or those who value forest
regardless of diversification or not. Subsection (1.6.3) below will provide further
insight about the factors that lead households to make the choice of a particular
strategy.
Table 1.1 displays a description of variables included in the analysis to test the
hypotheses. We basically distinguish social assets, human capital, natural capital,
financial assets, the environmental context, and infrastructure assets. Regarding
social assets, in 2014, 70% of the households in the overall sample were married. The
average household size was 6.5 with a standard deviation of 4. Twenty-six percent of
the households belong to a community group of interest, households employ on average
1.87 member of pygmy society. Regarding human capital, 56% of the households
have reached at least secondary-school educational level. Regarding natural capital,
we choose not to introduce land-holding as a determinant of livelihoods strategies,
as there is neither a market of lands nor a binding regime on access to land. Yet,
we introduce human-elephant conflict which caused CFA620 mean damage cost per
month. We also introduce the land conflict among households. Indeed, 18% of the
households have faced conflicts with their neighbors. Both variables should also
provide some information on the behavior of vulnerable households especially when
facing a shock.
9In 2014, year of the field work, CFAF1 = $0, 0021)
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Financial assets are approximated by loans and money transfers with a mean value
of CFA8.66 ∗ 103 per month. Regarding the environmental context, households
are located on average at 29.3km to the nearest protected area with a standard
deviation of 22.58. As an indicator of transport cost and infrastructure assets, the
average distance to the subdivision’s market is 51.65km with a deviation of 35.7.
Female-headed households account for 23% of the sample, and the average age is
48.44 years. The table in appendix (A.2.2) provides a more detail description of
these variables with respect to various strategies and trade-offs.
Table 1.1: Variables and descriptive statistics of overall sample
Variables Description of variables Mean StDev
Social asset
Marit_single Matrimonial status. Dummy (1=Maried) 0.70 0.46
Hsize Household size (continuous) 6.50 4.01
Pygmee_employmt Pygmies employment (continuous) 1.86 2.95
CommunityGroup Community Interest Companies . Dummy (1=yes) 0.28 0.45
Autochbaka Indegenouesness . Dummy (1=pygmy. 0=Bantou) 0.05 0.22
Human Asset
Age Household’s head age (continuous. in years) 48.44 14.61
Seniority Seniority in the village (continuous. in years) 27.01 20.71
Schoolcycl Education level . Dummy (1=secondary school) 0.56 0.50
Naturel asset (access to)
Land holding Deforestation per household (in ha) 4.55 5.31
Landconflict Land use conflict . Dummy (1=yes) 0.18 0.38
Human_Wildlife Damage cost of wildlife conflict (CFA/month) 0.62 1.45
Financial asset
Finance_asset Credit and money fransfert (CFAF/month) 8.66 33.54
Location asset
Distance to PA Distance to the nearest Protected Area (in Km) 29.30 22.58
Distmarket Distance to market (in Km) 65.05 58.69
Other drivers
Gender Gender. Dummy (1=Male) 0.77 0.42
Country Country. Dummy (1=Cameroon. 0=Gabon) 0.73 0.44
1.6.2 Spatial dependance and sensitivity
1.6.2.1 Data generation process and results’ accuracy with the weight
matrix type
The standard Probit model is contrasted to the SAR-probit model as suggested
by LeSage et Pace (2009, 2014). Further, we check the sensitivity of the results
to various specifications used for the spatial weight structure in the SAR-probit.
It finally concludes on the nature of the spatial dependence in various trade-offs,
considering the best model.
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The table in appendix (A.2.3) displays the results of the standard Probit model
that assumes non-spatial relationship among observations alongside with those
of the spatial autoregressive model for the trade-off between specialization and
diversification. This table shows some stark contrasts between the estimates and
marginal effects of both standard Probit model and SAR-probit. It also suggests a
significant effect of distance to market as well as distance to the nearest protected
area. On the other hand, these effects are not significant for the SAR-Probit. In
the latter model, the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, differs statistically from
zero. It is thus clear that estimates and marginal effects of the standard Probit
model are biased and inconsistent, allowing non pertinent causations as regards
to both distances to the market and the nearest protected area. As result, the
decision to choose among specialization and diversification is generated by spatially
interdependent processes.
The table in appendix (A.2.4) contrasts the results of various SAR-Probits given
the structure of neighbors to illustrate the impact of changing the type of the
weight matrix. It shows that varying the type of the matrix does not lead to
similar results. Indeed, the Gabriel-relative neighborhood graph (Gabgrahp) reports
the absence of spatial patterns. The value of ρGabgraph is close to zero and non
significant (ρGabgraph = 0.05), while the KNN and the distance-based matrix report
the influence of spatial effects on the households’ likelihood to adopt a livelihoods
strategy. Further, differing the number of neighbors yields different results. As the
number of neighbors increases, the strength of spatial interaction increases. The
spatial weight matrix based on 10 nearest neighbors (10NN) presents higher spatial
dependence with ρ = 0.36 compared to 3NN (ρ3NN = 0.23) and 5NN (ρ5NN = 0.29).
The distance-based matrix yields spatial effects that are closer to the 10NN.
This analysis validates the sensitivity of results to the weight matrix specification
postulated by LeSage et Pace (2009, 2014). Therefore, a good analysis of households
livelihoods strategies should involve testing and accounting for spatial effects using
spatially explicit econometric models, as well as checking the accuracy of the results
with the form of the spatial weight matrix. In the following, we consider the distance-
based weight matrix. Indeed, as the households were geo-localized during the field
work, the distance-based weight matrix (that yields almost similar results with
the 10NN matrix in our study) is better. This matrix allows for the magnitude
of interaction among two individuals to be proportional to the inverse euclidian
distance among them, while the KNN matrix tends to attribute the same weight
to all the k individuals. The quantitative explanatory variables were checked for
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multi-collinearity, tables (A.2.5) and (A.2.6) in appendix suggest the independence
among them.
1.6.2.2 Spatial dependence
Table 1.2 shows an evidence of spatial autocorrelation among the likelihood of
proximal households to choose among livelihood strategies. Indeed, the value of ρ
is positive and significant at 1%. This suggests that households tend to mimic the
livelihood strategies of their neighbors.
The range of the ρ parameter suggests a difference among the strength of mimicry
among the three trade-offs. Indeed, the dependence among closer households’ like-
lihood appears to be stronger regarding strategies that value forest rather than
choosing or not to choose between forest-based strategies and land-conversion based
strategies, or between specialization and diversification.
1.6.3 Coefficient Estimates and Marginal Effects
Table 1.2 presents the sign and the possible variables that drive household heads’
decision in various trade-offs. Tables 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 present the magnitude or the
incremental change resulting from a one-unite change in the independent variables
on both own and neighboring likelihood of choosing or not to choosing a strategy
in various trade-offs. As a reminder, the independent variables include households’
human, social, natural and financial assets; geographical assets of location and
infrastructure; remaining households characteristics and spatial spillover effects.
1.6.3.1 Specialization vs diversification
Table 1.3 displays the results for the first trade-off where households choose between
specialization (either on forest activities, or on cash-crop or small-scale farming) and
diversification (mixing cash crop, forest and small-scale farming). One can argue that
households specializing in one activity tend to be more income-maximizing oriented,
while those tending toward diversification are more risk-coping oriented. Yet, other
kinds of characteristics have to be taken into account: some households may have to
specialize because there are some barriers to diversification, related to low levels of
some assets.
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Table 1.2: MCMC SAR-Probit estimates
Specialization
VS
Diversification
Forest-based
VS
Land-Conversion
Valuing Forest
VS
Non Valuing Forest
Estimate Std. Dev Estimate Std. Dev Estimate Std. Dev
Social assets
Marit_single(1=Maried) 0.0640 0.107 -0.0310 0.106 -0.191 0.106 *
Hsize(continious) -0.0584 0.012 *** -0.058 0.012 *** -0.014 0.011
Pygmee_employmt(cont) 0.0095 0.015 -0.018 0.017 -0.018 0.015
CommunityGroup(1=yes) -0.1531 0.098 -0.12 0.109 -0.086 0.102
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.4552 0.194 ** 0.651 0.201 *** 0.762 0.252 ***
Human assets
Age(continious) 0.0038 0.003 0.005 0.003 ** 0.007 0.003 ***
Seniority(years in the vlge) -0.0056 0.002 ** -0.007 0.003 *** -0.004 0.003
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) -0.0857 0.087 -0.08 0.095 -0.057 0.095
Natural assets (access to)
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.0631 0.112 0.129 0.119 0.024 0.123
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.0497 0.03 * 0.06 0.03 ** 0.091 0.033 ***
Financian asset
Finance_asset(CFAF) 0.0036 0.002 ** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Location assets
Distance(in Km) 0.0023 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
Distmarket (in Km) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 * 0.001 0.001
Other drivers
Gender(1=Male) 0.0258 0.095 -0.011 0.102 0.15 0.104
Country(1=Cameroon) -0.2464 0.109 ** -0.165 0.114 0.01 0.098
ρ 0.3616 0.122 *** 0.484 0.094 *** 0.732 0.049 ***
L_{i}(0.1) (654. 333) (721. 266) (321. 666)
AIC 1199.268 1064.261 1224.836
logLik.sarprobi -583.63 -516.13 -596.41
N draws 1000 1000 1000
burn-in 200 200 200
• Social asset
Among households’ social assets, being part of a community group of interest,
marital status and pygmies employment do not have any direct or indirect
impact on the household’s head likelihood to choose between diversification and
specialization. The direct and indirect effect resulting from the household size
is negative and significative. This suggests that larger households will be less
likely to specialize than others. Moreover, they tend to have negative spillover
on their neighborhood. Further, regarding the magnitude, a one-unit increase
in household size will reduce both own probability and neighboring households’
probability to specialize by 1.93% and 1.16% respectively. This leads to a
total impact of 3.09%, (i.e. 1.93%+1.16%). Finally, autochthonous (wether
indigenous pygmy or not) exerts a positive and significant direct and indirect
influence on specialization strategy. Indeed, indigenous Baka pygmies are more
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likely to specialize in forest-based activities. Being a pygmy is associated with
15.08% more chances to specialize and tends to increase his/her neighboring
households’ likelihood to specialize by 9.16%, leading to a total impact of
24,23%.
• Human asset
With respect to human capital, the direct and the indirect effect associated with
secondary school education level as well as age is not significant. Yet, households
who settled long ago in villages (seniority) are less likely to specialize in their
livelihoods strategies. An additional seniority year increases the likelihood to
diversify by 0.18% with a positive spillover effect of 0.11% on the likelihood of
neighboring households to diversify.
• Natural asset
Human-wildlife conflict as well as land conflict with the neighboring households
were considered as an indicator of access to natural capital. Table 1.3 also shows
a non significant impact of land conflict within the household’s neighborhood.
It also shows that households who face human-wildlife conflict are more likely
to specialize in a particular livelihood strategy. More precisely, a CFAf1000
($2.1) additional elephants damage cost per month will lead to increasing own
probability to specialize by 1.65% with a positive spillover effet of 0.98% on
the probability of those living within their neighborhood to specialize, that is
a total effect of 2.62%.
• Financial asset
Household heads’ financial capital endowment and more precisely, loan and
money transfers increase both own and neighboring households’ likelihood
to specialize. A CFAf1000 ($2.1) increase of the household financial capital
will increase own and neighboring likelihood to specialize by 0,12% and 0.07%
respectively, that is a total effect of 0.19%. This result gives the insight that
higher financial assets alleviate some barriers to specialization. Moreover,
financial assets constitute a risk-management tool, which reduces the need for
other risk-coping strategies such as diversification.
• Geographical asset or location
Both location assets, including environmental state (distance to the nearest
protected area) and infrastructure (distance to market), do not significantly
influence households’ choices between specialization and diversification.
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• Gender and Country effect
Gender seems to have no impact on the choice of specializing versus diversifying.
Also, Cameroonian households are less likely to specialize in their livelihood
strategies.
Table 1.3: Marginal effect Specialization VS Diversification
Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects
Mean z(1.96, 5%) Mean z(1.96, 5%) Mean z(1.96, 5%)
Social asset
Marit_single(1=Maried) 0.0212 0.7211 0.0133 0.764 0.0345 0.748
Hsize(continious) -0.0193 -6.2294 ** -0.0116 -2.0044 ** -0.0309 -3.9114 **
Pygmee_employement 0.0032 0.7392 0.002 0.7896 0.0051 0.7678
CommunityGroup(1=yes) -0.0507 -1.7847 -0.0306 -1.219 -0.0813 -1.7702
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.1508 2.7952 ** 0.0915 2.2696 ** 0.2423 2.6349 **
Human Asset
Age(continious) 0.0013 1.7187 0.0008 1.7912 0.002 1.7292
Seniority(years in the vlge) -0.0018 -2.7086 ** -0.0011 -1.5184 -0.0029 -2.4753 **
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) -0.0283 -1.1339 -0.0164 -0.8347 -0.0447 -1.1135
Naturel asset (access to)
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.021 0.6682 0.0128 0.6911 0.0338 0.6751
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.0165 1.9409 * 0.0098 1.9419 * 0.0263 1.9458 *
Financial asset
Finance_asset(CFAF) 0.0012 2.6644 ** 0.0007 2.3046 ** 0.0019 2.6551 **
Location asset
Distance(in Km) 0.0008 1.6009 0.0004 1.6234 0.0012 1.6066
Distmarket 0.0003 1.8139 0.0002 1.8315 0.0005 1.8077
Other drivers
Gender(1=Male) 0.0085 0.3258 0.0046 0.2816 0.0132 0.3022
Country(1=Cameroon) -0.0813 -2.7045 ** -0.0465 -1.5516 -0.1278 -2.8956 **
1.6.3.2 Non-land-conversion activities vs land-conversion activities
Table 1.4 displays the marginal effects for the trade-off between non-land-conversion
activities (which consists of forest-based specialization) vs land-conversion activities.
This brings interesting insights, as it can help to understand which factors lead
households to engage in activities related to land-use change and deforestation. As a
matter of fact, households taking the non-land-conversion strategy were associated
with average levels of deforestation of 1.78 ha, while those engaged in land-conversion
activities had average deforestation levels of 5.57 ha.
• Social asset
The household size and the indigenous status of the households are both the
social assets that influence households’ likelihood to adopt either forest-based
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or land-conversion activities. Increasing household ii’s size by one unit will
significantly decrease both own and neighboring households’ likelihood to adopt
forest-based activities as livelihoods strategy by 1.69% and 1.58% respectively.
This result suggests that land-conversion activities are more labour intensive
than others, and increased household size facilitates conversion. Belonging to
the pygmy ethnicity is associated with a greather likelihood (18.8%) to adopt
forest-based strategy, with a significant indirect spatial effect of 17.9% on the
neighboring preferences for such strategy.
• Human asset
This table suggests that education level does not influence households’ decision
between forest-based strategy and land-conversion strategy. However, the
direct and the indirect, and thus the total impact of the household age and
seniority on this trade-off, is significant, the first being positive and the second
negative. In detail, when a household becomes one year older, their probability
to practice non-conversion strategy increases by 0.15% with a positive spillover
effect of 0.14% on their neighborhood. The resulting total effect is an increase
in the likelihood to specialize by 0.29%. With regard to seniority, households
who settled long ago in villages will be more likely to base their livelihoods
strategies on land-conversion activities. They are associated with an additional
0.21% probability to keep such strategies and with 0.2% positive spillover effect
on their neighborhood.
• Natural asset
Among the factors that influence access to natural assets, land conflict in
a neighborhood does not have any effect. Moreover, human-wildlife conflict
remains non neutral as in the preceding subsection. An increase of CFA1000 in
crop damage by elephants increases the likelihood of the concerned household’s
head to prefer non-conversion strategies by 1.74% with a 1.62% positive knock-
on effect on the neighboring household likelihood to adopt the same strategies.
• Geographical asset or location
Distance to the nearest protected area remains non significant as previously.
In contrast, households living far from local markets are more likely to rely on
non-conversion strategies for their livelihoods, with a positive spillover effect
within their neighborhood. This may reflect transport costs that are larger,
which leads to lower profitability of agriculture and especially cash crops.
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• Other assets
Financial assets, gender and country do not exert any effect on the household
decision in this trade-off.
Table 1.4: Marginal effect Non-land-conversion VS Land-conversion
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Mean z(1.96, 5%) Mean z(1.96, 5%) Mean z(1.96, 5%)
Social asset
Marit_single(1=Maried) -0.009 -0.3605 -0.0084 -0.3319 -0.0174 -0.3451
Hsize(continious) -0.0169 -5.427 ** -0.0158 -2.813 ** -0.0327 -4.6673 **
Pygmee_employement -0.0052 -1.2117 -0.0049 -1.0165 -0.01 -1.1997
CommunityGroup(1=yes) -0.0347 -1.319 -0.0328 -1.0939 -0.0675 -1.2449
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.1886 3.9571 ** 0.179 3.0834 ** 0.3676 3.6718 **
Human Asset
Age(continious) 0.0015 2.2978 ** 0.0014 2.222 ** 0.0029 2.2329 **
Seniority(years in the vlge) -0.0021 -3.3589 ** -0.002 -2.1831 ** -0.0041 -2.8667 **
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) -0.0232 -1.0763 -0.0207 -0.9471 -0.0439 -1.0341
Naturel asset (access to)
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.0374 1.2849 0.0352 1.3231 0.0726 1.303
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.0174 2.341 ** 0.0162 2.2367 ** 0.0336 2.3308 **
Financial asset
Finance_asset(CFAF103) 0.0004 1.1673 0.0003 1.2182 0.0007 1.1754
Location asset
Distance(in Km) 0.0002 0.5494 0.0002 0.5213 0.0005 0.5464
Distmarket 0.0004 2.2866 ** 0.0004 2.2933 ** 0.0008 2.3702 **
Other drivers
Gender(1=Male) -0.0032 -0.1267 -0.0029 -0.1214 -0.0061 -0.1268
Country(1=Cameroon) -0.0472 -1.641 -0.0421 -1.5131 -0.0894 -1.7657
1.6.3.3 Forest-based vs non forest-based
• Social asset
Social capital, such as being part of a community group of interest, pygmies
employment and the household size do not exert any influence on the households
trade-off between forest-based activities and land-conversion strategies; while
marital status and the indigenous status of the households do. Being married
decreases the household head’s likelihood to expect at least 30% of his/her
income from forest-based activities by 6.4% without indirect spatial spillover
effect within their neighborhood. In contrast, being a pygmy household head
is associated with 25.6% more chances to exert livelihood strategies that value
forest. This result is consistent with the main activity of pygmy communities
being related to forests, specialization and non-land-converting-activities.
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• Human asset
Age is the only households’ human asset that impacts the likelihood to choose
or not to choose among both strategies in this trade-off.
• Natural asset
Land-use conflict among households does not influence household heads’ choice
in this trade-off. But the marginal effect resulting from increasing the cost of
crop damage caused by wildlife increases the likelihood of the household to
choose strategies associated with at least 30% of income from forest.
• Other assets
Financial asset, geographical asset, including distance to the nearest protected
área, and distance to the nearest market, gender and country do not influence
the preferences within the third trade-off.
Table 1.5: Marginal effect strategies valuing forest VS Non valuing forest
Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
Mean z(1.96, 5%) Mean z(1.96, 5%) Mean z(1.96, 5%)
Social asset
Marit_single(1=Maried) -0.0642 -2.0832 ** -0.1713 -1.8273 -0.2355 -1.9699 **
Hsize(continious) -0.0046 -1.4943 -0.0121 -1.3673 -0.0167 -1.451
Pygmee_employement -0.0059 -1.3073 -0.0158 -1.2937 -0.0217 -1.3438
CommunityGroup(1=yes) -0.0287 -1.0346 -0.0776 -0.9803 -0.1063 -1.0561
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.2561 3.899 ** 0.6889 3.4181 ** 0.945 3.6702 **
Human Asset
Age(continious) 0.0023 3.2291 ** 0.0061 3.2878 ** 0.0084 3.2939 **
Seniority(years in the vlge) -0.0014 -1.9094 -0.0036 -1.757 -0.005 -1.822
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) -0.0194 -0.7046 -0.0521 -0.6465 -0.0715 -0.6632
Naturel asset (access to)
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.008 0.2375 0.0225 0.2645 0.0305 0.2547
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.0304 3.2818 ** 0.0812 3.2239 ** 0.1116 3.3479 **
Financial asset
Finance_asset(CFAF103) -0.0004 -1.1009 -0.001 -1.0613 -0.0013 -1.0746
Location asset
Distance(in Km) -0.0004 -0.9262 -0.0012 -0.8947 -0.0016 -0.9092
Distmarket 0.0002 1.0903 0.0006 1.0749 0.0008 1.0843
Other drivers
Gender(1=Male) 0.0502 1.7329 0.1351 1.7548 0.1854 1.7539
Country(1=Cameroon) 0.0037 0.1363 0.0108 0.1428 0.0145 0.1399
1.7 Discussion and conclusion
In rural areas of the developing world, livelihood strategies have key choices determin-
ing population wellbeing, sustainability and natural resource management. Yet, these
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choices are constrained by many types of variables, including assets at households’
disposal. It is then of crucial importance to understand to what extent these assets
influence the choice of livelihoods strategies. In this paper, we argue that the choice
of activities portfolios can be decomposed in diverse strategic choices. We focus on
the choices of diversification versus specialization, land-conversion activities versus
non-land-conversion activities, and forest-based activities versus non-forest-based
activities. Moreover, we give a special emphasis to spatial spillovers, relying on the
assumption that individual choices have external impacts within his/her neighbor-
hood. For that purpose, we rely on a unique dataset of households survey, conducted
in the Tridom-TCL.
Our paper brings interesting insights. First, belonging to the pygmy community has
some key influence on livelihood choices: Pygmies tend to specialize in forest-based
activities and to avoid land-converting activities. This result is not a surprise per
se, but it underlines that autochthonous status has a strong influence on livelihood
choices. Pygmies have historically been living in the forest and depending on forest
products. Their traditional livelihood strategies are hunting bushmeat and gathering
NTFP; this is why they are usally labelled as hunter- gatherers.
Second, we find evidence of a few drivers of specialization. Financial assets increase
the likelihood to specialize. This can be explained by the fact that such assets can
be seen as a safety net in case of shocks. Thus, higher financial assets decrease
households’ vulnerability, and increase the need to diversify to cope with risks.
Seniority and household size increase the likelihood to diversify. These factors may
have two kinds of explanation: (1) a larger household may increase the need to cope
efficiently for all the risks the family faces; (2) these factors can also represent a
higher capacity of larger households with deep roots in the community to diversify.
Third, the choice of land-converting activities is driven by household size, newer
arrivants in the community, and smaller distance to markets. Indeed we can expect
larger households to be able to engage in activities that are more land extensive, as
it can represent a larger labour force. Smaller distance to markets represents smaller
transportation costs, and thus higher profitability of land-converting activities.
Fourth, the role of wildlife conflict has to be pointed out. Larger crops losses implicitly
increase forest valuation and the need to cope with the crops losses but also increase
land conversion. Following this argument, it is interesting to analyze how human-
wildlife conflicts influence the household preferences for wildlife conversation (this
is done in Ngouhouo Poufoun et al. (2016)). Environmental state is also important
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when dealing with livelihood choices. Proximity to protected areas does not seem
to impact these choices. This gives the insight that conservation policies do not
influence much households in the neighborhood. Thus it appears that environmental
protection is not carried out at the expense of setting more constraints on households’
livelihood choices. Likewise, it appears that land conflicts do not influence the choice
of livelihoods strategies. This can indicate that access to land is not scarce in the
study area. In this case, land access does not seem to impose a strong constraint on
households in their livelihood choices.
Finally, it is crucial to note the existence of spatial spillovers. In all cases, the direct
effects of the assets on livelihood choices are combined with indirect effects on the
neighborhood. This result can be related to agglomeration effects: households of
the same types tend to live in the same neighborhood. It can be also related to
mimicking or other types of spatial dissemination.
The three strategic choices that we analyse in this paper have an impact in terms
of well being, but also in terms of land use. A quick look at the figure (A.1.2) in
appendix shows that households that specialize have better economic outcomes,
both in terms of yields and income, than those diversifying their activities. This
is consistent with the fact that households choosing specialization strategies tend
to be income maximizers, while those choosing diversification tend to have others
objectives, such as risk coping or they make a constrained choice. In terms of land
use, specialized households tend to have smaller deforestation levels than others.
Thus if economic development reduces households’ vulnerability to shocks (e.g.,
through better access to markets), this can bring larger deforestation rates if those
households decide to specialize 10.
When comparing households focusing on land-conversion activities, they unsurpris-
ingly tend to have larger deforestation levels than others. In terms of economic
outcomes, they have slightly lower levels of income, which may seem surprising. In
such case, it is likely that higher income from households relying on cash crops are
balanced by lower income for small scale farming households. In the same manner,
one can see that households relying on forest resources have lower deforestation levels,
while their income is comparable to others. Thus it appears that giving incentives to
households so that they rely on forest resources would help to protect forests, while
not hurting their livelihoods.
10However, this result may be driven by the presence of cash crops in the diversified portfolios.
This would require further investigations in terms of land-use analysis.
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This work opens the field for further research using our database. First, the impact
of the livelihood choices on deforestation requires a deeper analysis. Second, as
mentioned, risk is an important matter in rural areas. Analyzing factors influencing
households risk preferences, and the way those risk preferences influence livelihoods,
deforestation and ecosystem services preferences is of crucial matter.
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abstract
This chapter aims to examine the determinants of household’ deforestation in the
Tridom tansboundary conservation landscape (Tridom-TCL). It investigates the role
of households’ livelihoods strategies. It also tests the effects of crop damage caused
by elephants (human-elephant conflict) on the households’ decision of deforestation,
using a unique dataset gathered with 1035 households in the Tridom-TCL. The
results of the spatial autoregressive model show that: (1) households tend to imitate
deforestation decisions of their neighbors. (2) When account cash crops is part of a
diversification livelihoods strategy, households’ deforestation increases significantly
with a significant indirect impact on neighboring households’ deforestation. In
fact, a one-unit increase in the income of households that include cash crops in
their portfolio, leads to six to seven times increases in households’ deforestation
compared to the effect of income increase in households choosing other livelihoods
strategies. Also, (3) the indirect effects of these choices on neighboring households’
deforestation have almost the same magnitude as the direct impact resulting from
other strategies. (4) We find no substitutability between leisure and work in land
use choices. Indeed, the Pygmies, who constitute the pincipale labour with low
cost, are employed in activities related to larger deforestation, while household
labour duration does not significantly drive households’ deforestation. The share
of households’ self-consumption is associated with a low deforestation, therefore,
a bigger integration of the market can lead to increased deforestation, if practices
remained unchanged.
keywords : Small-scale farming, Forest-based livelihood , Landscape approach,
Deforestation, Spatial Spillover Effects, Neighborhood Peer Effects.
JEL Classification: C31,Q23 & 24, R14
67
68
2.1 Introduction
In most developing world, rural households rely on both small scale farming and
forest-based activities to develop their survival strategies. Small scale agriculture
is known as a source of livelihoods for about 86 percent of the three billion people
living in rural areas (Burch et al., 2007), while forests-based activities are widely
recognized to provide safety nets to mitigate agricultural risk (Pattanayak et Sills,
2001) and contributes between 22.2% to 27% of total households income (Vedeld
et al., 2007; Angelsen et al., 2014). As pointed-out by the literature on sustainable
livelihoods strategies by Ellis (2000); Scoones (1998), rural households switch between
specialisation and diversification to optimize their livelihoods provisioning. In the
Dja-Odzala-Minkébé trinational tansboundary conservation landscape (Tridom-TCL),
Ngouhouo Poufoun et Delacote (2016) investigates the variables determining the
household choice to specialize or diversify its activities. The authors have also shown
that choosing a livelihoods strategy in the Tridom-TCL can be seen as strategic
choice between forest-based and non-forest-based portfolios including small-scale
farming and/or cash cropping (cocoa and rubber). Yet, depending on the orientation
between land-converting activities and forest resource extraction, effort allocation
by households might either increase deforestation, increase forest degradation, or
enhance both (Delacote et Angelsen, 2015). Indeed, agriculture is estimated to be
the proximate driver for around 80% of deforestation worldwide, contributing for
10 to 12% of the total global annual anthropogenic emissions of GHGs (Verchot,
2014), while poaching and non-sustainable harvesting of non-timber forest products
(NTFPs) can have significant adverse impacts on forest ecosystems and lead to forest
degradation (Belcher et Schreckenberg, 2007; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Angelsen, 2009;
KissinGer et Herold, 2012), reducing the capacity of forest to regenerate and to
produce ecosystem services.
Our recent household survey at the Tridom landscape-scale provides some evidence
that about 85,45% of households are responsible for changing forest cover to other
uses regardless of their livelihoods strategies. There is a low population density
(less than 7 inh./km2) and local households are less likely to practice optimal crop
rotation. As there is no binding regime1 of land acquisition in the non-permanent
1A binding regime or more secure property rights motivates efficient resources management by
landowners (Angelsen et Kaimowitz, 2001).
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forest estate2 that is seen as common access resources, they can clear relatively large
area of land at low cost.
In almost all cases, land conversion is done without revival of forest neither artificially
nor naturally. Indeed, rural households do not apply any agroforestry system and
they are not involved in the reforestation activities, while primary or secondary forest
is progressively replaced by corkwood, whose carbon storage potential is very low.
In many case, extensive and unsustainable household farming based on slash-and-
burn cultivation accentuates small-scale deforestation and forest degradation. After
removal or selling the softwood lumber in surrounding forests, all the remaining
plants and material in the forest are burnt and land is used for extensive agricultural
and cash-crop production. Soil fertility and crop yields are continuously declining
(Boahene et al., 1998) and could cause a food crop production loss of at least $2.4billion
to $5 billion to across the Congo Basin (Ernst et al., 2010). Without an optimal fallow
system, local people are experiencing poor yields per hectare regarding cash-cropping
and crop production. Indeed, at least 75% cocoa and plantain yield observed are less
than 0,338t/ha and 3.59t/ha respectively with an average of 0.236t/ha and 3,09t/ha.
This average yield is below the average performance given limited farm means of
production that is 0.5t/ha and 16.5 t/ha, respectively. The potential yield of Cocoa
is 0.73t/ha and 1.22t/ha when cocoa plantations are associated with timber shade
and leguminous tree species and when there is a good use of the litter fall resoectively.
The maximum yield can reach 2.4t/ha (Somarriba et Beer, 1998, 2006). Regarding
plantains, the potential yield can reach 30t/ha/year (MINCOMMERCE, 2010). The
diminishing returns due to the unsustainable practices contribute to the perpetration
of poverty (Alemagi et al., 2014). Hence, the high level of forest dependence may
not necessarily correspond to a high and sustainable potential to reduce poverty
(Angelsen et Wunder, 2003). Rather, this may lead to over-exploitation of common
access resources and constitute poverty trap when rural households face a large need
of insurance (Delacote, 2007).
In light of the above considerations, analyzing the full set of potential drivers of
households’ deforestation, prioritizing or distinguishing among them in order to
inform policy makers and facilitate appropriate political decision process to curb
deforestation in the medium and long term perspectives is of crucial interest (Pfaff,
2The forest sector in Congo Basin Countries is divided into (i) ‘Permanent Forest Estate’, that
includes logging concessions, ought to remain forest and mandated to maintain the biological
diversity, and (ii) ‘Non-Permanent Forest Estate’, that can be turned to alternative use including
sustainable agriculture.
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1999; Tegegne et al., 2016). Our paper contributes to the literature, and seeks to
answer the following questions : How and how much do the different livelihoods
strategies developed by households, given wildlife constrains such as human-wildlife
conflict impact small-scale deforestation ?
The following sections develop the literature review and our contribution (section
2.2), Objectives and hypothesis (section 2.3), a simple microeconomic model (section
2.4). The spatial economic procedure in presented in section 2.5, the results in section
(2.6) and discussion and conclusion in section (2.7).
2.2 Literature Review and contribution
2.2.1 Literature review
The substantial academic research on the causes of tropical deforestation includes (1)
conceptual framework for analyzing deforestation, (2) macro-level empirical studies
including regional and national levels, (3) micro-level empirical studies and (4)
spatially explicit analyses.
2.2.1.1 Conceptual Framework related studies
The first analysis that combined the results of multiple studies to frame the causes
of tropical deforestation was realized by Angelsen et Kaimowitz (1999). The authors
have synthesized the results of more than 140 economic models using five types
of variables3 to build a helpful framework for both understanding deforestation
processes and classifying modeling approaches. According to the authors, the agent
or the source of deforestation (plantation companies, small farmers, etc.) has to
be identified. Further, agents’ decisions have to be considered, accounting for (1)
their characteristics, including their preferences, their background (seniority of a
households head), labour allocation as well as their initial resource and for (2) their
decision parameters such as property regime, agricultural price, timber prices and
3The five types of variables used in the 140 models of deforestation are : (1) The magnitude
and location of deforestation; (2) the agents of deforestation, namely, individuals, households, or
companies involved in land use change and their characteristics; (3) the choice variables (decisions
about land allocation that determine the overall level of deforestation for the particular agent or
group of agents); (4) Agents’ decision parameters and (5) macroeconomic variables and policy
instruments affecting forest clearing indirectly through their influence on the decision parameters
Angelsen et Kaimowitz (1999).
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income. These variables represent immediate or proximate causes. Finally, underlying
variables, i.e., broader forces like macroeconomic variables or policy instruments that
influence the source or agents and indirectly drive deforestation have to be taken into
account. Proximate drivers stand for human-induced factors that influence directly
households’ deforestation, while underlying driving forces are fundamental social
processes, that underpin the proximate causes and either operate at the local level
or have an indirect impact from the national level (Geist et Lambin, 2002; KissinGer
et Herold, 2012). From their meta-analysis, Angelsen et Kaimowitz (1999) derived
two categories of models. Microeconomic models should focus on immediate causes,
while macroeconomic models tend to deal with underlying causes. The authors
also suggest distinguishing between models based on perfect markets and models
assuming imperfect markets.
Geist et Lambin (2002) have contributed to the building of this conceptual framework
via a meta-analysis of 152 case studies taken from 95 articles published in 40 scientific
journals. The authors’ main contribution was the breakdown of numerous factors
found in the existing literature into (1) three aggregate proximate causes that are
agricultural expansion, wood extraction and expansion of infrastructure; into (2)
five broad categories of underlying driving forces which are demographic, economic,
technological, policy/institutional, cultural or socio-political factors; and a group
of "other variables" associated with deforestation, comprising land characteristics,
biophysical drivers and social trigger events (economic crises, war, etc.).
More recently, Combes et al. (2015) have contributed to the conceptual framework
with a theoretical model that emphasize a substitution effect between seigniorage and
deforestation income. This contribution complies with the framework presented above.
Indeed, Combes et al. (2015) considered the triple Environment-Economic-Social
crises, which Geist et Lambin (2002) refer to as social trigger event, and proposed a
link or a trade-off between macroeconomic and environmental outcomes, using an
explicit model. This contribution is valuable to the traditional framework developed
by Angelsen et Kaimowitz (1999). It presents a very feasible transmission channel
between broad underlying drivers and deforestation. For instance, international
transfers, public debt and saving can be used by the government to optimize inter-
temporal allocation of natural resources and spending (Combes et al., 2015).
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2.2.1.2 Macro-level empirical studies
A broad existing literature addresses causes of tropical deforestation at national,
regional, and global scales using macro-level data in developing countries, considering
many type of forests, macroeconomic variables, institutional and policy factors
(Kaimowitz et Angelsen, 1998; Pfaff, 1999; Palo, 1999; Bhattarai et Hammig, 2001;
Barbier et Burgess, 2001; Geist et Lambin, 2002; Nguyen Van et Azomahou, 2007;
Culas, 2007; Damette et Delacote, 2012; Wolfersberger et al., 2015; Tegegne et al.,
2016; Combes et al., 2015). Major conclusions from a meta-analysis using results of
150 deforestation models by Kaimowitz et Angelsen (1998) in Brazil, Cameroon, Costa
Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, Ecuador, the Philippines and Tanzania are that
deforestation tends to be greater when economic liberalization and adjustment policy
reforms increases; when forested lands are more accessible; when agricultural and
timber prices are higher; when rural wages are lower and there are more opportunities
for long distance trade. Nguyen Van et Azomahou (2007) use a panel dataset of 59
developing countries over the 1972–1994 period to study the deforestation process.
They found no evidence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve and they pointed out
political institution failures as factor that can worsen the deforestation process in
developing countries. More generally, the evidence supporting the existence of an
EKC for deforestation is contrasted (Choumert et al., 2013).
Hosonuma et al. (2012) derive deforestation and degradation drivers using empirical
data synthesized from existing reports on national REDD+ readiness activities. They
assessed the relative importance as well as the drivers of variability by continent
reflecting approximately the period 2000–2010. They used the forest transition
model, considering deforestation rate and remaining forest cover in 100 subtropical
non-Annex I countries4. They found that, similarly to Asia, the importance of
deforestation drivers in Africa varies with different forest transition phases and with
different areas. The impact of commercial agriculture on deforestation rises until the
late-transition phase and the relative importance of subsistence agriculture remains
fairly stable throughout the different phases.
4Annex I countries parties to the Convention includes the OECD countries and economies in
transition that accepted to returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of greenhouse gas
emissions by the year 2000. The other countries are referred to as Non-Annex I countries.
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2.2.1.3 Micro-level empirical studies relating to agent livelihoods deci-
sion
There is strong evidence that forests have an important role in insuring livelihood
over time and in some cases, contribute to poverty alleviation (Sunderlin et al., 2005).
Yet, few studies have investigated the relation between agent livelihoods decision
and tropical deforestation at household’s level.
Babigumira et al. (2014) use the CIFOR-PEN dataset, comprising of 7172 households
from 24 developing countries to analyze which household and contextual charac-
teristics affect land use decision in the developing world. The authors consider
the sustainable livelihoods framework and assess the role of various asset types on
households’ deforestation. The authors found out that 27% of rural household have
cleared forest for agricultural based livelihoods. They also found out that asset
poverty does not drive deforestation. Indeed, households with medium to high asset
holdings and higher market orientation were more likely to clear forest than the
poorest and market-isolated households. They found out that households that cleared
forests were closer to the forest and came from villages with higher forest cover.
Relying on a rich panel dataset collected from the Tsimane’ communities in Bolivia,
Perge et McKay (2016) analyze the relationship between forest households’ livelihoods
strategies, and forest clearing, and the relationship of both to welfare. The authors
identify four livelihoods strategies based on households’ reported sources of cash
earnings, namely, sale, wage, diversified and subsistence strategy. They find that
forest clearing is positively linked to welfare especially for households whose income
results from combining agricultural sales and wage activities compared to households
adopting other strategies. Households with subsistence strategy are not able to
accumulate assets in the long run. As one of the main conclusions, the authors state
that households clear only small areas of forest with a positive effect on welfare,
enabling accumulation of assets.
Pacheco (2009) define a typology of smallholders that accounts for both livelihoods,
farming systems and wealth to analyze smallholders’ deforestation in Uruará and
Redenção in the Brazilian Amazon. The author use households survey data from
136 interviews in Uruará and 82 interviews in Redenção area, and find that cattle
ranching is associated to greater impact than cash cropping or subsistence agriculture.
Contrary to Perge et McKay (2016), a strong correlation between deforestation and
the wealth of the farmers is found.
74
2.2.1.4 Spatially patterns studies
Spatially explicit econometric studies of drivers of deforestation have taken more
importance in the last few years (Ferretti-Gallon and Busch, 2014). According to these
studies, most deforestation tends to be located outside the reserve and mountainous
area and deforestation occurred primarily within the more accessible Eastern counties
and at areas near deforested areas. This illustrates the spread effect of deforestation
in the Brazilian Amazon (Mertens et al., 2002). In the same vein, Pfaff et al. (2007)
find evidence of spatial spillovers from roads in the Brazilian Amazon’s deforestation.
Considering local administrative entity, Amin et al. (2014) found that deforestation
activities of neighboring municipalities are correlated with some leakage. As a point
of fact, protected areas may shift deforestation to neighboring municipalities.
Using a general spatial two stage least squares model to analyze the determinants
of deforestation in 24 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period spanning
1990 to 2004, Boubacar (2012) found that deforestation in one country is positively
correlated to deforestation in neighboring countries and that determinants of forest
clearing are region specific.
2.2.2 Contribution
More often, data on tropical deforestation including household scale-level have been
debatable and notoriously unreliable or non-available (Palo, 1999; Geist et Lambin,
2002). Furthermore, there is a very poor level of econometric studies on the drivers of
deforestation in tropical Africa including Congo Basin countries (Gbetnkom, 2009).
While, unlike Southeast Asia and the Amazon regions, where large-scale agricultural
operations play an important role, most deforestation in the Congo basin can be
attributed to small-scale farmers using extensive slash-and-burn techniques (Weise
et Ngobo, 2004; Kotto-Same et al., 2002). In the same vein, a meta-analysis by
Ferretti-Gallon et Busch (2014) reveals a geographical lag of spatially explicit studies
of tropical deforestation in peer-reviewed academic journals as regard to Africa from
1996-2013, underlined the availability of data as the main constraint.
In this context, our contribution is multiple:
• We assess the impact of livelihood choices on deforestation. This research is
among the pioneering studies that investigate the factors that govern households’
deforestation in the Congo basin using a household-level survey. Indeed, west
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and central Africa account among regions that lag in econometric analysis
of deforestation (Ferretti-Gallon et Busch, 2014; Geist et Lambin, 2002). At
the same time, the factors affecting deforestation are more complex and vary
significantly from one location or continent to another (Rudel et Roper, 1997;
Murali et Hedge, 1997; VanWey et al., 2005; Babigumira et al., 2014).
• We refer to the standard protocol of analyzing deforestation. This is crucial as
it allows for improved comparisons in future research (Geist et Lambin, 2002).
Our research considers and tests the influence of (1) agents’ decision parameters
such as family income and factor constraints (2) agents’ characteristics and (3)
other contextual variables such as choice and biophysical variables on the agent’
deforestation. Further, our research used a microeconomic model, therefore, we
focus on immediate causes as suggested by (Angelsen et Kaimowitz, 1999). The
figure 2.1 shows the adaptation of our research to the conceptual framework
for analyzing households’ deforestation.
• We consider the landscape approach and test the impact of human wildlife
conflicts on households’ deforestation. In the same vein, we consider testing
the impact of land conflict among households on households’ deforestation.
• The influence of spatial spillovers is investigated. Beside direct effects on
households’ characteristics, we consider endogenous and exogenous interactions
among households and test the possible resulting spillover effect on households’
deforestation within their neighborhood.
2.3 Objective and Hypothesis
This paper investigates the factors that drive households’ deforestation in the Tridom-
TCL, with a particular interest in the impact of households’ choice of livelihoods
strategies. More precisely, we test the following hypothesis:
Decision variables influence deforestation. (1) The impact of family income
on small-scale deforestation is closely related to the households’ livelihoods strategies.
This hypothesis will allow comparing the incremental change on households’ defor-
estation resulting from a one-unit increase in income given their livelihoods portfolio
and strategies. (2) Following Pfaff (1999); Fontes et Palmer (2016); Caldas et al.
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UNDERLYING CAUSES OF DEFORESTATION 
 
Macroeconomic-level variables and policy instruments 
AGENT’ DECISION PARAMETERS 
 Family income of households who diversify (combining activities) 
 Family income of households who Specialize (single activity) 
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HOUSEHOLDS CHARACTERISTICS & LABOR 
 Gender  
 Age (initial resource) 
 Marital status (Background variable) 
 Households size (initial resource) 
 Education (Background variable) 
 Ethnicity or indigenousness (Background variable) 
 Seniority  or Duration of residence (Background variable) 
 Community Group (Social Capital) 
 Pygmee employement (Hired labor) 
 Labor duration (Labour allocation Between work and leisure)     
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
 Distance to market (Infrastructures) 
 Proximity to a protected area (environmental states) 
BIOPHYSICAL VARIABLE 
    Rainfall  
SPATIAL SPILLOVER EFFECTS (DIRECT & INDIRECT) 
 Shift Effect (Endogenous spatial autocorrelation) 
 Neighbourhood peer effect (Mimicry…) 
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Agents of deforestation: 
choice variables 
DEFORESTATION 
Source: Authors, Adapted from Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999). Elements in blue color represent our contribution to the framework. 
Figure 2.1: Adaptation of deforestation framework to Tridom-TCL case study
(2007), distance to market influences deforestation. Distance to market is considered
here as an indicator of transaction cost regarding land location. (3) Financial asset
(Walker et al., 2000, 2002) and factor constraints such as both Human-Human and
Human-Wildlife conflicts drive households’ deforestation. (4) Environmental state
and policy, captured by the distance to the nearest protected area, rank among
households’ deforestation drivers. Due to their legal status, protected areas are
supposed to be associated to lower deforestation (Pfaff et al., 2015; Ferretti-Gallon
et Busch, 2014). Yet they may also have an impact on surrounding deforestation, for
instance through leakage (Amin et al., 2014).
Households’ characteristics influence deforestation. Gender, households’
head age and education, marital status, the household’s size, ethnicity as well as
duration of residence (seniority) account for the drivers of small-scale deforestation.
Households’ Choice variables influence deforestation. Following Pichón
(1997); Walker et al. (2000, 2002), labour allocation between work and leisure
and hired labour (especially Pygmies employment with very low cost in our case)
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increases forest clearing. (2) Social capital, like belonging to a group of interest, has
an impact on households’ deforestation. (3) Finally, following Chowdhury (2006a,b)
we test that biophysical variables namely, rainfall have a strong impact on small-scale
deforestation.
Spatial patterns influence deforestation. This paper tests the presence of
endogenous interaction of households’ deforestation. Indeed, proximity among house-
holds in the Tridom-TCL implies the existence of cultural and social interaction
that could yield spatial spillover effect leading to similarities in deforestation deci-
sion. Further, it was shown that, households’ deforestation as a social and cultural
phenomenon is likely to be characterized by spatial autocorrelation (Mertens et al.,
2002; Pfaff et al., 2007; Boubacar, 2012; Amin et al., 2014; Brueckner, 2003; Anselin,
2002). The observations we did during the 8 months fieldwork in Cameroon and
Gabon reveal some competition about land holding among household heads. This
observation calls for testing the existence of spatial effects within a household’s
neighborhood.
2.4 A simple microeconomic model of deforesta-
tion choices
Consider household i choosing his/her level of deforestation Di to maximize its utility:
max
Di
Ui(Di, Li, Xi, Dj) (2.1)
Li is the livelihoods strategy selected by the household, as defined in citeN-
gouhouoPoufoun2016lvlhd. 6 different household strategies are considered: agricul-
ture (A), cash crop production (C), forest-based activities (F ), and combinations of
cash crops/forest-based (CF ), agriculture/forest-based (AF ) and agriculture/cash
crops/forest-based (ACF ); such that Li = [A,C, F, CF,AF,ACF ].
Xi is a vector of household i socio-economic variables susceptible to influence de-
forestation. Household i’s utility function may encompass income, but also other
non-observable outcomes such as household’s vulnerability. Thus, the household
characteristics Xi may influence not only the household economic return, but also
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other household matters of interest. Furthermore, we also consider that household i’s
utility may be influenced by its neighbors. Dj is the level of deforestation chosen by
household i’s neighbors, that is likely to influence its decision. This type of strategic
interactions is close to the resource-flow model presented by Brueckner (2003) and
Anselin (2002).
The first-order condition implicitly gives the optimal level of deforestation
D∗i (Li, Xi, D∗j ) for household i:
U ′Di =
∂Ui(D∗i , Li, Xi, D∗j )
∂D∗i
= 0 (2.2)
Optimal deforestation strongly depends on the livelihoods strategies chosen by the
households:
D∗i (Li, Xi, D∗j ) 6= D∗i (L′i, Xi, D∗j ), ∀Li 6= L′i. (2.3)
Moreover, one can then infer the impact of livelihoods strategies, other variables and
neighbors deforestation on household i deforestation level:
∂D∗i (Li, Xi, D∗j )
∂Xi
= −
∂U ′Di
∂Xi
∂U ′Di
∂Di
(2.4)
∂D∗i (Li, Xi, D∗j )
∂Dj
= −
∂U ′Di
∂Dj
∂U ′Di
∂Di
(2.5)
In the next section, we will investigate the impact of livelihood choices on deforestation
levels (sign of equation (2.3)), the impact of other control variables (sign of equation
(2.4)) and the nature of spatial spillovers (sign of equation (2.5)).
2.5 Spatial Econometric Procedure
The common observation that individuals belonging to the same group tend to behave
similarly can de explained by three hypotheses of the standard linear model (SLM)
that are the endogenous effects, the exogenous effects, and the correlated effects
(Manski, 1993). The endogenous and the exogenous effects express distinct ways that
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persons might be influenced by their social environments. The first assumes that, all
else equal, individual behavior (deforestation (Di) tends to vary with the average
behavior (deforestation of the group or neighbor (D−i)). The second effect assumes
that individual behavior is in some way influenced by the characteristics of the group
or neighbors (Z−i). The correlated effects express nonsocial phenomena. According
to these similarities in individuals’ behavior may results from spatially dependent
omitted variables, interaction among error terms (ε) or environmental similarities
(Brueckner, 2003; Manski, 1993; Elhorst, 2014; Anselin, 1988b). In the following,
we present a short description of various cross-sectional spatial econometric models
(2.5.1). Then, we present the selection procedure we used (2.5.2).
2.5.1 Cross-sectional spatial econometric models
The matrix form of the generalized nested spatial model that accounts for all the
three effects was defined by Manski (1993) in equations (2.6-2.7). This model is also
called the Manski model.
D = α ∗ IN + ρWD + Zβ +WZθ + ε, (2.6)
ε = λWε+ µ (2.7)
.
In this expression, IN is a n by n identity matrix. WD denotes the endogenous
effects, representing the average deforestation of neighboring individuals (D−i). The
ρ parameter measures the strength of spatial dependence. W is a row-standardized
weights matrix such that the elements (wij) in each row (i) sum to one and the
diagonal elements set to zero, each element (wij) measures the intensity of interaction
among household’s (i) and its relevant neighbors (Anselin, 1995). WZ stands for
the exogenous effects representing the average value of neighboring households’
characteristics, scaled by the parameter θ. The parameter β captures the direct
impact of independent variables. Wε denotes the interaction among the disturbance
terms. the parameter λ measures the spatial autocorrelation intensity among error
terms. After testing the equations (2.6-2.7), Manski (1993) found that data on
equilibrium outcomes cannot distinguish both endogenous and exogenous interactions
from contextual effects based on testing the model (2.6-2.7).
80
Further, LeSage (1997) suggested specifying a model that accounts for both en-
dogenous and exogenous spatial effects among individuals. Equation (2.8) is the
resulting model, called the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) by Anselin (1988b). This
model is equivalent to the component (2.6) of the Manski model, with λ = 0 in (2.7).
Following (LeSage, 2008), The SDM will allow deforestation of each household to
vary with respect to both own characteristics and the mean characteristics within
his/her neighborhood.
D = α ∗ IN + ρWD + Zβ +WZθ + ε (2.8)
A year later, Kelejian et Prucha (1998) suggested to include both endogenous inter-
action effects and correlated effects among the error terms. This model is equivalent
to the Manski equation with θ = 0 in the component (2.6). This model is called
the Kelejian-Prucha Model or the Spatial Autoregressive model with Autoregressive
disturbances (SARAR). This allows spatial autocorrelation in both non-observed
pattern and households’ deforestation, without spillover effects neither from the
neighborhood characteristics, nor from own characteristics on neighboring households.
D = α ∗ IN + ρWD + Zβ + ε (2.9)
ε = λWε+ µ (2.10)
.
The Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) was proposed by Anselin (1988b) to test
only the endogenous interaction, using the lag value of the dependent variable. The
SAR model allows only spatial autocorrelation of households’ deforestation, without
spillover effects neither from the neighborhood, nor from own behavior on neighboring
households.
D = α ∗ IN + ρWD + Zβ + ε (2.11)
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Among other models, (1) the Spatial Error Model (SEM) was developed by Anselin
(1988b) to account only for the correlated effects. This assumes that ρ = 0 in the
SDM model. (2) The Spatial Durbin Error Model (SDEM) includes spatial lags of
independents varables (θ 6= 0) and the spatially lagged error term (λ 6= 0) in equation
(2.6-2.7). (3) The Spatial Lag of the explanatory variable (SLX), (ρ = 0), (θ 6= 0)
and (λ = 0) in equation (2.6-2.7)
2.5.2 Selection procedure
The consideration of spatial effects in econometric models require some specific
processes to avoid model misspecification (Le Gallo, 2002).
The usual standard approach is to start with a specific SLM. Further, test if the
error terms and/or the dependent variable are spatially correlated, to specify the
spatial model that is consistent with the data generation process. This is called
the specific-to-general approach. The second approach is to start with the Mansky
model and test progressively the existence of various spatial effects (Elhorst, 2014).
In this study, we started with the standard approach that is most common in spatial
analyses, following Anselin (1988a). After estimating a SLM, we first tested for the
existence of spatial autocorrelation using the Moran i statistic on the residual of the
linear model. Further, we proceeded to the Lagrange Multiplier test that helps to
find the type of spatial effects that fit with our data generation process. Tables 2.2
and ?? in the subsection 2.6.2 display our procedure of model specification.
An issue that arises in applied econometrics is the need to compare models (LeSage,
2008). Indeed, a universal criticism of spatial regression models is the sensitivity of
the estimates and inferences to the form of spatial weight matrix (LeSage et Pace,
2014). After specifying our econometric model, we use four types of weight matrix
namely, the Gabriel graph weight matrix, the five nearest neighbors (5NN), the ten
nearest neighbors (10NN) and the distance based weight matrix to account for this
criticism. These weight matrices are presented in detail in Ngouhouo Poufoun et
Delacote (2016).
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Variables and Descriptive statistics
Dependent variable : our measure of deforestation followed two steps. We first
asked the households to fill the information about their land-holding in a table. After
that, we randomly chose one plot among the total plots declared by the household
to visit. The visited plot was tracked using a Global Positioning System (GPS) to
have the real area. A total of 3338 plots of land were declared by overall sample that
is on average 3.2 plots held by each household. A total of 526 plots were tracked
with a GPS. The data declared were adjusted using the tracked data to obtain the
value used in this study. On average, household heads declared clearing 4.75 ha of
forest. We found after statistical adjustment that the average land clearing of each
household stands at 4.41 ha.
Figure 2.2: Livelihoods and mean deforestation in the landscape
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Independent variables : we distinguish our independent variables in three cate-
gories.
First, we consider the household income, depending on the livelihoods strategy
chosen. In our case study, like many contexts in rural areas of developing countries,
access to land can be considered open. Figure (2.2) above displays the distribution
of mean deforestation and livelihoods in the Tridom-TCL.
Second, diverse households’ characteristics can have a part in explaining deforestation.
We consider here several potential constraints to deforestation. Credit constraints are
approached through credit and money transfer received by the household. Finally,
land-use conflict is a proxy for constraints on land access, while the damage costs
from wildlife conflicts represent environmental damages.
Third we consider a set of contextual variables, such as distance to markets, as a
proxy for transaction costs. Proximity to protected areas represents constraints
brought by environmental policies. Table 2.1 displays the variables’ definition and
descriptive statistics.
Table 2.1: Variables and descriptive statistics (N=986 households)
Variable Definition of variables Mean Std. Dev.
AGENT’S DECISION PARAMETERS
Income of households adopting diversification livelihoods strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_ACF_households Income of households mixing Agriculture &Cashcrop & Forest 38.96 117.06
FamilyIncome_AF_households Income of households mixing Agriculture & Forest 54.97 126.6
FamilyIncome_CF_CashcropForest Income of households mixing Cashcrop & Forest 21.28 73.34
Income of households adopting specialisation livelihoods strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_F_Forestbased Income of households specializing in Forest-based activities 70.18 372.79
FamilyIncome_A_Agriculture Income of households specializing in Agricultural 12.39 121.41
FamilyIncome_C_Cashcrop Income of households specializing in Cashcrop 8.85 67.93
Other decision variables
Autocons_Share (% of total value) Autoconsumption share in the total income 0.26 0.19
Capital & factor constraints
Finance_asset Credit and money transfer (CFAF/month) 8.67 33.55
Human_Wildlife (FCFA103) Damage cost of wildlife conflict (CFA/month) 0.62 1.45
Landconflict Dummy (1=yes) Land use conflict, Dummy (1=yes) 0.18 0.38
HOUSEHOLDS CHARACTERISTICS
Gender Gender, Dummy (1=Male) 0.77 0.42
Age Household head age (continuous, in years) 48.44 14.61
Ages_thr Age centered and squared 213.34 246.72
Marit_single Matrimonial status, Dummy (1=Maried) 0.7 0.46
Hsize Household size (continuous) 6.5 4.01
Schoolcycl_2 Education level, Dummy (1=secondary school) 0.56 0.5
Autochbaka Indegenouesness, Dummy (1=Pygmy. 0=Bantou) 0.05 0.22
Seniority Seniority in the village (continuous, in years) 27.01 20.71
CommunityGroup Community Interest Companies, Dummy (1=yes) 0.28 0.45
Pygmy_employmt Pygmies employment (continuous) 1.87 2.96
Labourduration Working hour per day 5.49 4.39
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Country Country, Dummy (1=Cameroon, 0=Gabon) 0.73 0.44
Distmarket Distance to market (in Km) 65.06 58.69
Distance to P. Area Distance to the nearest Protected Area (in Km) 29.3 22.58
Biophysical factor
Rainfall The per annum amount of rain that falls (mm) 1638.30 113.66
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2.6.2 Spatial dependence diagnostic
Table 2.2 below displays the Moran coefficient index computed after running the
SLM. This statistic tests the existence of the spatial autocorrelation. Except for
the Gabriel Graph weight structure, the index value is positive and statistically
greater than 0. It appears a positive spatial clustering of deforestation among nearby
households in the Tridom-TCL.
The Lagrange multiplier test presented in table 2.3 is used to diagnose the type of
spatial dependence that governs our data generation process among the endogenous
effects, i.e. spatial lag of the dependent variable (ρ 6= 0) and the correlated effects
or the spatial autocorrelation of the disturbance term (λ 6= 0). This test suggests
rejecting all the specifications that allow spatial autocorrelation in the disturbance
term. Therefore, we avoid estimating the SARAR, the SEM and the generalized
nested Manski spatial model. In the following, we estimate the SAR as it fits with
our data generation process. We avoid displaying the results of the SDM as it yielded
counter-intuitive findings.
Overall, following the findings in tables 2.2 and 2.3, we cannot reject our hypothesis
of a spatial effects, giving rise to a presumption of the existence of a positive relation
between households’ deforestation and the average deforestation of neighboring
households. In section 2.6.3 below will confirm or reject this presumption via the ρ
parameter and present the drivers of households’ deforestation.
Table 2.2: Spatial autocorrelation test
Global Moran I Moran I test under randomisation
Moran I E(I) z(I) P-value Moran I E(I) z(I) P-value
gabhsld.w 0.0171 -0.0032 0.7060 0.2401 0.1191 -0.0010 4.2133 0.0000
3NN weight matrix 0.0377 -0.0032 1.7138 0.0433 0.1461 -0.0010 6.2109 0.0000
4NN weight matrix 0.0339 -0.0032 1.7903 0.0367 0.1396 -0.0010 6.8335 0.0000
5NN weight matrix 0.0336 -0.0032 1.9876 0.0234 0.1301 -0.0010 7.1017 0.0000
10NN weight matrix 0.0363 -0.0030 2.9635 0.0015 0.1352 -0.0010 10.2690 0.0000
17NN weight matrix 0.0217 -0.0028 2.4270 0.0076 0.1218 -0.0010 12.0470 0.0000
Distance based weight matrix 0.0171 -0.0025 3.1368 0.0009 0.0993 -0.0010 15.4710 0.0000
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Table 2.3: Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostic of Spatial dependence
LM Test for Spatial Error Components LM Test for Spatial lag model
Ordinary LMerr Robust LMerr(ρ = 0) Ordinary LMlag
Robust LMlag
(λ = 0)
Stat. P-value Stat. P-value Stat. P-value Stat. P-value
Gabhsldweight matrix 0.3512 0.5535 0.1233 0.7254 0.6565 0.4178 0.4286 0.5127
3NN weight matrix 2.4699 0.1160 0.5971 0.4397 4.4385 0.0351 2.5657 0.0992 *
4NN weight matrix 2.6354 0.1045 0.6091 0.4351 4.9138 0.0266 2.8875 0.0893 *
5NN weight matrix 3.2194 0.0728 0.1058 0.7449 4.9313 0.0264 1.8178 0.0976 *
10NN weight matrix 7.2122 0.0072 0.8022 0.3704 13.0090 0.0003 6.5990 0.0102 **
17NN weight matrix 4.3451 0.0371 2.0311 0.1541 12.2670 0.0005 9.9533 0.0016 ***
Distance based weight matrix 6.4858 0.0109 0.0442 0.8335 12.0590 0.0005 5.6177 0.0178 **
2.6.3 What are the immediate causes of households’ defor-
estation in the Tridom-TCL?
2.6.3.1 Robustness check and spatial dependence
Table 2.4 displays the estimates’ results based on the SLM and four variants of
SAR model considering four different types of weight matrix. This result considers
only the factors that significantly drive households’ deforestation. The table (B.2.1)
in appendix display the results from the model with overall variables presented in
the subsection 2.6.1 above. Insignificant variables were removed progressively until
we got the reduced set of significant variables. The post estimation test (Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), Wald and LR tests) confirm the reduced model as
best-suited compared to the full model.
The SAR models show a significant spatial dependence between deforestation of each
household and the average deforestation of neighboring households. This suggests
some similarities in the deforestation decision of households located nearby. The
expected deforestation of each household in the Tridom-TCL is determined by both
own characteristics and a linear combination of neighboring households’ deforestation
scaled by ρ. The SLM estimates have larger size compare to the SAR models
considering all types of weight matrice. It attributes the variabilities in households’
deforestation only to the independent variables. Also, the SAR model suggests that
the variability of deforestation across households is partially explained by neighbors’
deforestation behaviour. Further, the spatial lag of households’ deforestation is
treated as an endogenous variable and the error term is influence by the same
process. As a result, although the Q-Q plot in the figure (B.1.1) in appendix
reveals normal distribution of households’ deforestation, the SLM is biased and yields
inconsistent estimates due to simultaneity bias. In these conditions, the SAR is
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a proper specification to account for this endogeneity (Anselin, 2001). Following
Anselin (1988b, 2001) our spatial lag model of deforestation was estimated using the
maximum likelihood technique.
As shown in table 2.4, the strength of spatial dependence (ρ) varies along with
the type of the weight matrix. The scale of the ρ parameter varies increasingly
from 0.027 for the the Gabriel graph weight matrix to 0.235 for the distance-based
weight matrix. It equals 0.089 for the 5NN and 0.179 for the 10NN weight matrices.
Further, the estimates vary decreasingly from the from the Gabriel graph matrix
to the distance-based matrix. The warning in LeSage et Pace (2014) regarding
the sensitivity of the estimates and inferences to the type of matrix is confirmed.
Among these four candidate models, the 10NN base model, displayed in the third
column with bold characters, performs better as it minimizes the information loss.
This model has the maximum log likelihood with the minimum Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) compared to others. The goodness-of-fit test confirms that the
SAR model based on the 10NN weight matrix is the best to fit the households’
deforestation. Indeed, combining the Wald test (W ), the the Log-likelihood Ratio
test (LR) and the Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) as suggested by Anselin (1988b),
we found that the inequality W ≥ LR ≥ LM is verified only for the 10NN based
model that is (W = 10.399) ≥ (LR = 10.16) ≥ (LM = 1.014). In the following,
estimates from the SAR model based on 10NN weight matrix are used to derive the
drivers of households’ deforestation.
The β coefficient of the SAR model cannot be interpreted as partial derivatives
of households’ deforestation in the Tridom-TCL with respect to a one-unit change
of various independent variables as in conventional linear regression model (Pace
et LeSage, 2006). The subsection 2.6.3.2 below presents the impact of the various
independent variables on the households’ deforestation.
2.6.3.2 Direct, Indirect and Total effects
Table 2.5 displays the factors that proximately drive households’ deforestation in
the Tridom-TCL. These factors are regrouped into (1) Livelihoods Strategies; (2)
households characteristics and (3) contextual variables. Variables with insignificant
coefficients are displayed in the full model in table (B.2.1) in appendix.
87
Table 2.4: Spatial Autoregressive Model
SLM GabGraph 5NN Weight matrix 10NN Weight Matrix Distance based
Coef. SD Coef. SD Coef. SD Coef. SD Coef. SD
(Intercept) -3.5941 1.1117 *** -1.1331 0.7166 -1.2545 0.7185 * -1.4842 0.7173 ** -1.7664 0.7390 **
AGENT’S DECISION PARAMETERS
Income of households adopting diversification livelihoods strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_ACF_households 0.0109 0.0013 *** 0.0108 0.0013 *** 0.0106 0.0013 *** 0.0102 0.0013 *** 0.0102 0.0013 ***
FamilyIncome_AF_households 0.0026 0.0012 ** 0.0026 0.0012 ** 0.0025 0.0011 ** 0.0025 0.0011 ** 0.0025 0.0011 **
FamilyIncome_CF_CashcropForest 0.0120 0.0021 *** 0.0119 0.0020 *** 0.0116 0.0020 *** 0.0112 0.0020 *** 0.0113 0.0020 ***
Income of households adopting specialisation livelihoods strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_A_Agriculture 0.0029 0.0012 ** 0.0029 0.0012 ** 0.0029 0.0012 ** 0.0029 0.0012 ** 0.0028 0.0012 **
FamilyIncome_C_Cashcrop 0.0186 0.0021 *** 0.0185 0.0021 *** 0.0183 0.0021 *** 0.0180 0.0021 *** 0.0179 0.0021 ***
Autocons_Share (% of total value) -2.1269 0.7737 *** -2.1210 0.7667 *** -2.1518 0.7649 *** -2.0922 0.7620 *** -2.1346 0.7633 ***
Capital & factor constraints
Finance_asset (FCFA103) 0.0106 0.0043 ** 0.0106 0.0042 ** 0.0104 0.0042 ** 0.0102 0.0042 ** 0.0099 0.0042 **
Human_Wildlife (FCFA103) -0.2135 0.0979 ** -0.2125 0.0970 ** -0.2143 0.0968 ** -0.2179 0.0965 ** -0.2183 0.0966 **
HOUSEHOLDS CHARACTERISTICS
Gender (1=Male) 0.6200 0.3450 * 0.6127 0.3419 * 0.5928 0.3411 * 0.5816 0.3398 * 0.6210 0.3404 *
Age (continuous. in years) 0.0293 0.0115 ** 0.0293 0.0114 ** 0.0291 0.0114 ** 0.0301 0.0113 *** 0.0303 0.0114 ***
Ages_thr -0.0013 0.0006 ** -0.0013 0.0006 ** -0.0013 0.0006 ** -0.0013 0.0006 ** -0.0013 0.0006 **
Hsize (continuous) 0.1692 0.0379 *** 0.1677 0.0376 *** 0.1669 0.0375 *** 0.1650 0.0374 *** 0.1675 0.0374 ***
Seniority (continuous. in years) 0.0401 0.0080 *** 0.0402 0.0079 *** 0.0404 0.0079 *** 0.0399 0.0078 *** 0.0390 0.0079 ***
CommunityGroup Dummy (1=yes) 0.5566 0.3263 * 0.5605 0.3233 * 0.5777 0.3226 * 0.5718 0.3214 * 0.5922 0.3220 *
Pygmy_employmt (coutinuous) 0.1428 0.0507 *** 0.1462 0.0503 ** 0.1522 0.0502 *** 0.1584 0.0500 *** 0.1539 0.0501 ***
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLE
Country (1=Cameroun. 0=Gabon) 1.3424 0.3556 *** 1.2738 0.3617 *** 1.0840 0.3722 *** 0.8565 0.3826 ** 0.8475 0.4080 **
R-squared: 0.32
F-statistic: (16; 969) 28.38 *
Rho (ρ) 0.0274 0.0892 ** 0.1799 *** 0.2354 ***
Log Likelihood -2856 -2855 -2852 -2853
ML residual σ 4.39 4.38 4.36 4.3667
AIC Criterion 5750 5751 5748 5742 5744
Wald Statistic 0.737 3.996 ** 10.399 *** 7.848 ***
LR test value 0.694 4.207 10.165 8.010
LM for Residual autocorrelation 0.122 0.262 1.014 0.128
Observations 986 986 986 986 986
*, ** and *** = significance level at 1% 5% 10% respectively
Livelihoods Strategies: The direct effects for household income are all posi-
tive and significant regardless of the livelihoods strategy, except for the income of
households who practice forest-based activities.
Diversification strategies and specialization strategies have comparable impacts on
deforestation. Strategies that encompass cash crops production have the highest
impact. On the other hand, family income of households specializing in forest-based
activities unsurprisingly do not tend to impact deforestation. Further, the indirect
effects of these incomes are positive and significant except for households who adopt
a diversified portfolio comprised of agriculture and forest-based activities. More
precisely:
• ACF: A one-unit increase in the monthly income of a household’s head, who
diversifies choosing agriculture, cash-crop and forest-based activities (ACF),
leads to increasing own deforestation by 0.0102 ha; with a positive spillover
effect of 0.0023 ha within his/her neighborhood. The resulting total effect
is 0.0125 ha. Translating into dollars, using the 2014 exchange rate 5, this
approximately equates to an incremental increase of own deforestation by 4.9
5In 2014, year of the field work, $ CFAF1 = $0, 0021)
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ha with a spillover effect of 1.1 ha within the neighborhood, resulting from per
annum $1000 increase in the household income. That is a total effect of 6ha.
• CF: Likewise, a one-unit increase in the monthly income, of a household’s head
who chooses cash crop and forest (CF), leads to increasing own deforestation
by 0.0113 ha; with a positive spillover effect of 0.0025 ha within his/her
neighborhood. This approximately equates to an incremental increase of own
deforestation by 5.4 ha with a spillover effect of 1.2 ha within the neighborhood,
resulting from per annum $1000 increase in the household income. The total
effect is of 6.6 ha.
• AF: A one-unit increase in the monthly income, of a household’s head choosing
agriculture and forest, leads to increasing own deforestation by 0.0025 ha;
This approximately equates to an incremental increase of own deforestation
by 1.2 ha resulting from per annum $1000 increase in the household income.
Households’ heads choosing (AF) portfolio do not exert any significant spillover
effect within their neighborhood.
• A: The direct effect of increasing of households specializing in agriculture
(A) is a significant increase by 0.0030 ha of own deforestation. The resulting
significant and positive spillover effect within the neighborhood is 0.0007 ha.
The resulting total effect is 0.0037 ha. This approximately equates to an
incremental increase of own deforestation by 1.43 ha with a spillover effect of
0.33 ha within the neighborhood, resulting from per annum $1000 increase in
the household income. That is a total effect of 1.76 ha.
• C: The incremental change of deforestation resulting from a one-unit increase
in the monthly income of households choosing cash crop (C) is an increase of
0.0180 ha. This leads to increasing deforestation of households sharing the
same neighborhood by 0.0040 ha. The resulting total effect is 0.022 ha. This
approximately equates to an incremental increase of own deforestation by 8.6
ha with a spillover effect of 1.9 ha within the neighborhood, resulting from per
annum $1000 increase in the household income. The total effect is of 10.5 ha.
As regard the capital and factor constraint decision’s variables, financial asset as
well as "the damage cost from human-elephants conflict have both significant direct
and indirect effects (table 2.5). Yet,the existence of land conflicts among households
(Human-Human conflict) were insignificant (see table (B.2.1) in appendix).
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An additional unit of loan contracted (or transfer received) by a household’s head
leads to a marginal increase of own deforestation of 0.0102 ha with a positive spillover
effect within his/her neighborhood of 0.0043 ha. That is a total effect of 0.0145 ha.
This equates to an increase of own deforestation by 6.9 ha with a spillover effect
of 2.04 ha within the neighborhood, resulting from per annum $1000 increase in
the financial asset. That is a total effect of 8.94 ha. This indicates that increasing
money transfer in favor of households living in the landscape may foster engagement
in forest clearing by households.
Unlike the financial asset, monthly cost of crops damage by elephants exert a negative
and significant direct and indirect effect on the households’ deforestation. Indeed,
additional unit of damage cost reduces both own and neighboring deforestation by
0.217 ha and 0.048 ha. The resulting total effect is 0.265 ha. This approximately
equates to an incremental decrease of 103 ha and 22.8 ha respectively, resulting
from per annum $1000 increase in damage cost. This result translates into two
complementary effects. Firstly, a business discouragement effect that could lead to
the abandonment of spaces nearby the promenade area of elephants; on the other
hand, it may cause a switch from activities relating to land use to forest extraction
activities that seem least risky with a possibility of increasing forest degradation.
The existence of land conflict among households (Human-Human conflict) were
insignificant (see table (B.2.1) in appendix). The third result gives the insight
that there is little constraint on land access in our case study: deforestation and
agricultural expansion is not impacted by neighbor conflicts.
Households characteristics: Among the socioeconomic variables, education, the
marital status and the ethnicity do not influence households’ deforestation as shown
in table (B.2.1) in appendix. Those with significant effects include gender, age,
households’ size and the residence duration or seniority.
Table 2.5 shows that men are associated with 0.58 ha more deforestation than women
without spillover effects within the neighborhood.
Deforestation increases slowly and significantly with the household’s head age with
some threshold effect. For every year they get older, deforestation increases by
0.03 ha, with a negligible spillover effect. Larger household’s size induces more
deforestation. Indeed, an additional member in a family increases own deforestation
by 0.16 ha with a spillover effect of 0.034 ha. As pointed out by Kaimowitz et
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Angelsen (1998), the residence duration is positively associated to forest clearing
with the same level as age.
When it comes to labour, it is interesting to note that Pygmy employment is related
to larger deforestation, while household labour duration has no influence (see table
(B.2.1 in appendix). Thus both types of labour do not seem to be substitutes for
households’ labour. Pygmy labour appears to be more land-intensive practices, while
household labour seems not to be related to land-use choices, i.e. more related to
labour-intensive practices.
Contextual variables: Among contextual variables presented in table 2.1, "dis-
tance to market", "distance to the nearest protected area" and the first result suggest
that distance to markets has no direct effect on deforestation. However, as shown
by citeNgouhouoPoufoun2016lvlhd, distance to markets influences the livelihoods
strategies: thus the effect of distance apparently passes through the livelihoods
strategies transmission channel. The second result indicates that public policies such
as protected areas do not bring constraints on land use decision. Moreover, we do
not find evidence of leakage between protected areas and neighboring households.
Finally, both the direct and the indirect effects of country are positive and signif-
icant. Indeed, households living in Cameroon are associated with 0.85 ha more
deforestation compare to those living in Gabon, with a spillover effect of 0.178 ha on
proximate households in Gabon. This result suggests paying additional attention in
the Cameroonian segment of the landscape.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this study is to better understand how livelihoods strategies have an
impact on deforestation. To that matter, this paper is a natural extension of citeN-
gouhouoPoufoun2016lvlhd, which determines the variables influencing livelihoods
strategies. We also develop a spatial approach in order to take into account spatial
interactions between agents. Our analysis relies on an original household survey
collected in the Tridom-TCL.
Our results are multiple. First, when it comes to livelihoods, diversification and
specialization strategies roughly seem to have the same impacts. Yet, we show that
strategies incorporating agricultural activities tend to have an impact on deforestation.
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Table 2.5: Directs, Indirects and Total Effects
Coeff. Direct Effects Indirect effects Total effectsMean SD Mean SD Mean SD
AGENT’S DECISION PARAMETERS
Income of households adopting diversification livelihoods strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_ACF_households 0.0102 0.0102 0.0012 *** 0.0023 0.0009 *** 0.0125 0.0017 ***
FamilyIncome_AF_households 0.0025 0.0025 0.0012 ** 0.0006 0.0003 0.0030 0.0014 **
FamilyIncome_CF_CashcropForest 0.0112 0.0113 0.0020 *** 0.0025 0.0010 ** 0.0138 0.0025 ***
Income of households adopting specialisation livelihoods strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_A_Agriculture 0.0029 0.0030 0.0012 ** 0.0007 0.0004 * 0.0036 0.0015 **
FamilyIncome_C_Cashcrop 0.0180 0.0180 0.0021 *** 0.0040 0.0016 *** 0.0220 0.0029 ***
Autocons_Share (% of total value) -2.0922 -2.1099 0.7635 *** -0.4726 0.2496 * -2.5825 0.9487 ***
Capital & factor constraints
Finance_asset (FCFA103) 0.0102 0.0102 0.0043 ** 0.0023 0.0013 * 0.0125 0.0053 **
Human_Wildlife (FCFA103) -0.2179 -0.2172 0.0975 ** -0.0488 0.0297 * -0.2660 0.1213 **
HOUSEHOLDS CHARACTERISTICS
Gender (1=Male) 0.5816 0.5802 0.3326 * 0.1300 0.0944 0.7102 0.4122 *
Age (continuous, in years) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0113 *** 0.0067 0.0037 * 0.0368 0.0140 ***
Ages_thr -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0006 ** -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0017 0.0008 **
Hsize (continuous) 0.1650 0.1649 0.0369 *** 0.0369 0.0164 ** 0.2018 0.0475 ***
Seniority (continuous, in years) 0.0399 0.0403 0.0080 *** 0.0090 0.0039 ** 0.0494 0.0105 ***
CommunityGroup Dummy (1=yes) 0.5718 0.5729 0.3161 * 0.1281 0.0896 0.7010 0.3914 *
Pygmy_employement (coutinuous) 0.1584 0.1592 0.0495 *** 0.0356 0.0177 ** 0.1948 0.0622 ***
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLE
Country (1=Cameroun. 0=Gabon) 0.8565 0.8515 0.3778 ** 0.1786 0.0921 * 1.0300 0.4406 **
*, ** and *** = significance level at 1% 5% 10% respectively
The corollary to this result is that only agents specializing in forest-based activities
do not influence deforestation. More precisely, households integrating cash-crops
in their activity portfolio are those getting the largest impact on deforestation.
Further, spillover effects from strategies with cash-crop (C, CF, ACF) have almost
the same scale than the direct effect of the remaining strategies (AF, A). Cash-crop
as a specialization strategy has the highest influence on forest cover compared to
the other strategies, with a spillover effect that is almost twice as large as the
direct effect caused by households mixing agriculture and forest. These results
bring the insight that, if development leads to households switching from small-scale
agriculture to cash-cropping as a main activity, this would result to a major increase
in deforestation. As an example, one extra dollar earned in cash-crops appears to
have about a 7-times larger effect on deforestation than an extra dollar in agriculture.
In the same vein, we show that the share of auto-consumption is negatively related
to deforestation. Here again, if economic development brings a better market access
and lower auto-consumption shares, this may positively influence deforestation.
Second, we show that land conflicts and distance to protected areas do not seem to
influence deforestation. This result brings the insight that competing land-uses is
not really a matter of constraints for households, nor does it represent a source of
leakage. In contrast, land-wildlife conflicts do seem to have a negative impact on
deforestation. Therefore, if policies are set with the aim to protect wildlife in rural
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areas and decrease human-wildlife interactions at the same time (Ngouhouo Poufoun
et al., 2016), it is a crucial matter to monitor and to involve local populations in
order to avoid a bump up in deforestation.
Third, our paper underlines the importance of assessing deforestation factors in a
spatial context, using a landscape approach. Indeed, spatial spillovers tend to be
of large magnitude: indirect effects may reach up to 20% of the direct effects. This
result is important, as it shows that micro-economic analysis of deforestation factors
should take into account those spatial interactions, in order to have an accurate
understanding of the mechanisms in place. This statement also holds for the choice
of livelihoods strategies (Ngouhouo Poufoun et Delacote, 2016).
Fourth, labour allocation is important. While the household labour duration does not
seem to impact deforestation, employing Pygmy labour tend to increase it. Therefore,
both types of labour cannot be considered as substitutes, especially when it comes
to land use. Household labour appears to be allocated to labour-intensive activities,
while Pygmy labour seems to be allocated to activities requiring more land and thus
more deforestation. If we consider a Chayanovian approach (Kaimowitz et Angelsen,
1998), it seems that the trade-off between household labour and leisure does not
influence deforestation.
Overall, our paper brings some reflexion on how development may influence defor-
estation in such a landscape. Three transmission channels are to be distinguished:
an income channel, an activity portfolio channel and a market integration channel.
First, economic development comes with larger income. We show that, except for
households specializing in forest-based activities, an increase in income is related
to more deforestation. Second, the portfolio of activities is likely to change with
economic development, with an increased importance of cash-cropping. This would
also result in larger deforestation rates. Finally, when households have a better
access to markets, they tend to decrease their share of auto-consumption, which can
also have an tendency to increase deforestation. It is important for development
projects and policies to take those three channels into account, when dealing with
possible environmental adverse effects.
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Abstract
This paper seeks to determine and characterize social and cultural preferences for
the conservation of endangered forest elephants (EFEs) in the Congo Basin’s Tridom
Landscape. Using unique data from a stratified, random, face-to-face survey with
1,035 households in 108 villages in 2014, we combine double-bounded dichotomous
choice with open-ended elicitation formats to assess the willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for EFE conservation. We find that local households are willing to pay CFA 1,139.4
(e1.74) per month to prevent EFE extinction. This totals CFA 753.9 million (e1.15
million) per year for all inhabitants. Indigenousness positively influences the WTP
for EFE conservation. Spatial data suggest that local communities prefer that
elephants remain far from their crops. The existence of human-elephant conflicts
has a neutral effect on preferences for EFE conservation. Therefore, our study
suggests that local communities would engage in biodiversity preservation when
the public benefits of conservation are accompanied by private benefits, such as
human-elephant conflict avoidance.
Keyword: Forest Elephant Extinction, Indigenous People, Contingent Valuation,
WTP, Interval Regression Model, Double-Hurdle Model.
JEL Classification : Q 57, 29, C24
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3.1 Introduction
Forest elephant (Loxodonta africana cyclotis)1 poaching in tropical Africa is a major
threat to the dynamics of this iconic species. In 2011, the Congo Basin’s forest
elephant population was less than 10% of its potential size and occupied less than
25% of its potential range (Maisels et al., 2013; Blake et al., 2007; Martin et Stiles,
2000). The Tri-national Dja-Odzala-Minkebe (Tridom) cross-border landscape,
spanning Cameroon, Congo (R), and Gabon, is considered to have ecological and
biodiversity uniqueness, and hosts the most important population of forest elephants
in the world, with the highest density in the Minkébé National Park (MNP). The
MNP lost more than 11,000 individuals between 2004 and 2012, representing more
than 50% of the 2004 elephant population (Maisels et al., 2013). Despite the ivory
trade ban by CITES2 to protect the African elephant (Van Kooten, 2005), the
current growing demand for ivory for jewellery, leisure and Asian medicine as well as
the increasing deforestation and land pressure are the main drivers of the elephant
population’s devastating decline. It is evident that the elephant is much appreciated
for these material and provisioning services. However, elephants also contribute to
the maintenance of ecological equilibrium and to the provision of social and cultural
services.
The forest elephant can be considered a flagship species, as its protection implies the
protection of other species in the same ecosystem. Indeed, the elephant disseminates
the seeds of important tropical fleshy fruit trees over long distances and contributes
to the regeneration of these tree species throughout the Congo Basin (Blake et al.,
2009; Wang, 2008; Beaune et al., 2013). For instance, Baillonella toxisperma (moabi),
a traditional multi-use species among Bantu and Baka villagers in the Tridom
region is now an endangered species because of its high commercial value in the
wood market. Moabi contributes significantly to balanced diets among forest people.
Indeed, its fruits and nuts are eaten raw and its oil is used in cooking, disease
treatment and cosmetics. By disseminating its seeds, the elephant contributes to
the restoration of the forest; therefore, it indirectly contributes to carbon storage.
1There are two elephant subspecies, the forest elephant and the savannah elephant. This paper
focuses on the forest elephant.
2CITES stands for Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora Signed in Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973
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Hence, elephant conservation is consistent with the REDD+ mechanism 3, which
has emerged as an important framework for forest conservation. Forest elephants
help improve the forest habitat and thus restore the ecological services provided by
the forest (i.e., they regulate the ecosystem).
Moreover, forest elephant populations are crucial to the cultural identity of the
indigenous Baka ethnic group. Their main rituals occur after an elephant hunt, and
the most important are the "yeli" and the "jengi" ceremonies. "Yeli" is the female
ritual, and "Jengi" is the male ritual (Kent, 1996). The traditional elephant hunt
is also the most important spiritual and religious event for this population. The
hunt brings together dispersed groups, all of which have specific responsibilities
(e.g., the vital contribution of women to the mystical preparations for a safe hunt).
Only the oldest Baka are permitted to kill elephants, and they undergo rigorous
preparation, in which they learn from experienced hunters over many years before
obtaining permission to kill elephants. Once killed, the elephant is celebrated for
many days and nights in a complex series of ritual feasts and celebrations until
all the meat has been consumed (Lewis, 2002). Therefore, elephants participate
in maintaining the spiritual enrichment, cultural identity and knowledge of the
Baka community. This cultural service implies that elephant extinction entails
an opportunity cost in terms of the loss of cultural values (Garrod et Willis,
1999). Figure 3.1 provides a synoptic description of the ecosystem services and the
total economic value of the elephant in the Tridom landscape. Considering the
importance of forest elephants to ecological, cultural and socio-economic equilibria,
possible crop damage (human-elephant conflicts) notwithstanding, endangered
forest elephant (EFE) extinction would severely and directly affect local and
indigenous welfare. Considering the interdependence of the elephant, Baillonella
toxisperma and rural communities as described above, “nature too would seem to
lose” (Tisdell, 1990, pp. 83). This irreplaceable loss to Tridom society makes the
EFE a priority in biodiversity conservation decisions. In addition, the social value of
biodiversity is unknown, and thus, the potential impact of this loss in biodiversity
on social wellbeing is uncertain (Turpie, 2003). An assessment of the economic
3This emerging policy aims to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD+). It aims to create financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for
developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to
sustainable development. REDD+ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation and includes
the role of conservation, the sustainable management of forests and improvement of forest carbon
stocks.
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Figure 3.1: Ecosystem Services and Total Economic Value (TEV) of Forest Elephants
(Adapted from Brahic et Terreaux (2009); MEA (2005)).
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value of the ecosystem services that the elephants provide for local communities
will yield important information for policy makers and conservation managers. The
findings may also increase awareness of the importance of biodiversity conservation.
Therefore, the key question addressed in this paper is the following: What are
local households willing to pay to prevent the elephant’s extinction?
A large body of research has contributed to enriching the literature on the economics
of endangered species conservation (Bishop, 1978; Barbier et al., 2013; Kremer et
Morcom, 2000; Tisdell et al., 2002; Bulte et Kooten, 2002). However, only a few
studies have assessed the indirect use value, bequest value and existence value of the
elephant (Bandara et Tisdell, 2005, 2003a,b), even though this iconic species plays im-
portant roles in socio-cultural and ecological integrity (Lewis, 2002; Blake et al., 2009).
Bandara et Tisdell (2001) used data from a face-to-face contingent valuation (CV)
study of a sample of 300 urban residents in Colombo (Sri Lanka) to assess their
willingness to pay (WTP) for elephant conservation. Their assessment differentiated
between the values reported by users and non-users for the Asian elephant.
Respondents who had used elephant facilities at least once were willing to pay Rs.
137.38 (e2.05), while non-users were willing to pay Rs. 82.96 (e1.24) for elephant
conservation, yielding an average of Rs. 110.17 (e1.65) per month. The results
reveal that urban residents are willing to pay for elephant conservation because
they want to secure the existence of the elephant (non-use value) and because the
presence of elephants has a use value, i.e., importance for recreation and tourism.
The results also indicated that the probability of a positive WTP is significantly and
positively influenced by pro-conservation attitudes and higher incomes (Bandara et
Tisdell, 2004). The study found that the total WTP is sufficient to compensate for
the value of annual crop damage.
While a small number of studies have investigated farmers’ valuations of the use value
(Smith et Sullivan, 2014), as well as the option value and non-use value, of Asian
savannah elephants (Vredin, 1997; Bandara et Tisdell, 2003a,b, 2004), no research
has addressed the value of EFEs to local and indigenous communities. Our first
contribution is thus to measure the value of EFEs to local and indigenous communities
in Central Africa to contribute to the growing literature on CV implementation
in developing countries. Additionally, this paper considers the relations between
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landscape factors, such as the distance between the household and the nearest
concentration of elephants (i.e., protected areas), the elephant population density in
the protected area and the households’ land ownership, and the WTP. Furthermore,
our methodological contribution involves combining closed-ended and open-ended
(OE) elicitation formats to target robust WTP value. This analysis is facilitated by
the collection of a novel, unexploited dataset obtained through face-to-face interviews
with 1,035 households geo-localized by GPS.
The purpose of this study is to calculate local and indigenous households’ WTP for
EFE conservation and to analyse the factors that influence its value. We test four
hypotheses. First, the extinction of the forest elephant may lead to a significant
net loss in household welfare. Second, WTP for elephant conservation varies with
the distance between the household and the nearest protected area. The effect of
this distance may be positive or negative. Indeed, following the distance decay
hypothesis, WTP declines as the distance between the respondent location and the
site providing environmental services increases (Bateman et al., 2006; Loomis et al.,
2000; Schaafsma et al., 2013). However, the distance to the protected area may also
be an indicator of elephant scarcity. Therefore, if we assume decreasing marginal
utility of forest elephant presence, household heads living close to a protected area
with higher elephant density would be likely to express lower marginal WTP for
elephant conservation. Third, WTP is significantly influenced by the indigenous
status of households, as cultural services such as traditions and religious practices
depend on the elephant’s existence. Knowledge of spatial and ethnic differences in
WTP may be used to design spatially explicit and culturally adapted conservation
policies. Fourth, the presence of human-elephant conflicts is expected to reduce
WTP for elephant conservation.
The following sections present the case study of the Congo Basin Tridom landscape’s
EFEs (section 3.2), the methodology (section 3.3), the results (section 3.4) and the
discussion and conclusion (section 3.5).
3.2 Case Study: The Tridom Landscape’s EFEs
in the Congo Basin
The Tridom is a cross-border conservation landscape covering a geographical
area of 191,541 km2, representing 7.5% of the total area of tropical forests in the
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Congo Basin of Central Africa. The Tridom was created in 2005 by an agreement
among the Cameroon, Gabon and Congo governments, as one of the twelve Congo
Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) priority landscapes. The agreement targets the
promotion of long-term biodiversity and protected areas’ system conservation, the
rational use of natural resources and sustainable development, including poverty
reduction. It encompasses 10 protected areas representing 37,498 km2. Five of these
areas are located in the Cameroonian segment (BoumbaBek, Kom, Mengame, Nki
and Dja Biosphere Reserve), three in the Gabonese segment (Minkébé, Mwagne
and Ivindo National Parks) and two in the Congolese segment (Odzala and Lossi
National Parks). Between protected areas is a liveable inter-zone totaling 40,000
km2, with the remaining area being non-livable. The Tridom landscape includes rich
and diversified flora and fauna and is abundant in highly commercially valuable
timber species. In addition to elephants, this landscape has a relatively high density
of large mammals, such as buffaloes, bongos, giant pangolins and gorillas. The
range of human population density is 1-7.9 inhabitants/km2 and is increasing as
a result of resource exploitation (Ngoufo et al., 2012). The Tridom inter-zone is
home to numerous economic activities, including forest management. Aproximately
78% of the indigenous and local communities rely on small-scale farming (40.9%),
cash-cropping (19.6%), hunting-gathering bushmeat and non-timber forest products
(14.8%), and Traditional gold-mining (3%) as their predominant livelihood with
full-time employment. Among these activities, cash-cropping and small-scale farming
constitute the main sources of income in the region.
Data were collected from a representative face-to-face survey of a random, stratified
sample of 1,035 households (from a total of approximately 65,140 households in the
study area). Because of administrative constraints and limited field work funding, our
survey was conducted in the Cameroon and Gabon segments but not in Congo (figure
3.2). These segments are inhabited by more than 43 tribes, which are dominated by
the Bantu, although the minority indigenous Baka tribe is also present (table C.2.1
in appendix). Random sampling of the households in the villages was based on the
inhabitants’ registers held by the village chiefs. The survey was administrated for 8
months between December 2013 and July 2014 in 108 villages representing all 26
administrative units of the Cameroonian and Gabonese part of the landscape (table
C.2.2 in appendix). The visited villages are spread over nearly 27,000 km2, which
represents two-thirds of the landscape’s liveable inter-zone. Each household was geo-
localized using a GPS. Interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours. In addition, evening
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visits to various surveyed households were conducted to measure daily production.
The field work was supervised by the first author. Ten master’s degree students
were selected after five training seminars to participate as surveyors. Each village
provided us with at least two local translators in case the household heads could not
communicate in French.
Figure 3.2: The Study Area.
3.3 Methodology: Combining Open-Ended and
Closed-Ended CV Methods
3.3.1 Overview of CV methods
Major differences between CV approaches include open-ended (OE) and closed-ended
formats, or discrete-choice contingent valuation (DCCV)(Cameron et James, 1987).
In the OE format, respondents are asked to specify their WTP, while in the
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close-ended format, respondents are asked to indicate whether they would pay a
specified amount (Kealy et Turner, 1993). Regardless of the level of information
that respondents receive, the predicted WTP may be unstable with respect to the
elicitation format (Brown et al., 1996). Indeed, the DCCV and OE mechanisms
may yield significantly different preferences for public goods because of the varying
incentives for strategic behaviour (Kealy et Turner, 1993). We use both mechanisms
to approximate the true WTP. The DCCV approaches include single-, double-, or
multiple-bounded dichotomous-choice approaches (Hanemann, 1985; Carson, 1985;
Hanemann et Kanninen, 1999). In the double-bounded dichotomous choice (DBDC)
approach, the respondents, having been asked a DCCV question, are asked a second
DCCV question that depends on the answer to the first.
We first apply the DBDC model proposed by Hanemann (1985) and Carson (1985).
The advantage of DBDC over the single-bounded format is that we obtain more
information from the respondents. The former is therefore asymptotically more
efficient than the single-bounded method developed by Bishop et Heberlein (1979);
Hanemann et al. (1991); Alberini (1995); Haab et McConnell (2002). However,
DBDC is more complicated to implement and requires more advanced econometric
approaches to analyse the data. Furthermore, the initial bid may provide an anchor
for the uncertain respondent, implying a bias in the response to the second question.
For example the respondent may believe that the first bid may represent the "true"
value of amenity valuated and may consider this information when responding to
the second question (Hanemann et al., 1991; Herriges et Shogren, 1996). However, a
good starting point has the benefit of preparing and encouraging respondents to
reveal their maximum WTP (Brouwer et Martin-Ortega, 2012; Bateman et al., 2008;
Frew, 2010a; Fischhoff et Furby, 1988).
Our methodological approach is to combine the DBDC format and the OE format.
Once the starting points are well defined, the use of DBDC in first stage is expected
to provide the best basis for an OE question. In fact, stand-alone OE questions often
suffer from a high share of protesters as the respondents have difficulties when they
are not accustomed to valuing a service or good (Zeiler et Plott, 2004; Bateman
et al., 2011; Brouwer et Martin-Ortega, 2012). According to the discovered preference
hypothesis, executing DBDC yields repetition and experience and therefore facilitates
convergence towards stable and theoretically consistent preferences (Zeiler et Plott,
2004; Bateman et al., 2008). Hence, following Bateman et al. (2008), the DBDC
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format may be considered a learning design that may help to reduce the preference
anomalies that occur under the OE format as well as the non-response rate and
the number of protesters. Asking an OE question after the DBDC provides more
information when the respondent answered either ‘yes’ to both amounts or ‘no’ to
both amounts (Mahieu et al., 2012b). Indeed,the WTP stated by these respondents
is unbounded when only the DBDC format is used.
3.3.2 Survey design
CV questions were included in a questionnaire addressing the characteristics,
behaviours and motivations of the households. The CV first described the
socio-economic and ecological attributes of the elephant, as well as the potential
change in socio-cultural services associated with possible extinction given that forest
elephants are currently present only in the Congo Basin. The respondents were
asked to state their preferences for the entire bundle of services provided by forest
elephants because addressing services separately leads to double counting. For
instance, existence value will ensure bequest value, as well as option value (Loomis
et Larson, 1994; Bandara et Tisdell, 2003a). Next, we proposed the following
hypothetical scenario, given that we are valuing a non-market good without an
implicit market. "Considering the trend towards the extinction of forest elephants,
if action is not taken quickly, this multi-use, iconic species will disappear in the
next few years. To stop this tendency towards extinction and make the species
more abundant, the Tridom Regional Project Management Unit may develop a
10-year elephant conservation programme that aims to seize weapons currently
used by poachers and to effectively fight cross-border poaching by (1) creating joint
checkpoints on the landscape scale and (2) recruiting more young people from villages
and involving them in a communication network to improve anti-poaching control
strategies and prevent human-elephant conflicts". Then, each respondent was asked
whether he would be willing to contribute to the programme by paying some monthly
amount if the Regional Management Unit were to demand financial support from all
the inhabitants of the village.
The payment vehicle presented was the direct cash payment of secure funds that
would be held by the Tridom programme. This means of payment is the most
familiar, credible and feasible based on the economic situation in the landscape. To
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minimize "yea-saying" and "nay-saying" bias4 as well as the starting point bias, (1)
we asked each respondent to consider his monthly income, his sources of income, and
his usual monthly expenditures, and (2) we asked each respondent to be realistic, in
ensuring that he could actually pay the stated monthly amount for the next 10 years
before answering. Furthermore, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of six
starting bids developed and validated during two pretest steps with 40 households
in four villages (Meyomessi, Oveng, Kongo and Mbieleme) of two subdivisions of
the study area using an OE elicitation format (Boyle et Bishop, 1988). A lower bid
was presented to those who gave a negative answer to the starting bid, and a higher
bid was presented to those who gave a positive answer. The bid card structure is
presented in the figure (C.1.1 in appendix). After the double-bounded elicitation
format was used, the respondents were assigned an OE question asking the maximum
amount they would be willing to pay for forest elephant conservation. Finally, we
ask follow-up questions to examine the reasons for zero observations to be able to
identify protest bidders in the database before model estimation (Arrow et al., 1993).
3.3.3 Theoretical model specification
Household preferences for forest elephant conservation in the Tridom can be described
by a random utility model as developed by McFadden (1973) and formalized by
Manski (1977) and Hanemann et al. (1991). The indirect utility function is given by
the following:
Uij = Vij(Yi − a,E(a), Xi) + εij (3.1)
In equation (3.1), j = 1 ∧ a > 0 if household i is willing to pay an amount a, or
j = 0 ∧ a = 0 otherwise. Yi is the household head’s income, Vij is the deterministic
component of the utility function measuring the indirect utility to respondent i
in the state j, and Xi is vector of socio-economic and geographical characteristics
influencing households preferences, εij is the unobserved random component of the
utility function. This function is supposed to be increasing and concave in available
income Yi as well as in the level of elephant protection E(a). The household head i
4Yea-sayers and nay-sayers are respondents who try to please or to counter, respectively, the
interviewer without considering the specific amount they are asked about (Carson et Hamenann,
2005; Frew, 2010b).
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will then be willing to pay if the following holds:
Ui1 > Ui0,⇐⇒ (Vi1(Yi − a,E(a), Xi) + εi1) > (Vi0(Yi − 0, E(0), Xi) + εi0)(3.2)
A household would be willing to contribute to EFE conservation if doing so provides
greater utility than not paying. Therefore, the maximum WTPi of household head i
can be expressed in equation (3.4):
(Vi1(Yi −WTPi, E(WTPi), Xi) + εi1) = (Vi0(Yi − 0, E(0), Xi) + εi0) > 0 (3.3)
(3.4)
3.3.4 Econometric model specification
Following Cameron (1988), we model the random WTP generated by closed-ended
and OE question formats using the following formulation:
WTPi(Xi, µi) = X ′iβ + µi (3.5)
In equation (3.5), WTPi represents the WTP vector of the ith respondent, Xi is a
vector of explanatory variables, β is a parameter vector, and µi a normally distributed
error term.
In the following, we specify four econometric models, using both the DBDC and
the OE elicitation procedures described above. These models represent different
assumptions about the reasons for respondents of not giving a positive bid. Our
sample included a significant number of zero-bidders. Furthermore, as explained
below, the different model assumptions concerns also how we combine information
from the closed-ended and OE elicitation formats. The first two models are variants
of the interval regression model (IRM) initially proposed by Hanemann et al. (1991)
to analyse DBDC data. The other two models are corner solution models, i.e., a
Tobit model and Cragg’s truncated normal double-hurdle model (DHM).
3.3.4.1 Interval regression models
First, we estimate a standard interval regression model (IRM) based on the data
obtained from the DBDC elicitation format. We estimate the model with and
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without zero-bid protesters. In our questionnaire, zero-bid protesters are identified
as zero bidders who may have a true positive WTP but stated zero WTP in the
OE question. Strazzera et al. (2003); Jorgensen et Syme (2000) and Halstead et al.
(1992) recommend excluding them from the analysis only if they are similar to other
respondents. Indeed, socio-demographic characteristics do not differ significantly
between zero-bid protesters and non-protesters (see Table 3.2). By excluding
zero-bid protesters, we assume that they have similar preferences, on average, as
non-protesters.
In the standard application of IRMs (DBDC), a respondent who refuses to pay the
lowest bid ("no/no" respondents) is left-censored at the lowest bid. If the respondent
accepts both bids, the true WTP is right-censored at the upper bid.
The IRM is adapted to account for point data. Applying OE responses in cases
in which the respondents reply "no/no" or "yes/yes" under a DBDC format helps
significantly reduce the share of unbounded intervals. Our hypothesis is that
combining these two datasets increases statistical efficiency (Mahieu et al., 2012a;
Haab et McConnell, 2002).
Furthermore, we use follow-up questions to identify respondents who may have a
negative WTP in the proposed conservation scenario. It is assumed that respondents
may have a negative WTP if they answer zero WTP for the OE question and reply
to a follow-up question that elephants are considered a cost5. We estimate the
modified interval regression model (IRM1) assuming that respondents who consider
elephants a cost after facing a human-elephant conflict and who answer zero WTP
in the OE question may effectively have a negative WTP. This approach involves
left-censoring at zero. The remaining respondents answering zero in the OE format
are considered true zero bidders and are integrated as point data. These respondents’
main motives for zero WTP include "I cannot afford to pay for elephant conservation",
"I do not receive any benefit from elephants", and "I do not see any problem if they
disappear". The second estimation of the modified IRM left-censors household heads
who expressed a possible loss in utility from the presence of elephants and who
do not necessarily face human-elephant conflicts. This IRM has expected negative
preferences (IRM2).
The standard IRM or DBDC model described above yields four possible interval
outcomes with respect to the "yes/yes", "yes/no", "no/yes" and "no/no" answers.
5The motives offered by these respondents include "elephants are a cost for me because they
destroy my crops".
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The added value of the modified IRM is that, in addition to the output formats of
the DBDC, it accounts for point data. Hence, Table 3.1 presents various possible
specifications of the dependent variable.
Table 3.1: Various specifications of the dependent variable
Data First Bid (FB) Secondary Bid (SB) OE
"no/no" and WTP ≥ 0 aOEi asij alij aOEi ≥ 0
"no/no" and WTP < 01 [−∞, 0[ asij alij 0
"yes/yes" aOEi asij auij aOEi ≥ auij
Interval "no/yes"
[
alij, a
s
ij
[
asij a
l
ij a
l
i ≤ aOEij ≤ asij
Interval "yes/no"
[
asij, a
u
ij
[
asij a
u
ij a
s
i ≤ aOEij ≤ auij
1These are "no/no" respondents who respond 0 to the OE and who faced or expect
to face crop damage caused by elephants.
Here, asij, alij and auij represent the starting point, the lower bid and the upper bid,
respectively, of the jth random bid card assigned to the ith household. According
to Table 3.1, the probability that the ith household is willing to pay an unobserved
amount within one of these intervals is given by the following:
P lc = P (µi < 0−X ′iβ)
= Ψ
(
0−X ′iβ
σ
)
= Ψ
(
−X ′iβ
σ
) (3.6)
P id = P (FBi ≤ X ′iβ + µi < SBi)
= Ψ
(
SBi −X ′iβ
σ
)
−Ψ
(
FBi −X ′iβ
σ
) (3.7)
where Ψ(∗) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Equation (3.6) represents
the left-censored (lc) data, that is, zero bidders who face or expect to face crop
damage caused by elephants. Equation (3.7) represents the interval data (id), that
is, the no/yes and yes/no respondents in the DBDC format. In this equation, FBi is
the first bid or starting point asij, and SBi is the secondary bid, with alij or auij as
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the value for the "no/yes" or "yes/no" respondents, respectively
Stewart (1983) suggests using the maximum likelihood technique when estimating
the IRM. Hence, following Wooldridge (2012), the log-likelihood function can be
expressed as follows:
ln(L(β)) =
N∑
i=1
blci ln
[
Ψ
(
−X ′iβ
σ
)]
+
N∑
i=1
bidi ln
[
Ψ
(
SBi −X ′iβ
σ
)
−Ψ
(
FBi −X ′iβ
σ
)]
+
N∑
i=1
1
2b
OE
i
[(
aOEi −X ′iβ
σ
+ ln 2πσ2
)]
(3.8)
The first element of equation (3.8) accounts for left-censoring at zero observations.
The second element accounts for interval data ("no/yes" and "yes/no"). The last
element accounts for "no/no" or "yes/yes" respondents who are willing to pay an
amount aOEi ≥ 0. In equation (3.8), blci , bidi and bOEi are dummy variables indicating
the type of interval to which a houshold relates.
3.3.4.2 Corner solution models
A total of 358 households replied "no/no" in the DBDC and gave zero as an answer
to the OE question; thus, there remains a non-trivial proportion of the population
that did not state positive preferences for forest elephant conservation. These zeros
may represent true zeros when the respondent does not obtain any utility from
the proposed conservation scenario or cannot afford to pay for the conservation
programme. A stated zero WTP can also be given if respondents have a negative
WTP but are asked to only state a positive WTP. Alternatively, respondents may
obtain positive (or negative) utility from elephant conservation but refuse to reveal
their preferences, e.g., because they may find it difficult to put a value on such an
asset (Mitchell et Carson, 1993). If some household heads stating a zero WTP in fact
have a negative WTP for conservation, then the full possible range of respondents’
preferences for elephant conservation is not observed. In this case, the dependent
variable is a corner solution outcome (Wooldridge, 2010; Cameron et Trivedi, 2005).
Econometric models that can cope with corner solution outcomes include Type I
Tobit models (Tobin, 1958), Heckman selection or incidental truncation models
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(Heckman, 1979) and Cragg DHMs (Cragg, 1971).
Given the high number of zero bidders we apply a Tobit model and a DHM model
that allows us to investigate the reasons for not participating (giving a positive bid).
In the Tobit model, the likelihood of participation and the intensity of participation
(in elephant conservation) are determined in the same way using the same covariates.
This assumption is not generally reasonable (Katchova et Miranda, 2004). For
example, in our case, households living very far from a protected area with high
elephant density may be less likely to participate in elephant conservation and those
that do participate may pay larger amounts because they are often close to urban
areas. Furthermore, Tobit models do not remain consistent under heteroscedasticity
(Brooks, 2014; Amemiya, 1984). DHMs provide the option of separating the
parameterization of both decisions under a conditional independence assumption
for drivers of participation and intensity (Burke, 2009; Solomon et Bekele, 2014;
Wooldridge, 2010). Cragg’s DHM allows heteroscedasticity in the second hurdle
without conceding model misspecification in the first hurdle (Burke, 2009).
The paper considers and compares traditional Tobit models and Cragg’s DHMs. As
the Tobit model is nested within Cragg’s alternative, the following specifies only
Cragg’s model. The first hurdle, or participation decision di, and the second hurdle,
explaining the intensity of participation (Y2i), are defined as follows:
Participation equation:
Y ∗1i = X1iα + εi (3.9)
Threshold participation equation:
di =
1 if Y ∗1i>00 otherwise (3.10)
Observed contribution intensity:
Y ∗2i = X2iγ + µi (3.11)
Threshold contribution intensity:
Y2i =
Y ∗2i if Y ∗2i>00 otherwise (3.12)
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In equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12), Y ∗1i and Y ∗2i are latent variables. Here, di
equals 1 if the household participates in EFE conservation and 0 otherwise, X1i is a
vector of socio-demographic and geographical covariates, α a vector of coefficients,
and εi is the iid error term. Y ∗2i is the household’s latent contribution to EFE
conservation, X2i is the vector of socio-demographic and geographical covariates
that drives the intensity of payment, γ is the vector of coefficients, and µi is an iid
error term. Following Moffatt (2005), the DHM log-likelihood function is specified
as follows:
ln(L) =
∑
Y2i=0
ln
[
1− ψ (X1iα) Ψ
(
X2iγ
σi
)]
+
∑
Y2i>0
ln
[ 1
σi
ψ
(
Y2i −X2iγ
σi
)
Ψ
(
X1iα
σi
)] (3.13)
In equation (3.13), ψ(∗) and Ψ(∗) are the probability density functions and
cumulative normal distribution functions, respectively. The first element represents
the non-participants, while the second represents the summation over observed
positive contributions to EFE conservation. The expression σi is the standard
error or the value of σ for each observation. If α
σi
= γ and X1i = X2i, then the
Tobit model and the truncated DHM are mathematically identical. For detailed
presentations of both models, see Cragg (1971) and Wooldridge (2010).
Following Burke (2009), this paper considers three values of interest to characterize
the households’ likelihood and intensity of participation in EFE conservation. The
first is the partial effects of the covariates on the probability of participation, and
the second and third are the partial effects of the covariates on the conditional and
unconditional expected preferences derived using the maximum likelihood outcome
obtained from the truncated DHM.
Partial effects of the covariates j on the probability of participation:
∂P (Y ∗1 > 0 | X1)
∂X1j
= αjψ (X1α) (3.14)
Partial effects of the covariates on the conditional expected preferences:
∂E (Y2 | Y2i > 0, X2i)
∂X1j
= γj
[
1− λ
(
X2γ
σi
)(
X2γ
σi
+ λ
(
X2γ
σi
))]
(3.15)
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Partial effects of the covariates on the unconditional expected preferences:
∂E (Y2 | X1, X2)
∂X1j
= αjψ (X1α)
{
X2γ + σλ
(
X2γ
σi
)}
+ Ψ (X1α) ∗ γj
[
1− λ
(
X2γ
σi
)(
X2γ
σi
+ λ
(
X2γ
σi
))] (3.16)
In equations (3.14) and (3.16), αj is an element of α that appears as the coefficient
on X1. In equations (3.15) and (3.16), γj is an element of γ that appears as the
coefficient on X2; λ = ψ (X1α) /Ψ (X1α) is the inverse Mills ratio.
We also considered a Heckman selection model allowing for dependence in the
error terms of the participation and contribution equations (Martínez-Espiñeira,
2006). However, our tests indicated no significant dependence, and the results of the
Heckman selection model are not presented.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 describes the independent variables used in the various econometric models,
as well as the descriptive statistics. Of the 1,035 household heads surveyed, 99
(9.6%) were excluded as protesters, leaving a sample of 936 of non-protesters. The
Baka indigenous group, an ethnic minority group, represented 5% of the households.
Their traditional way of life is closely linked to the elephant’s existence. The main
activity or type of land use may also influence a household’s preferences for forest
elephant conservation. Of the 936 respondents, 19% produce cash crops (e.g., cocoa)
as their main use of land, while 41% are small-scale farmers producing crops for
subsistence and small-scale trading. Only 3% of households use forest land for
traditional gold mining. Using the forest for hunting and gathering was reported by
15% of the sample, while 3% work in biodiversity conservation organizations, forest
administration, or forest concession management. Among the remaining respondents,
9% work for other administrations, and 10% engage in animal husbandry, work in
fisheries, or engage in trade.
Experiencing conflicts with elephants may have a negative impact on households
welfare and thus on households preferences for EFE conservation. Indeed, conflicts
have been reported by 259 households (28%), with approximately CFA 28,140 or
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e43 of damages reported per household. This cost is rigorously calculated, as it is
typically registered by households that faced conflict in obtening compensation from
decentralized administrations. To date, no household has received compensation.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Description of householdhead characteristics
Without protesters
(n=936)
Protest bidders
(n=99)
Overall obs.
(n=1,035) Comparison test
Mean (Std) Mean (Std) Mean(Std) Chi 2 (1) <3.84[ t-test (5%, 1,033)] <1.96
GENDER 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.76 (0.42) 0.77 (0.42) 0.76 (0.42) 0.007
AGE age in years 48.29 (14.68) 50.79 (13.52) 48.53 (14.59) [-14.07]
HSIZE household size 6.43 (4.05) 7.02 (3.90) 6.49 (4.04) [-0.0194]
EDUCATION LEVEL 1 if at least secondary school, 0 otherwise 0.55 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.56 (0.50) 6.21
MONTHLY EXP monthly expense 46,604 (59,463) 59,792 (68,242) 47,865 (60,446) [-2.40E+19]
INDIGENOUSNESS 1 if indigenous BAKA (Pygmies), 0 otherwise 0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.21) 0.77
SMALL FARMER 1 if small scale farmer, 0 otherwise 0.41 (0.49) 0.42 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.09
TRAD GOLD MINER 1 if traditional gold miner, 0 otherwise 0.03 (0.16) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.16) 2.82
HUNTER GATHERER 1 if hunter-gatherer, 0 otherwise 0.15 (0.36) 0.09 (0.29) 0.15 (0.36) 2.81
FMU OR FOREST AD 1 if works in the forest administration or a FMU 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.18) 0.48
OTHER ADMIN 1 if works in other administration 0.09 (0.28) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.16
HUM/ELEPH CONFLICT 1 if human-elephant conflict, 0 otherwise 0.28 (0.45) 0.23 (0.42) 0.27 (0.45) 0.88
LAND HOLDINGS land area (ha) ownership 4.32 (5.32) 5.36 (4.32) 4.42 (5.24) [-0.09.73]
DIST_NAREA distance to the nearest protected area (km) 28.98 (22.26) 27.60 (22.14) 49.06 (493.20) [40.17]
ELEPHANT DENSITY elephant density of the nearest protected area 0.94 (0.84) 0.83 (0.72) 0.93 (0.83) [0.01.51]
Variables such as land holdings, distance between the respondent and the nearest
protected area and proximity to a protected area with relatively high elephant density
may also influence the preferences of the respondents for elephant conservation. The
first two of these variables were determined using a GPS and the ArcMap software.
Indeed, land holdings refer to the area of land holdings of a household head. This
variable was generated using GPS tracking to capture the exact area. Approximately
70% of the households own between 0.1 and 5 ha, 8% do not have access to land, 29%
own between 5 and 15 ha, and 3% own between 15 and 25 ha. A few household heads
own between 25 and 57 ha of land. With regard to proximity to a protected area
(with relatively high elephant density), the elephant density of the various protected
areas is considered a continuous variable (this variable was determined using the
UICN elephant database).
Table 3.3 provides the distribution of the 936 answers to the DBDC questions,
excluding identified protest bidders. As expected, the frequency of "yes" and "yes/yes"
respondents decreases with the starting bid. On average, 56% responded "no/no".
The WTP reported by 18.4% of the remaining respondents was in the interval
between the lower bid and the starting bid (6.5%) or between the starting bid and
the upper bid (11.9%). Approximately 25.4% were willing to pay more than the
higher bid. Table 3.4 shows the outcome summary with respect to the various
econometric models estimated. The DBDC model without protesters left-censors
all "no/no" observations, that is, 56.2% of the sample; it considers 43.8% of positive
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Table 3.3: Answers to bids
Bid cards
as/al/au1
Bid card
Statistics Yesto
as
No
to
as
Answers
to bids Perc. (%)
Freq. Perc. YY NY YY NYYN NN YN NN
1,000/500/1,500 191 20% 46% 54% 56 15 5.98 1.60
31 89 3.31 9.51
1,500/1,000/2,000 161 17% 47% 53% 53 5 5.66 0.53
22 81 2.35 8.65
2,000/1,500/2,500 148 16% 34% 66% 33 14 3.53 1.50
18 83 1.92 8.87
2,500/1,000/3,000 163 17% 33% 67% 40 5 4.27 0.53
13 105 1.39 11.22
3,000/1,500/3,500 115 12% 38% 70% 31 10 3.31 1.07
3 71 0.32 7.59
3,500/2,000/4,000 158 17% 31% 56% 25 12 2.67 1.28
24 77 2.56 10.36
Total 936 100% 238 61 25.43 6.52
111 526 11.86 56.20
1as = Starting bid; al = Lower bid; au=Upper bid
preferences. The OE format assigned to the respondent after the DBDC yielded 578
positive stated WTP values, that is, for 61.75% of the respondents. As a corollary,
the level of information obtained about forest community preferences improved
considerably in two ways. Among the household heads responding “no/no” to the
Table 3.4: Dataset description (percentages)
DBDC standard IRM Tobit Double-hurdle model IRM + point data
Total (1,035) Without protesters (936) First hurdle Second hurdle IRM 1 IRM 2
Left-censored data 60.4 56.2 38.20 - 0.00 2.90 11.10
Right-censored data 23 25.4 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interval data 16.6 18.4 0.00 - 0.00 18.20 18.20
Point data 0 0.00 61.80 100 61.80 79.00 70.70
Truncated at zero - - 0.00 - 38.20 - -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
DBDC question, that is, 56.2% of the sample surveyed, 18% stated a positive WTP
in response to the OE question, and 25.4% were willing to pay more than the higher
bid. The follow-up questions revealed that 104 households reported a zero WTP
because they considered elephants to be a cost for them. Of these, 27 households
had experienced crop damage from elephants.
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3.4.2 Econometric results
3.4.2.1 Predicted WTP for EFE conservation and extrapolation
Table 3.5 presents the factors influencing households’ WTP, as well as the estimated
WTP. We display the results from the diverse models described in the previous sec-
tion in order to underline how estimated WTP are influenced by the chosen models.
Overall, we see that the estimated WTP is sensitive to the estimation techniques
and assumptions about protesters and zero bidders. Indeed, the first two columns
display the results based on the standard DBDC model with and without the zero-bid
protesters. As expected, the predicted WTP is higher when zero-bid protesters are
removed. Indeed, the remaining respondents are assumed to be representative of the
population, as they have nearly the same characteristics as the zero-bid protesters.
The removal of protesters leads to an increase in the monthly predicted WTP from
CFA 368.84 (e0.56) to CFA 742.92 (e1.13) per household.
The DHM model resulted in an unconditional expected WTP for EFE conservation
of CFA 1,326.87 (e2.02). As expected the conditional expected WTP, based on
the respondent having a positive WTP, was significant higher CFA 2,081.84 (e3.17)
because of the non-trivial share of respondents who did not state positive preferences
for forest elephant conservation. IRM1 produced a monthly predicted WTP of
CFA 1,245.66 (e1.89). This model left-censors only the 27 households that experi-
enced both human-elephant conflicts and crop damage. IRM2 left-censors the 104
households that experienced elephant-related costs as well as those citing potential
elephants-related cost as the reason for a zero bid. This model generated a predicted
WTP of CFA 1,138.17 (e1.74) or CFA 13,658 (e20.82) annually per household.
To estimate the expected aggregate WTP for elephant conservation by the population
living in both the Cameroonian and Gabonese segments of the Tridom landscape,
the simple transferring point estimate is used as the sampling of respondents was
random and representative. This method produces a robust aggregate with less
bias than a benefits function transfer approach (Bandara et Tisdell, 2004; Loomis
et al., 2000; Brouwer et Spaninks, 1999). The aggregate population size in both
segments of the Tridom is 418,855 inhabitants (Bucrep, 2010; Gabon, 2010). Con-
sidering the mean household size of the sample (6.43), the number of households is
approximately 65,140. The monthly WTP of the overall population is CFA 74.14
million (e113,000) or CFA 889.7 million (e1.36 million) annually. Given the current
2.4% population growth rate (World Bank) and a 3% discount rate, the local and
indigenous Tridom households have a net present value of CFA 8.67 billion (e13.2
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Figure 3.3: Aggregate WTP (∗106CFA ) by division and elephant densities in
protected areas.
million) for the proposed 10-year elephant conservation programme. According to
the high population density, as shown in figure 3.3, the Haut-Nyong, the Dja et
Lobo and the Boumba et Ngoko in Cameroon expressed the greatest aggregate WTP
for elephant conservation at CFA 2,380 million, CFA 2,287 million and CFA 1,139
million, respectively (figure C.1.2 in appendix). Among the Gabonese subdivisions,
the Ivindo, Woleu and Haut-Ntem expressed the greatest WTP at CFA 769 million,
CFA 528 million and CFA 380 million, respectively.
3.4.2.2 Drivers of participation, intensity of participation and the im-
pact of covariate change
The drivers of households’ participation decisions and their intensity of participation
are analysed using the Tobit model and DHM. Applying a log-likelihood test, we test
if the more general DHM can be reduced to a Tobit model. See, for example, Katchova
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et Miranda (2004). The calculated Lstatistic given by −2∗(DHMLL–TobitLL), which
equals 178, is greater than χ2(13) at the 5% critical value (27.69). This outcome shows
that the data do not support the more restricted Tobit model. Indeed, participation
in and the size of the contribution to elephant conservation cannot be examined using
one-step parameterization. In addition, these decisions are not explained by the
same covariates. The household heads’ activities influence the participation decision,
but not the intensity of participation. These variables are removed from the second
hurdle, as the restricted model provides a smaller Akaike Information Criterion value
compared with the value obtained from the model including all covariates.
Table 3.5: Coefficient estimates
Predictors
CLOSE-ENDED MODELS OPEN-ENDED – CORNER SOLUTION MODELS COMBINING DBDC and OE
DBDC
Overall sample
DBDC without
protesters Tobit model
Heteroscedastic double-hurdle estimates IRM 1 + effective
negative utility
IRM 2 + potential
negative utility1st hurdle 2nd hurdle Het.
Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std) Coef. (Std)
AGE -28.476***(8.938)
-24.444***
(8.537)
-22.153***
(7.482)
-0.008**
(0.003)
16.136
(15.671)
-20.297**
(8.669)
-13.373***
(4.786)
-15.855***
(5.325)
EDUCATION LEVEL 814.450*** 966.276*** 639.181*** 0.296*** 2,204.333*** -678.365*** 337.981*** 405.907***
(261.024) (251.769) (197.365) (0.092) (643.792) (247.065) (117.385) (130.888)
MONTHLY EXP 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.00784*** 6.00E-07 -0.005 0.022*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (8.00E-07) (0.011) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
INDIGENOUSNESS 1,678.716*** 1,684.426*** 881.164** 0.417** 2,802.750*** -1,002.568*** 580.169*** 629.073***
(536.186) (512.805) (347.409) (0.210) (666.533) (283.159) (209.415) (225.923)
SMALL FARMER 66.121 53.891 181.726 0.126 - - 53.789 84.957
(289.733) (281.481) (218.536) (0.103) (142.599) (152.844)
TRAD GOLD MINER 2,516.476*** 1,993.225*** 1,776.781** 0.660** - - 1,310.554** 1,385.737**
(774.178) (722.910) (686.945) (0.305) (595.34) (611.959)
HUNTER GATHERER 497.433 419.813 406.523 0.195 - - 209.180 224.920
(388.632) (373.119) (280.632) (0.141) (177.173) (191.492)
FMU OR FOREST AD 1,880.433 1,665.085*** 1,408.703*** 0.962*** - - 767.973** 849.319**
(665.502)** (639.716) (456.845) (0.304) (378.348) (381.100)
OTHER ADMIN 1,102.013 1,012.012** 868.687** 0.418** - - 472.233* 514.322*
(450.792) (440.923) (355.409) (0.177) (274.521) (291.193)
LAND HOLDINGS 469.118* 569.682** 589.087*** 0.177* -8,663.312 2,960.953* 350.103*** 360.581**
(264.529) (257.990) (211.915) (0.096) (7,696.3) (1,642.55) (133.111) (143.537)
HUM-ELEPH CONFLICT -43.790 -61.491 48.305 -0.013 -1,394.463 905.122** -131.466 0.664
(267.087) (257.591) (202.818) (0.098) (1,231.3) (452.839) (138.767) (139.280)
DISTANCE*DENSITY 2.152 0.942 -0.763 -0.001 7.398** 0.315 -0.342 -0.588
(2.509) (2.421) (1.911) (0.001) (2.890) (2.409) (1.153) (1.279)
INTERCEPT 334.306 391.343 336.557 0.298 -1,956.741 2,553.671*** 1,132.088*** 1,054.191***
(561.368) (535.129) (393.581) (0.196) (1,203.5) (582.020) (286.764) (301.033)
/lnsigma - - - - - - 7.518*** 7.580***
(0.133) (0.131)
SIGMA
_CONS 3,017.586 2,814.215 2,582.161 - - - 1,841.317 1,959.043
(198.43) (183.290) (314.105) (244.970) (257.955)
Number of obs 1,035 936 936 936 578 936 936
Left-censured 625 526 358 - - 27 104
Uncensored - - 578 - 578 739 662
Right-censored 238 238 0 - - 0 0
Interval Data 172 172 - - - 170 170
Wald chi2(13) 73.92 81.09 55.39 89.12 84.67
F( 13, 923) - - 6.2 - - -
Prob >chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 - - 0.0092 - - -
Log-likelihood -1,070.67 -1,012.31 -5,624.67 -5,535.857 -7,008.259 -6,439.55
Unconditional WTP 368.84 742.92 1,326.873 1,245.66 1,138.17
Conditional WTP 2,081.839
Legend: * p<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01
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Drivers of participation and intensity
The coefficients of the first hurdle in the fourth column of Table 3.5 indicate that
the likelihood of participating in the elephant conservation programme is negatively
influenced by age and positively influenced by education level; indigenousness;
specific activities, such as traditional gold mining or having a job in a forest
management unit, forest administration or other administration unit; and the land
holdings of the household heads.
Some of the covariates have conflicting effects on both the decision to participate
(first hurdle) and the intensity of participation (second hurdle). This also motivates
the choice of the double parameterization technique under the DHM. Indeed,
as a household head grows older, he is less likely to participate in the elephant
conservation programme, yet the age variable does not influence the intensity of
participation.
The higher the household head’s education level is, the more likely he is to participate
(and participate more intensively) in EFE conservation. The positive influence of
education suggests positive feedback between better education and environmental
awareness. This result suggests positive environmental benefits that arise from
addressing education improvement and facilitating access to higher education in
developing regions.
The effect of working in a forest management unit or a forest conservation NGO is
positive, which implies a virtuous circle of environmental preservation: increasing
the importance of forest protection also increases household awareness of biodiversity
protection.
The impact of changes in covariate drivers of participation and inten-
sity
The impact of a change in a covariate on the decision to participate is measured
using the marginal effects based on the first hurdle equation. See the first column of
Table 3.6. The conditional and unconditional average partial effects on the intensity
of participation are derived from the second hurdle; see the second and third columns,
respectively, of Table 3.6.
Indeed, a one-unit increase in the age of the household head will lead to an approxi-
mate decrease of 0.3 percentage points in the probability of programme participation.
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Table 3.6: Conditional and Unconditional Partial Effects (CFA)
Predictors Partial effecton prob(participation)
Conditional average
partial effect on E(WTP)
Unconditional average
partial effect on E(WTP)
AGE -0.003 4.648 -3.036
EDUCATION LEVEL 0.107 635.031 615.652
MONTHLY EXP 2.29E-07 -0.001 0.0004
INDIGENOUSNESS 0.151 807.42 813.368
SMALL FARMER 0.046 -1,431.913
TRAD GOLD MINER 0.239 -260.821
HUNTER GATHERER 0.071 0.491
FMU OR FOREST AD 0.348 93.277
OTHER ADMIN 0.152 487.291
LAND HOLDINGS 0.064 -2,495.752 143.959
HUM-ELEPH CONFLICT -0.005 -401.721 709.561
DISTANCE*DENSITY -4.14E-04 2.131 308.764
INVERSE MILLS RATIO 1.344
Given the unconditional average partial effect in the third column simultaneously
with the first two columns of Table 3.6, it appears that the overall effect of being one
year older is a decrease of CFA 3.04, as the negative effect on participation dominates
the positive conditional average partial effect.
When a household head reaches secondary school, the probability of participation
increases by 10.7 percentage points. This would lead to an average partial increase
in the expected payment for EFE conservation of CFA 635 (e0.968) given the par-
ticipation of the household head. The unconditional expected contribution to EFE
conservation increases by CFA 615.6 (e0.939) compared with a contribution of a
household head who has not enrolled in secondary school.
The likelihood of participating in such a programme would increase by 15.1, 23.9,
34.8 or 15.2 percentage points if the household head is a Baka pygmy, traditional
gold miner, forest administration or other administration worker, respectively.
Conditional on agreeing to participate, an indigenous household head would pay an
additional CFA 807.4 (e1.23). Not conditional on the agreement to participate, when
the household head is an indigenous Baka, WTP increases by CFA 813.4 (e1.24)
compared with the WTP of the rest of the population. Finally, household heads
would pay an additional CFA 2.13 (e0.003) for an additional elephant per hectare
in protected areas that are far from their crops.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of our paper is to determine local households WTP for forest elephant
conservation. Our methodological contribution consists of combining OE and closed-
ended CV methods. The above estimates provide four major outcomes with respect
to the hypotheses. The extinction of Loxodonta cyclotis may lead to a significant net
loss in household welfare. In fact, the predicted monthly WTP by household head is
CFA 1,138.17 (e1.74). This value is close to the results found by Bandara et Tisdell
(2005). Indeed, they found that respondents in general were willing to pay Rs. 110.17
(e1.65) per month for elephant conservation. The corresponding annual social value
that we found is CFA 889.7 million (e1.36 million), and the net present value over 10
years is CFA 8.67billion (e13.2 million). By comparison, despite the expected annual
budget of e1.5 million for the Tridom landscape biodiversity conservation project,
the completed budget was e0.905 million on average per year between 2007 and 2011
(Baastel, 2012; Undp, 2013)6. This conservation project concerns slightly more than
9,000 species, including flagship species, such as buffaloes, gorillas, chimpanzees,
bongos, otters, Nile crocodiles, giant hornbills, and giant pangolins in all Tridom
segments, including Congo. As a matter of comparison, the estimated social value
of improving conservation management for local people only, in the Cameroon
and Gabon part of the Tridom of one species, the forest elephant, represents
150% of the total biodiversity conservation effective cost. This suggest that the
programme is under-funded relative to the social benefits of biodiversity conservation.
The variable resulting from crossing distance and the protected area’s elephant
density does not influence the households’ participation decision (i.e the first
hurdle in the Table 3.5 parameterization, the likelihood of participation in EFE
conservation). However, household heads who live far from a protected area with
high elephant density are willing to pay larger amounts to avoid EFE extinction. The
positive sign of this variable tells us that local communities prefer elephants, albeit
they prefer them far from their crops. Referring to the second hypothesis, distance
as an indicator of scarcity is supported rather than the distance decay assumption.
The Tridom Regional Management Unit should promote elephant mobility corridors,
and these corridors should be located far from local and indigenous peoples’ areas of
6The total project disbursements amounted to $6.03 million between 2008 and 2012, including
$4.08 million between 2008 and 2011 and $1.95 million in 2012, yielding an annual disbursement of
$1.2 million. Given the exchange rate prevailing in 2014(reference date for the social value), this
amount is equivalent to e0.905 million.
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interest in forests.
As expected in the third hypothesis, indigenousness (i.e., being a Baka pygmy) has a
positive and significant influence on household preferences, while the distribution of
the mean WTP does not seem to be conditional on ethnicity among the remaining
Bantou ethnic groups (figure C.1.3 in appendix). Baka pygmies are likely to pay
larger amounts. This information is important, as elephant extinction would severely
threaten the spiritual enrichment, cultural identity and way of life of the Baka ethnic
minority group.
Furthermore, contrary to the fourth hypothesis, the estimates show that the existence
of human-elephant conflicts influences neither the household decision to participate
nor the intensity of its preferences. Additionally, households with more access to
land are more likely to contribute to the conservation programme. Theoretically,
households with more access to land are more likely to face human-elephant conflicts,
but the impact of such conflicts is likely to represent a smaller share of their
income. Overall, the second effect seems to dominate the first. The relevance of
these results is that local and indigenous people feel that their concerns about
offsetting human-elephant conflicts are adequately addressed by the hypothetical
scenario. This result makes the implementation of the proposed hypothetical
scenario very important, as it simultaneously (1) insures the preservation of a
public good (EFE) and its ecosystem services and (2) improves private benefits
by preventing human-elephant conflicts. Therefore, our study suggests that local
communities may be willing to engage in biodiversity preservation when the public
benefits of conservation are accompanied by private benefits and when it prevents
human-elephant conflicts.
EFE conservation decisions by policy makers should reflect a range of considerations,
such as socio-economic and cultural issues, zero-conflict-oriented elephant habitats
and optimal harvest rules with less poaching. However, our results cannot
disentangle the WTP for EFE conservation from the WTP associated with avoiding
human-elephant conflicts. Nevertheless, even if the policy does not succeed in
preventing human-elephant conflicts, local demand for elephant conservation is likely
to remain non-negligible. Indeed, considering the CFA 28,140 (e43) annual mean
damage incurred by 27.7% of the sampled households, the net benefit for the overall
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population in both the Tridom segments is CFA 3.73 billion (e5.68 millions). This
finding suggests that the present benefits of the 10-year hypothetical scenario would
be greater than the present value of crop damage caused by elephants. This result
suggests that, conditional on the implementation of the hypothetical scenario, EFE
conservation is socially beneficial. It may also indicate tolerance by farmers for the
presence of EFE in their agricultural fields. Indeed, the underlying assumption of
this result is that the 10-year hypothetical elephant conservation programme is
effective in terms of both reducing poaching and preventing human-elephant conflicts,
thus offsetting the damage faced by local people. A critical issue here is thus the
ability of policy makers to cope with objectives that may be partially conflicting.
Overlapping maps of social value with elephant density and human-elephant conflicts
represent one way to proceed.
Biodiversity conservation solutions generally involve optimizing trade-off between
land use activities and the natural habitat of fauna. Therefore, the issues of
where habitat is needed and how it should be managed are at the core of the
problem (O’Laughlin, 1998). The Tridom regional manager should proceed with
the integration of elephant and large mammals in the national and international
mobility corridor (see figure 3.4) in landscape land use planning. To enhance
zero-conflict-oriented elephant habitats, corridors should be consistently placed
relative to high elephant-concentration zones without crossing into zones with denser
human populations. In (Figure 3.5), we propose to set some glades in protected area
on the side of highly prevalent human-elephant conflict zones. We also propose an
additional segment of the international corridor starting from the Ivondo National
Park to Odzala Kokoua National Park via Mwagna National Park with some glades
favoring elephant mobility within the natural habitat and far from communities.
The Tridom manager should devote additional effort to reducing poaching. The
international standard for management of protected areas is "one eco-guard for 5,000
ha" (IUCN et UNESCO, 2006), while the ratio in the Tridom protected areas is
one agent per 6,000 ha to 9,000 ha7. There is a need for recruiting and training
18 additional guards on average per protected area for a total of 160 guards, and
providing them with convenient equipment and setting up surveillance infrastructure.
Considering the average monthly wages (including bonus) of e100, this additional
7approximation from Rapac (2014)
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Figure 3.4: WTP, Human-elephant conflicts and corridor projects.
Figure 3.5: Glades proposition and elephants’ mobility corridor modification propo-
sition
effort equates to e1.64 million over the next 10 years and represents 12.4% of the social
value. This additional staff would be employed to (1) create additional checkpoints in
intensive poaching areas, such as Bengbis, Somalomo, Mouloundou, Ngoyla Mintom,
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Ouésso and Ntam-Carrefour, and (2) create vehicle and foot transboundary patrols
to strengthen cross-border cooperation for anti-poaching surveillance. As introduced
in the hypothetical scenario, recruiting young people from the villages and involving
them in anti-poaching communication networks remain feasible actions for improving
EFE management, as they are low-cost actions relative to the social value of EFE
(4%). Our results can also serve as the basis for determining optimal harvest rules
for forest elephants while accounting for the social value of EFE in the social planner
maximization programme. This important issue requires future research.
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3.6 General Conclusion
What drives livelihoods strategies of rural households of developing regions? How do
those strategies influence land-use choices and the willingness of local population to
protect endangered species? The ambition of this thesis is to bring some elements of
response on those important research questions.
Our work uses a unique households survey that we conducted for several months,
interviewing more than 1000 households in the Dja-Odzala Minkebe Tri-national
Transboundary Conservation Landscape (Tridom-TCL).. The database encompasses
information on livelihoods strategies, income, and other socio-economic characteristics.
It also bring information on the households past deforestation behavior. Finally, it
has the unique advantage to present data from a choice experiment of protected
forest elephant. In other word, the survey we collected presents the rare advantage
to provide information on the links between livelihoods, deforestation and preference
for biodiversity conservation.
Our contribution is multiple. First, we make a downstream assessment of the choice
of livelihoods strategies and their impact on deforestation. Further, we analyze how
households are influenced in their perception of wildlife conservation. Our study
makes a strong emphasis on the need to analyze those choices taking into account
spatial interactions. Indeed, we show that spatial spillovers may represent a strong
part of the total effect of the investigated variables.
First, when it comes to livelihoods, we show that the autochthonous status has a
strong influence on the choice of forest-based specialized strategies. We also find
evidence that financial assets bring incentive for households to specialize in their
main activity. It means that when households are less credit constraint, they tend to
specialize, which can be good in terms of income and well-being, but this may be at
the expense of larger deforestation. We finally show that people using forest-products
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harvesting tend to deforest less, which let think that increasing the value of NTFP
can be a way to protect tropical forests.
Second, we find indeed that households specializing in forest-based activities are
the only ones not impacting deforestation. For all the other livelihoods strategies,
an increase in family income leads to higher deforestation. This is especially true
for strategies that include cash-cropping. Also, households with larger share of
auto-consumption tend tu deforest less. Thus, when considering development in its
whole process, increase of income, the rise of cash-cropping as an important activity,
and market integration, appears to be three potentiel factors of deforestation.
Third, rural households appear to have significant willingness to pay for the protec-
tion and conservation of forest elephant in their neighborhood. Yet, this WTP is
conditional on the fact that human-wildlife conflicts are avoided. However, in chapter
2, we find evidence that smaller damage costs are related to higher deforestation.
Therefore, when implementing some conservation policy with the view to reduce
conflicts between wildlife and rural households, it is very important to monitor
land-use change and to let those households participate to the project in order to
avoid a bump up in deforestation.
Overall, we find that livelihoods strategies are determined by autochtonous status,
financial assets (money transfer and access to loan), distance to market and larger
crop looses resulting from human-wildlife conflicts. Further, we show that livelihoods
strategies are important for deforestation. Therefore, the commitments to reducing
small-scale deforestation may be favored by a good consideration of factors that
drive households’ livelihoods strategies. We find out that spatial issues seems to
be important. Proximity among households yields spatial shift effects and spatial
spillover effects that are likely to amplify small-scale deforestation.
148
We also argue that, cross-cutting solutions towards a sustainable landscape con-
sidering these three side issues involve optimizing trade-off between households’
livelihoods strategies, forest and the natural habitats of fauna. Therefore, the issues
of community land security, of where natural habitat is needed and of how it should
be managed are at the core of the problem. For example, decision-makers should
proceed with the integration of large mammals mobility corridors far away from the
community settlements in order to enhance zero-conflict-oriented elephant habitats;
corridors should be consistently placed relatively to high elephant-concentration
zones without crossing into zones with denser human populations.
Many more work can be done using our household survey. For instance, risk
preferences of households have been collected. It would be of great interest to get a
better knowledge of the factors influencing rural households? behavior toward risk,
and how their risk preferences relate to the use of natural resources is a key research
question. The objective of such research is precisely to bring new evidence on (1) the
factors explaining the rural households? attitude towards risk, (2) the impact of this
attitude on land-use change and deforestation and on (3) preferences for multiple
ecosystem services.
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A.1 Figures
A.1.1 Study Area and Location of households surveyed
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A.1.2 Absolute Frequencies of Households Strategies
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A.1.3 Trade-offs in livelihoods, Deforestation and Per
Annum Yiels/ha
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A.2 Tables
A.2.1 Measurement of NTFP in the forest-based strategy
Scientific name
Vernacular
name
Measure
unit
Measure
Conversion
Season
(Months
per
year)
Conversion
12 pails
Ricinodendron Heudelotti Ndjassang 5-liter pail 1 pail=7,5kg 2 1 bag=90kg
Gnetum africanum Okok packs 1 pack=2,5kg 12
Irvingia Gabonensis Peke/Ndo’o 5-liter pail 1 pail =4kg 2 - 3 1 bag=48kg
Elaeis guinensis palm nuts 5-liter pail 1 =7,5kg 12 1 bag=90kg
Fungi Edible mushroom 5-liter pail 1 pail=2,5kg 5
Coula edulis Noisettes 5-liter pail 1 pail = 6kg 2 - 3 1 bag=72kg
Garcinia kola Bita Kola 5-liter pail 1 pail =7,5kg 3 1 bag=90kg
Cola acuminata Cola spp 5-liter pail 1 pail = 10kg 3 1 bag= 120kg
Monodora myristica Pepe/ndind 5-liter pail 1 pail = 5kg 3 1 bag=60kg
Pausinystalia johimbe,
garcinia klaineana,
Bark 5kg 5kg 12
Dacryodes edulis Safout 5-liter pail 1 pail = 7,5kg 3 1 bag=90kg
Calameae Rattan bundle KG
Piper nigrum sap 5-liter pail 1 pail = 6kg 12 1 bag=72kg
Raphia farinifera Raphia bundle
Diospyros nigra black fruits 5-liter pail 1 pail = 7,5kg 12 bag=90kg
Fagus Fuelwood bundle 1 bundle=25kg 12
Matango liter 12
Baillonella Toxisperme Adjap moabi liter
Morinda Ndong-Tondo 5-liter pail 1pail = 6kg 12 1 bag=72kg
Afrostyrax lepidophyllus. Nguimba sihé 5-liter pail 1 pail = 5kg 3 1 bag=60kg
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A.2.2 Descriptive statistique among various trade-off
PART I Specification (n=333) Diversification (n=654)Mean St Dv Min Max Mean St Dv Min Max
Country(1=Cameroon) 0.62 0.48 0 1 0.78 0.41 0 1
Age(continious) 47.81 15.42 16 90 48.77 14.18 17 90
Gender(1=Male) 0.75 0.43 0 1 0.78 0.42 0 1
Marit_single(1=Maried) 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.73 0.45 0 1
Hsize(continious) 5.27 3.65 0 20 7.12 4.04 0 19
CommunityGroup(1=yes) 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1
Seniority(years in the vlge) 24.08 21.22 0 86 28.5 20.3 0 90
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.08 0.26 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) 0.52 0.5 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.76 1.56 0 8.33 0.55 1.39 0 8.33
Distance(in km) 30.67 23 0 94.54 28.6 22.34 0 94.55
Distance to Market (in km) 64.84 58.23 0 224.12 65.47 59.65 0 224.01
Finance_asset(CFAF/month) 11.67 52.34 0 750 7.12 17.28 0 170.83
PART II Forest-based act. (n=266) Land-Conversion (n=721)Mean St Dv Min Max Mean St Dv Min Max
Country(1=Cameroon) 0.6 0.49 0 1 0.78 0.42 0 1
Age(continious) 46.61 15.57 16 90 49.12 14.19 17 90
Gender(1=Male) 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.78 0.42 0 1
Marit_single(1=Maried) 0.62 0.49 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1
Hsize(continious) 4.94 3.26 0 18 7.07 4.11 0 20
CommunityGroup(1=yes) 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.3 0.46 0 1
Seniority(years in the vlge) 22.76 20.71 0 86 28.58 20.5 0 90
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) 0.49 0.5 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.83 1.63 0 8.33 0.54 1.37 0 8.33
Distance(in km) 28.89 22.02 0 94.4 29.45 22.79 0 94.55
Distance to Market (in km) 63.55 57.73 0 224.12 69.13 61.14 0 224.01
Finance_asset(CFAF/month) 9.4 49.91 0 750 8.39 24.97 0 425
PART III Strategies + Forest (n=666) Other strategies (n=321)Mean St Dv Min Max Mean St Dv Min Max
Country(1=Cameroon) 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.81 0.39 0 1
Age(continious) 48.01 14.86 16 90 49.34 14.07 17 81
Gender(1=Male) 0.76 0.43 0 1 0.78 0.41 0 1
Marit_single(1=Maried) 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.79 0.4 0 1
Hsize(continious) 6.13 3.85 0 19 7.25 4.23 0 20
CommunityGroup(1=yes) 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Seniority(years in the vlge) 26.2 20.75 0 90 28.7 20.57 0 80
Autochbaka(1=pygmy) 0.06 0.25 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1
Schoolcycl(1=2ndschool) 0.53 0.5 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Landconflict.(1=yes) 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
Human_Wildlife(Damage cost) 0.71 1.55 0 8.33 0.43 1.19 0 6.67
Distance(in km) 27.85 21.45 0 94.49 32.3 24.52 1.52 94.55
Distance to Market (in km) 58.65 56.81 0 224 68.14 59.36 0 224.12
Finance_asset(CFAF/month) 7.4 34.07 0 750 11.27 32.3 0 425
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A.2.3 Standard Probit VS SAR-Probit
Standard Probit Model SAR-Probit Model
Estimates
Marginal
effect
Estimates
Direct
effects
Indirect
effects
Total
effects
Country -0.4210 *** -0.1418 -0.2464 ** -0.0813 -0.0465 -0.1278
Age 0.0025 0.0008 0.0038 0.0013 0.0008 0.002
Gender 0.0180 0.0061 0.0258 0.0085 0.0046 0.0132
Marit_single 0.0604 0.0203 0.0640 0.0212 0.0133 0.0345
Hsize -0.0596 *** -0.0201 -0.0584 *** -0.0193 -0.0116 -0.0309
Pygmee_employt 0.0098 0.0033 0.0095 0.0032 0.002 0.0051
CommunityGroup -0.1440 -0.0485 -0.1531 -0.0507 -0.0306 -0.0813
Seniority -0.0058 ** -0.0019 -0.0056 ** -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0029
Autochbaka 0.4056 ** 0.1366 0.4552 ** 0.1508 0.0915 0.2423
Schoolcycl -0.1045 -0.0352 -0.0857 -0.0283 -0.0164 -0.0447
Landconflict. 0.0733 0.0247 0.0631 0.021 0.0128 0.0338
Human_Wildlife 0.0476 0.0160 0.0497 * 0.0165 0.0098 0.0263
Distance 0.0032 * 0.0011 0.0023 0.0008 0.0004 0.0012
Distmarket 0.0016 ** 0.0005 0.0010 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005
Finance_asset 0.0030 * 0.0010 0.0036 ** 0.0012 0.0007 0.0019
ρ - 0.3620 **
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A.2.4 results’ accuracy with the weight matrix type
Specialisation vs Diversification
Gabgrah 3NN 5NN 10NN Distance
ρ 0.0501 0.2322*** 0.2974*** 0.3682*** 0.3616**
AIC Criterion 1200.15 1194.85 1194.12 1190.58 1199.26
logLik.sarprobit -584.07 -581.42 -581.06 -579.29 -583.63
A.2.5 Variance Inflation Factor
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Age 1.56 0.64
Country 1.51 0.66
Seniority 1.40 0.71
Marit_single 1.30 0.77
Distmarket 1.26 0.79
Schoolcycl 1.22 0.82
Pygmee_employment 1.13 0.88
Autochbaka 1.13 0.89
Distance to nearest Protected Area 1.12 0.89
Hsize 1.09 0.92
Gender 1.09 0.92
CommunityGroup 1.08 0.93
Landconflict 1.05 0.95
Financial Asset 1.05 0.96
Human_Wildlife ConflictDamage cost 1.04 0.96
Mean VIF 1.20
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A.2.6 Correlation matrix among quantitative variables
v2 v7 v8 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15
Age v2 1,00
Hsize v7 0,03 1,00
Pygmee_employment v8 -0,12 0,18 1,00
Human-Wildlife ConflictDamage cost v11 -0,03 -0,07 -0,03 1,00
Seniority v12 0,47 0,10 -0,01 -0,02 1,00
Distance to nearest Protected Area v13 0,10 -0,02 -0,03 0,00 -0,03 1,00
Distmarket v14 -0,13 -0,04 0,09 0,01 -0,02 -0,29 1,00
Financial Asset v15 0,03 0,03 0,00 -0,02 -0,10 0,06 -0,09 1,00
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B.1 Figures
B.1.1 Diagnostic Plots for Regression Analysis
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B.1.2 Livelohoods Strategies and Per Annum Yiels/ha
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B.2 Tables
B.2.1 Full Spatial Autoregressive Model
SPATIAL AUTOREGRESSIVE FULL MODEL
Coef. SD z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -4,1857 2,2804 -1,8355 0,0664 *
AGENT’S DECISION PARAMETERS
Income of households adopting diversification livelihoods’ strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_ACF_households 0,0101 0,0013 7,905 0 ***
FamilyIncome_AF_households 0,0024 0,0012 2,0399 0,0414 **
FamilyIncome_CF_CashcropForest 0,0109 0,0021 5,326 0 ***
Income of households adopting specialisation livelihoods’ strategies (FCFA103)
FamilyIncome_F_Forestbased -0,0002 0,0004 -0,4287 0,6682
FamilyIncome_A_Agriculture 0,0026 0,0012 2,2638 0,0236 **
FamilyIncome_C_Cashcrop 0,0178 0,0021 8,3798 0 ***
Other decision variables
Autocons_Share (% of total value) -2,2003 0,7772 -2,8308 0,0046 ***
Capital & factor constraints
Finance_asset (FCFA103) 0,0089 0,0043 2,0988 0,0358 **
Landconflict Dummy (1=yes) 0,33 0,3763 0,8771 0,3804
Human_Wildlife (FCFA103) -0,2033 0,0978 -2,0785 0,0377 **
HOUSEHOLDS CHARACTERISTICS
Gender (1=Male) 0,6824 0,3508 1,9451 0,0518 *
Age (continuous. in years) 0,0208 0,0121 1,7115 0,087 *
Ages_thr -0,0014 0,0006 -2,2333 0,0255 **
Marit_single (1=Maried) 0,42 0,3485 1,2051 0,2282
Hsize (continuous) 0,1582 0,0376 4,2037 0 ***
Schoolcycl_2 (1=secondary school) -0,1703 0,314 -0,5423 0,5876
Autochbaka (1=Pygmy. 0=Bantou) -0,5574 0,6761 -0,8244 0,4097
Seniority (continuous. in years) 0,0391 0,008 4,859 0 ***
CommunityGroup Dummy (1=yes) 0,524 0,3235 1,62 0,1052
Pygmy_employement (coutinuous) 0,1518 0,0504 3,0118 0,0026 ***
Labourduration -0,0483 0,0319 -1,5107 0,1309
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Country (1=Cameroun. 0=Gabon) 0,8112 0,4593 1,7661 0,0774 *
Distmarket Km -0,0037 0,0029 -1,2952 0,1952
Distance to P. Area (Km) 0,0006 0,0066 0,0903 0,928
Biophysical factor
Rainfall 0,0014 0,0014 0,9974 0,3186
Rho (ρ) 0.1947 **
Log Likelihood -2849
ML residual σ 4.350
AIC Criterion 5754
Wald Statistic 4.8115 **
Observations 986
residual autocorrelation 0.0728
*, ** and *** = significance level at 1% 5% 10% respectively
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C.1 Figures
C.1.1 Bid structure
171
C.1.2 Aggregate WTP for elephant conservation of the
local Tridom population (106* CFA).
172
C.1.3 Mean willingness to pay per subdivision and ethnic
distribution(CFA).
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C.2 Tables
C.2.1 Ethnic Representativeness (without protesters)
Freq. Perc. Cum.
Baka 47 5.02 5.02
Fang-Beti-Bulu 369 39.42 44.44
Bangando 34 3.63 48.08
Kota et Bakota 64 6.84 54.91
Mahongwe 40 4.27 59.19
Kounabembe 20 2.14 61.32
Mvong Mvong et Mpumpong 22 2.35 63.68
Djem 65 6.94 70.62
Badjoue 66 7.05 77.67
Migration, Yambassa, Bamoun... 59 6.30 83.97
Nzime 61 6.52 90.49
Other ethnic groups (20) 89 9.51 100.0
Total 936 100.00
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C.2.2 Spatial Representativeness
Division Subdivision Freq. Perc. Cum.
CAMEROONIAN SEGMENT
South
DJA
ET
LOBO
Sangmelima 47 5.02 5.02
Meyomessala 53 5.66 10.68
Bengbis 22 2.35 13.03
Meyomessi 27 2.88 15.91
Djoum 48 5.13 21.04
Oveng 33 3.53 24.57
Mintom 17 1.82 26.39
MVILLA Mvangan 20 2.14 28.53
Est
HAUT
NYONG
Ngoyla 58 6.2 34.73
Lomie 52 5.56 40.29
Messamena 32 3.42 43.71
Somalomo 43 4.59 48.3
Dja 32 3.42 51.72
Messock 43 4.59 56.31
BOUMBA
ET
NGOKO
Mouloundou 46 4.91 61.22
Yokadouma 50 5.34 66.56
Salapoumbe 25 2.67 69.23
GABONESE SEGMENT
Ogooue
Ivondo
IVINDO
Makokou 29 3.1 72.33
Batouala 20 2.14 74.47
Mvadhi 14 1.5 75.97
Makebe Bakouaka 20 2.14 78.11
LA ZADIE Mekambo 42 4.49 82.6
LA LOPE Booue 30 3.21 85.81
LA MVOUNG Ovan 19 2.03 87.84
Woleu
Ntem
HAUT-NTEM Minvoul 35 3.74 91.58
WOLEU Oyem 56 5.98 97.56
OKANO Mitzic 23 2.46 100
Total 936 100
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